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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with the response of the criminal law and the 
criminal justice system in Scotland to children who commit serious 
crimes. It has two major themes. First, it seeks to reconcile the 
paradox inherent in the status of “child-criminal” between an 
individual who is, simultaneously, in need of protection (as a child) 
and the perpetrator of a seriously wrongful, sometimes violent act (as 
a criminal). Its second theme, and its main premise, is that the 
tendency which the criminal law has sometimes shown to respond 
only to one of the opposing elements of “child” and “criminal” can 
be rectified by a thorough investigation the child’s understanding of 
his/her criminal act in its context, the results of which ar e then used 
to inform decision-making about the child and, in particular, 
sentencing. The thesis is particularly concerned, therefore, with the 
child’s criminal capacity and his/her criminal responsibility.
The thesis re-examines the mental element in crime where the 
accused is a child, organising it into three discrete but overlapping 
constituents. First, there is a threshold (conceived as three 
preconditions of imderstanding, empathy and knowledge of 
criminality) which the court must establish that the child-accused 
crosses before s/he can be tried at all. Thereafter, assuming the 
threshold is met, the court must investigate his/her criminal capacity 
by hearing evidence on the six capacity points set out in thesis 
(volitional element, distinction between right and wrong, causation.
understanding of criminality and criminal consequences, rationality 
and mens rea-related capacity points). Finally, mens rea is defined, 
in the most pared down fashion possible, so that it is principally a 
factual issue for the Crown to prove. All elements of understanding 
which are sometimes subsumed within it are stripped out and become 
part of criminal capacity.
The thesis then examines the approach taken by Scots criminal law, 
both historically and in modem times, to the child’s criminal capacity 
and also the role of welfare and the children’s hearings system in 
relation to the child’s criminal responsibility.
It concludes first that it is possible to reconcile the welfare and justice 
approaches to childien who offend so that a more holistic picture of 
the child-criminal emerges and, second, with a plea for the fair, equal 
and compassionate treatment of child-accused, to be facilitated by 
changes to existing criminal procedure necessary to accommodate the 
reconceived mental element.
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Introduction
This thesis is concerned with the response of the criminal justice 
system in Scotland to children who offend -  and, particularly to those 
who commit serious crimes. The first difficulty for any legal system 
is that such children are a contradiction in terms. On the one hand, as 
children, they belong to a group which is generally regarded as 
vulnerable and in need of protection; on the other, as the peipetrators 
of seriously wrongful, sometimes violent, acts, they are perceived as 
deserving of punishment and condemnation. The thesis examines 
how the law might best respond, so as to accommodate this paradox, 
by rendering fair and compassionate judgments to child-accused 
which do not lose sight of the public interest in justice being seen to 
be done, and the need to retain public confidence in the criminal 
justice system.
The term “child” is used consciously throughout. Terminology is 
important in this area. Chapter 1 will demonstrate that legal systems’ 
current responses to “child”-“offenders” sometimes overemphasise 
one element of their dual status as children and as criminals. In the 
wake of the Bulger case, which is discussed in detail in chapter 1, 
this is often the “criminal” element. Using the teim “child” even for 
adolescents, as opposed to the, perhaps more correct and less 
pejorative, term “young person” serves to focus attention on the 
youth of those with whom the criminal process is engaging so that 
this does not disappear from consideration in the decision-making
process. Also, this tenninology is technically correct, in a legal 
sense, because Scots law, as a whole, categorises all young people as 
“children,” this being the only class which it recognises.^ The 
category is defined rigidly, by reference to chronological age and, 
technically, includes those aged seventeen and under.^ hi fact, in the 
criminal justice context, it is largely limited to those aged fifteen and 
under. No child aged under sixteen can be prosecuted except on the 
instructions of the Lord Advocate^ and, for the purposes of a first 
referral to the children’s hearings system, “child” is defined as “a 
child who has not attained the age of sixteen years.”  ^ It might have 
been appropriate to deal only with children aged between eight and 
fifteen, because the age of criminal responsibility is currently eight^ 
and no child aged seven or under is capable, in law, of committing a 
criminal offence.^ Nonetheless, because much of the discussion in
‘ English law draws a technical distinction between “childien” - those aged 13 and 
under -  and young persons - those aged 14 and over. See, for example, Children 
and Young Persons Act 1969, s 70(1)
 ^ “[A] person attaints] majority on attaining the age of eighteen”: Age of Majority 
(Scotland) Act 1969, s 1(1). The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child states that “[f]or the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every 
human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the 
child, majority is attained earlier.”
 ^ Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 [hereinafter “CP(S)A 1995”], s 42(1), 
Even then, prosecution is only possible in the Sheriff and High Courts.
 ^Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 93(2)(b). In certain limited circumstances, those 
aged sixteen and over may also referred to a children’s hearing and, hence, brought 
into the category of child. See the discussion of the age of criminal responsibility 
in chapter 5.
 ^CP(S)A 1995, s 41 
See Men-in v S 1987 SET 193
the ensuing chapters is of relevance to children of any age, the term 
“child” is used to connote an individual aged fifteen or under/
In a legal sense, then, a child can be defined by reference solely to 
his/her chronological age. One of the main arguments to be made in 
the thesis is, however, that fairness to a child-accused requires an 
individualised assessment of his/her understandings and 
competences, as these relate to the criminal offence with which s/he 
is charged. Equally, defining “child” by reference only to age fails to 
engage with the richness and complexity of the actual lives lived by 
children. It may allow the law to deteimine a class of people which 
requires to be treated in a particular way,^ but it ignores completely 
the characteristics, interests and traits which children display or 
which ai'e sometimes imputed to them. A definition based on age 
alone is too one-dimensional. Accordingly, the thesis draws on 
sociology, developmental psychology and philosophy to enhance and 
enlarge the picture of the child which it presents. The aim is to 
present children in a roimded, realistic and holistic fashion which 
does not lose sight of the fact that their immaturity may mean that 
they still require a degree of protection, particularly when charged 
with a criminal offence.
One of the primary contentions of the thesis is that dealing 
thoroughly and appropriately with the child-offender’s criminal
’ Cases involving young people aged sixteen, seventeen and eighteen may, 
however, occasionally be cited.
® I.e. by prosecution on the instr uctions o f the Lord Advocate or by referral to a 
children’s hearing
capacity will, in and of itself, assist in reconciling the statuses of 
“child” and “criminal”. If the court acknowledges that the child may 
not fully understand his/her act in context, this is an accommodation 
of the “child”. If it is proved that the child committed the criminal 
offence with a degree of understanding and the court imposes a 
disposal (or sentence) on that basis, this is an acknowledgment of the 
public interest. The thesis examines, in some detail, how best to 
achieve this.
Investigating the child’s criminal capacity then, should promote 
fairness to child-accused within the criminal justice system. This is 
its main perceived benefit but, alongside that, there is also the 
possibility that it will reduce the stigna which sometimes attaches to 
children convicted of serious crimes. It is accepted that one of the 
purposes of a criminal conviction is to stigmatise, in the sense that it 
denounces the criminal in the eyes of his/her own community for 
having breached its norms. If the child is not condemned out of hand 
by the criminal justice system, but rather treated by it in accordance 
with his/her actual understandings of his/her action, this type of 
stigna should be reduced. There is also the possibility that, if the 
criminal justice system’s decision-making is more rational, tlirough 
being based on capacity, this will sei*ve to diminish the extreme 
social stigma to which child-criminals are sometimes subject. The 
Bulger case, which will be discussed in chapter I, is a good example 
of such stigma.
Chapter Summary
Overall then, this thesis is concerned with accommodating the 
paradox inherent in the “child-criminal” in the legal context, and with 
identifying mechanisms by which to ensure the fair, compassionate 
and equal treatment of child-accused within the criminal justice 
system. Each chapter contributes to this enterprise as follows;
Chapter 1 seeks to place the issues to be discussed in the thesis as a 
whole in a broad social context, hi order to do so, it examines four 
cases of children who committed serious crimes, drawn fi'om 
Scotland and England and spanning different time periods. Overall, 
it aims to demonstrate the widely varying treatment accorded to 
broadly similar acts in order to substantiate the argument that there is 
a need to provide better mechanisms for responding to children who 
offend. It also engages directly with the tension at the heart of the 
status of “child” between autonomy and dependence and, to a lesser 
extent, between good and evil, examining sociological and 
philosophical literature which illustiates the difficulty.
Chapter 2 presents a formulation of the mental element in crime 
which both allows and requires a court to take full account of the 
child-accused’s actual understandings of the nature, purpose and 
content of the trial itself, and of the crime in context. The assessment 
of the child’s understanding is key to the whole enteiprise of 
reconciling the status of child with the status of criminal so it is
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important to provide some explanation of the characteristics of this 
assessment. This is the role played by this chapter.
Chapter 3 considers the existing position in Scots law in relation to 
the child’s criminal capacity both historically, in the form of the 
approach taken by the institutional writers, and in contemporary 
times, considering, as far as possible, the impact of the Human Rights 
Act 1998. The chapter demonstrates that, while, in the past, issues 
which would come under the broad heading of capacity were relevant 
to the decisions taken by the criminal justice system, currently, there 
is a tendency to ignore these.
Chapter 4 deals expressly with the question of the tension inlierent in 
children generally between autonomy and dependence and with the 
even greater paradox in the status of “child-criminal,” arising from 
the commission of a criminal offence. It considers particularly the 
approach of the Scottish children’s hearings system to children who 
offend. Overall, it seeks to reconeile the apparently conflicting 
“welfare” and “justice” approaches to juvenile justice so that the 
model which emerges can better serve children who offend by 
responding simultaneously and appropriately to their opposing, but 
omnipresent characteristics.
Finally, chapter 5 seeks to draw the arguments made in the rest of the 
thesis together and to deal with a number of procedural issues which 
the discussion in other chapters has raised.
11
Chapter 1 
The Social Context And The Bulger Case
Introduction
This thesis is concerned primarily with the child’s criminal 
responsibility within the Scottish legal system. It is necessary, 
however, to set this issue in a broader social context in order to 
support the thesis’s prior claim that there is, cunently, a lack of 
coherence in the criminal law’s, and indeed in the societal, approach 
to child-criminals which results in outcomes which are not 
necessarily “fair” to all young children who offend. Some stigmatise 
the children concerned excessively whilst others respond so strongly 
to the child’s needs that punishment and deterrence are relegated to 
secondary status.
This chapter examines four separate cases of serious crimes 
committed by children. Its purpose is to demonstrate the widely 
varying treatment accorded to broadly similar acts. The argument is 
that a more coherent treatment of the issue of criminal capacity -  
and, indeed, the mental element in general - where the perpetrator is a 
child, will lead to better-reasoned judgments on the important 
question of the child’s actual responsibility for his/her actions.
The criminal law has a tendency to cast issues related to 
understanding in black and white terms. In relation to children, the
12
approach of the cloli incapax presumption/ for example, could be 
summed up in the question -  which clearly sought a “yes or no” 
answer - “did the child-accused know the difference between right 
and wrong?” Capacity (meaning the child’s understanding of the 
crime and its context) could, however be viewed as a more relative 
concept, taking into account that the child may understand certain 
issues well (for example, that injuring another person is wrong) but 
have a limited understanding of other matters (for instance the way in 
which an initial (wrongful) act causes other events, both physically 
and legally)/ The advantage of formally investigating the child’s 
understandings of the crime in context in every case is that a child- 
accused who is deemed to be of limited capacity as a result of that 
investigation, is not “getting away with” the crime if a “lenient” 
sentence is imposed. Rather, s/he is bearing the (low) level of 
responsibility which the criminal process has imputed to him/her. In 
this way, the level of stigmatisation to which s/he is subject may be
’ This questioned tlie child’s understanding of the wrongfulness of the act and may 
have been used historically in Scots law. (This is implicit in the case of Alexander 
Livingston 1749 Maclaurin No 55). It certainly applied tliroughout English legal 
history until its abolition by s 34 of the Crime and Disorder Aet 1998. It will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 3.
 ^For example, the case of HMA v S (umeported) (5* October 1999) (High Court) 
(examination of the facts)
(see http://www.scotcourts.aov.uk/Qpinions/845A 99.html)) which, as will be 
discussed in chapter 3, did deal effectively with issue o f capacity It drew a 
distinction between the child-accused’s (reasonable) understanding of the 
dangerousness of setting light to petrol and his (lack of) understanding of the 
volatility of pehol vapour. The court ultimately determined that he lacked the 
mens rea o f recklessness.
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diminished/ By the same token, placing the child’s understanding in 
issue in every case will also ensure that no child-accused is 
automatically processed, sentenced and stigmatised as if s/he were, in 
fact, an adult, and consequently able to take full, adult responsibility 
for the crime/
The four cases examined here are presented as examples of varying 
perceptions of child-criminals and the impact which this has on their 
processing by the criminal justice system/ The cases to be 
considered are:
(1) the murder, in Liverpool in 1993, of two-year old James Bulger 
by Robert Thompson and Jon Venables both then aged ten, for which 
they were both sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure. 
Both boys spent a little over seven years in custody/
 ^Michael King has argued that, because crimes are primarily legal events, the way 
in which the law codes them has implications for the approach taken to tlrem in 
other areas. This argument draws on the theory of autopoesis or law as “a self- 
reproducing function system” which operates alongside other such systems such as 
politics and economics. To allow an otherwise meaningless event to be seen as an 
event within society, one o f these systems attaches meaning to it (eg law calls the 
infliction of injuries serious assault) and the legal communications on Üiis are 
interpreted by the oüier systems in their own terrr .^ See Michael King “The James 
Bulger Murder Trial; Moral Dilemmas and Social Solutions” 1995 International 
Journal o f Children’s Rights 3, 167 particularly at pp 168 - 171 
This is, o f course, a possible, if  unlikely outcome, if a very mature child was 
assessed to be of “full” capacity. The way in which the Scottish legal system has, 
on occasion, treated children identically to adults in relation to responsibility will 
be discussed in more detail in chapter 3.
 ^ In fact, the likelihood is that investigating the child-accused’s understandings of 
the crime in context on an individualised basis will also lead to widely divergent 
outcomes, but at least such diversity will then stem from a reasoned legal decision 
rather than social and historical happenstance.
 ^For an explanation of the reasons for this period being selected, see Re Thompson 
(Tariff Recommendation); Re Venables (Tariff Recommendation) [2001] 1 Cr App 
R25
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(2) the 1973 Scottish case of Mary Cairns^ who pled guilty, at the age 
of nine, (eight at the time of the crime) to assault to the severe injury, 
for stabbing a ten-year old neighbour in the back with a bread knife, 
puncturing a lung. On appeal her original sentence of eighteen 
months’ detention^ was quashed and a sentence of three years’ 
probation with a condition of attendance as an outpatient at the 
Department of Child and Family Psychiatry at the Royal Hospital for 
Sick Children in Glasgow was substituted;
(3) the manslaughter in 1992 of an eighteen-month old baby by his 
eleven-year old babysitter, who is identified in the case report only as 
Nicola G.  ^ She was sentenced to five years’ detention under s 53(2) 
of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and this was upheld on 
appeal; and
(4) the 1861 case of James Bradley and Peter Henry Barratt^®, both 
aged eight, who killed a two-year old boy. They were convicted of 
manslaughter and sentenced to one month in prison and, at the expiry 
of that period, five years in a Reformatory.
The purpose of considering these cases is to demonstrate the 
divergent responses to events which are all, at base violent attacks 
committed against children by other children. It could, of course, be
 ^ 1950- 1980 (1973) SCCR (Supp) 44
® Under the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937, s 57(2) as amended 
by the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 
 ^(1993) 14 Cr App R (S) 349
See Gitta Sereny “A Child Murdered By Children” Independent on Sunday 23 
April 1995, p 8 [hereinafter “B and B”]. Also Patiick Wilson Children Who Kill 
(London: Michael Joseph, 1973) pp 78 - 81
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argued that four such disparate cases are almost bound to have 
widely differing outcomes as a consequence of the clear differences 
in historical, social and legal conditions, applying to each of them. 
This argument can be countered on two fronts. First there is the 
narrow point, which is nonetheless significant, that Nicola G and 
Robert Thompson and Jon Venables committed their crimes only two 
years apart, in the same legal jurisdiction (England and Wales) yet, as 
will he discussed more fully, the treatment of the two cases by the 
legal system and in the social context was very different in terms of 
punishment, stigma, vilification and the overarching image of the 
child-offender projected.
The second, more general, counter-argument is that each case 
discussed here stands as an example of a particular approach to 
serious crime committed by children, of which other examples can be 
cited. The Bulger case, for instance, as a demonstration of the 
vilification of the child-criminal, was foreshadowed by the 1968 case 
of Mary Bell who, at the age of eleven killed two four-year old boys 
in separate incidents in Newcastle. In Gitta Sereny’s comparison of 
the two offences she notes, “[t]he honor people felt was the same, as 
was the fear of the unknown. The words which were used -  
“monster”, “evil fiend” -  were the same in 1968 to describe Mary, as 
in 1993 to describe Jonathan and Robert.”  ^^  The Scottish case of
" Gitta Sereny The Case o f  Mary Bell: A Poiirait o f A Child Who Murdered 
(London: Pimlico, 1972 (1994)) [hereinafter Re//]at p 279
16
Richard K e ith ta p s  a similar vein. In 1990, K, then aged eleven 
killed three-year old Jamie Campbell by hitting his head with stones 
and then drowning him in a bum. He was convicted of culpable 
homicide and sentenced to detention without limit of time. As soon 
as K turned sixteen, the order protecting his anonymity fell and the 
Daily Record identified him under the headline “This Boy is Evil to 
the Core .. HeTl Kill Again” including in its coverage photographs 
of him, taken at the time of the crime.
The English case of R v Stoner and Gibbens/^ on the other hand, 
demonstrates elements of the more child-friendly, welfarist approach 
discernible in HMA v Cairns and, indeed, in R v Nicola G and B and 
B’s case. Phillip Stoner, aged fourteen and Barry Gibbens, aged 
fifteen pleaded guilty to robbery. They had entered a bank wearing 
dark glasses and armed with modelling knives and had obtained 
£1,000 from the cashier, after telling customers to “get down”. Both 
boys had learning difficulties and the Court of Appeal went to 
considerable lengths to ensure that the sentences imposed^^ took 
account of their inherent vulnerability and allowed them to be 
detained in an institution where the proper support would be
’^ K vH M A 1993 SLT 237 
Daily Record 13 May 1996 p 4
See also “Centre Hits Out Over Allegations” Dunoon Obsei-ver and Argyllshire 
Standard 18 July 2003, p 3 reporting the outcry surrounding Keith’s employment 
for three weeks to paint the outside of a building at an outdoor centre for children. 
(1995) 16C rA ppR (S) 992
30 months’ detention under s 53(2) of the Children and Young Person Act 1933 
reduced, on appeal, to 2 years such detention for Stoner and 16 months for Gibbens
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available to them, hi Gibbens’ case this required a departure from an 
established principle of sentencing law.
The four cases chosen then are representative, in different ways, of 
two prevailing attitudes to children who commit serious crimes -  out- 
of-hand condemnation and welfarist paternalism. It is necessary now 
to turn to the cases themselves.
Case ri): Murder of James Bulger bv Robert Thompson and Jon 
Venables. 1993
Although the Bulger case is not the earliest chronologically, it is 
appropriate to consider it first because of the tendency which it has 
shown to circumscribe much of the popular debate on children and 
crime. Indeed it would, arguably, be difficult to contextualise the 
topic of children who commit serious crimes at all, without alluding 
to it. It has become the primary point of reference, socially and 
culturally, for discussions relating to youth crime -  and, indeed, in 
some instances, crime generally - across a wide range of individual 
topics and different legal jurisdictions. The popular perception of the 
two child-criminals has been overwhelmingly negative leading to 
their widespread condemnation and stigmatisation.
This discussion will, first of all, consider the press coverage in an 
attempt to demonstrate the case’s continuing social impact, and to 
identify mechanisms by which Robert Thompson and Jon Venables
18
were particularly vilified. The section will include a discussion of 
possible reasons for its notoriety.
Although it is often presented as such, the Bulger case was neither an 
aben*ation'^ nor a part of a growing trend towards greater and greater 
violence perpetrated by young children.’  ^ It is, in fact, an example, 
albeit an extreme example, of one particular type of response to 
children who commit serious crimes and it is considered here on that 
basis. It is necessary firstly to set down the facts. On Friday 12^^^  
February 1993, Robert Thompson and Jon Venables persuaded James 
Bulger to leave his mother in the Strand Shopping Centre, Bootle, 
Merseyside. They then took him on a walk in excess of two miles in 
length -  a considerable distance for such a small child -  in the course 
of which they were seen by a number of witnesses, some of whom 
challenged the older children about their relationship with James 
Bulger and the puipose of their journey. There is some evidence that 
the two-year old was assaulted during the walk.^^ At the murder 
scene, beside a railway line, T and V^° repeatedly attacked the
See, for example, Wilson supra, note 10, which records over fifty cases of 
children who killed between 1743 and 1973.
King supra, note 3, at p 186
Alison Young Imagining Crime: Textual Outlaws and Criminal Conversations 
(London: Sage, 1996) at p. 130
It is difficult to find an appropriate way of identifying Robert Thompson and Jon 
Venables. The other child-offenders whose cases are considered in this chapter are 
called by tlieir first names. Almost all of the vast discussion about the Bulger case 
however uses surnames, thereby creating an impression of a lack or loss of 
childishness as a result of their crime. Using their initials (“T” and “V”) is in 
keeping with the legal commentary and provides some recognition of their status as 
children, in that children are commonly identified in this way, in case reporting, to 
preserve their anonymity. Blake Morrison also uses T and V 'm As If (London: 
Granta Books, 1997).
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smaller child with bricks and a metal bar, and tlirew a tin of enamel 
paint over him, before finally placing his body on the railway line 
where it was severed by a train. It has been suggested that they used 
batteries to penetrate him anally and his body was discovered with 
the penis exposed and the foreskin drawn back.^^
The crime, then, was very serious both in terms of the violence 
employed and the fact that the victim was a very young child. It is 
not, in fact, unduly sensationalist to characterise it as heinous. Yet 
the way in which it co-opted the news agenda both at the time and 
subsequently is exceptional and provides an explanation for its 
hegemonic grip on the popular debate in this area. Even a snapshot 
of press commentary serves to confirm this.
In 1993, all national papers, tabloid and broadsheet, provided detailed 
coverage of the discovery of James Bulger’s body, the aiTest and 
detention of T and V and of all stages of the trial. Indeed, Bob 
Franklin and Julian Petley have described newspaper coverage of the 
trial itself as “nothing less than phenomenal”^^  supporting their view 
by reference to the actual number of column inches which the story 
generated.^^
These details are considered in some detail by Gitta Sereny. She argues that they 
may suggest that Robert Thompson and Jon Venables had themselves suffered 
sexual abuse and that this provides an explanation for the crime. Sereny, Mary 
Bell, supra, note 11, especially at pp 327 -  330
Bob Fraiiklin and Julian Petley “Killing the Age of Innocence; Newspaper 
Reporting of the Death o f James Bulger” in Jane Pilcher and Stephen Wagg (eds) 
Thatcher’s Children? Politics, Childhood and Society in the 1980s and 1990s 
(London: Palmer Press, 1996) 134, atp 136
By contrast, in relation to academic commentary, one widter noted that, at the 
time, “the criminological silence over the Jamie [sic] Bulger killing constituted, for
20
The tabloid press, in particular, revelled in the juxtaposition of 
innocence (James Bulger’s) and evil (T and Vs’) presenting these as 
absolutes. The Daily Mail, for example, filled nine pages in the 
immediate aftermath of the trial under the overall headline of “The 
Imiocent and the Evil” noting, inter alia, that “[t]he two hoys who 
murdered James Bulger are evil freaks of human nature who were 
fixated on killing and causing disaster”, a comment attributed to 
detectives who inteiTiewed the boys.^ "^  This followed its article, at 
the time of the murder, by William Golding, author of Lord o f the 
Flies, which sought an answer to the question “What Turns Children 
Into Savages?”^^  It is well known that the Daily Star headlined its 
report on the verdict in the trial “How Do You Feel Now You Little 
Bastards?”^^  and The Sun published a coupon which could be filled 
in and sent to the Home Secretary in these tenns: “Dear Home 
Secretary, I agree with Ralph and Denise Bulger that the boys who 
killed their son James should stay in jail for LIFE”.^  ^ A space was 
left for the sender to fill in his/her name and address.
[him], professional negligence.” Tony Jefferson “[Review of] James W 
Messerschmidt Masculinities and Crime: Critique and Reconceptualization o f  
Theory (Maryland:Rowman and Littlefield, 1993)” in 1995 Brit J Crirninol 35(1), 
149, atp 150 
Daily Mail November 25 1993, p 42 
Daily Mail, Febraary 17 1993, p 6
Daily Star, November 25, 1993. These words were shouted at T and V by James 
Bulger’s uncle, Ray Matthews, after the jury’s verdict was announced.
Quoted in Deena Haydon and Phil Scraton “‘Condemn a Little More, Understand 
a Little Less’: The Political Context and Rights Implications of the Domestic and 
European Rulings in the Venables-Thompson Case” 2000 Journal o f Law and 
Society 27(3), 416 at p 433
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The broadsheet press also devoted large tracts of its content to the 
case although, in general, its comment was more measured. In the 
immediate aftermath of the murder, The Times, in a leader, was 
critical of the Home Secretary for rushing out ill-considered 
measures on secure schools for persistent offenders aged between 12 
and 15 because “[o]ne horrific child murder does not make a crime- 
wave”.^  ^ The Independent on Sunday sought to scotch the view that 
the murder was indicative of a deeper malaise at the heart of British 
society.^^ In a feature on the trial, the Guardian challenged the 
pervasive ascription of “evil” to T and V noting that “[t]he word evil 
signals the end of a conversation before it has started”.^  ^ Overall, the 
Daily Mail published 571 articles relating to the case between 
February 1993 and April 2003, the Guardian 535, the Independent 
590 and the (Sunday) Observer \3>lX The case also provoked the 
publication of four books.^^
In the more recent past and, hence, at a greater distance from the 
offence itself, even a cursory examination of press coverage suggests
“Panic Over Crime” The Times March 3 1993, p 15
“Murder in Liverpool: The Fear, The Shame, The Guilt” Independent on Sunday 
21 February 1993
The Guardian 26 November 1993, p 5. This view is shared by the criminologist 
Alison Young. See Young supra, note 19, atp 111
Figures derived tiom a Lexis-Nexis search using the key word “James Bulger”. 
See http://web.lexis-nexis.com/professional/?ut^ 1008147365270. Other papers
have also made frequent reference to the case although their online records do not 
extend as far back as 1993. The Sun, for example, published 160 articles in the 
tlnree-year period from Febmary 2000 to February 2003.
David James Smith The Sleep o f Reasoft: The James Bulger Case (London: 
Arrow, 1994); Mark Thomas Every Mother’s Nightmare: The Killing o f James 
Bulger (London: Pan Books, 1993); David Jackson Destroying the Baby in 
Themselves: Why Did the Two Boys Kill James Bulger? (Nottingham: Muslrroom 
Publications, 1995); and Monison supra, note 20
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that the case is still accorded influence in some debates in the 
criminal justice field to an extent which its significance as a legal 
precedent would not support. For example, in an article in the 
Birmingham Post in 2002 on CCTV, it is the Bulger case^  ^ which is 
cited as having “given CCTV a common sense appeal”.^ "^  At this 
point, the case was nine years old, albeit that closed circuit television 
had played a prominent role in it. On the tenth amiiversaiy of the 
murder in February 2003, a number of newspapers canied lengthy 
articles revisiting the crime and the circumstances attending it.^ ^
A similar tendency, of more relevance to the issue of children’s 
criminal capacity, can be seen in reporting of proposed increases in 
the age of criminal responsibility in various jurisdictions. In 
Scotland, for example, in January 2002, the Scottish Law 
Commission recommended, in effect, that the age of criminal 
responsibility be raised from eight to t w e l v e . I n  opposing this 
proposal, the (Edinburgh) Evening News,^^ Scotland on Sunday^^ and 
the Sunday Times^^ all noted that such a change would have 
precluded prosecution of T and V. The Times Educational
Together with the arrest of the Brixton Nail Bomber.
34 «ÇQTY Is Not A Cure-All” Birmingham Post 21 August 2002
“The Bulger Legacy” Daily Mail 12 February 2003; “Bulger Killers’ Shame is 
Ours’ and Not Theirs’” Sunday Express 16 Febmary 2003; “James Bulger: 10 
Years On” Liverpool Daily Echo 13 February 2003
Although the Commission reftised to frame its recommendation in those terms. 
Scottish Law Commission Report on Age o f Criminal Responsibility (Scot Law 
Com No 185) (Edinburgh: TSO, 2002) paras 3.17 and 3. 20 
“Anger Over Plans to Take Under-12s Out of Courts” Evening News 14 January
2002, p 2
“Care Before Punisliment” Scotland on Sunday 13 January 2002, p 16 
“Criminal Age Limit May Rise” Sunday Times 13 January 2002
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Supplement quoted the Conservative politician Sir James Douglas- 
Hamilton commenting that “[sjuch a commission would have 
allowed the (James) Bulger killers to get off scot-free by asserting 
that they were too young to be held responsible for their actions. 
This is a concept that all fair-minded people across the United 
Kingdom will find deeply o f f e n s i v e . S i m i l a r l y ,  the Belfast 
Telegraph's report of a proposed increase in the age of criminal 
responsibility from seven to twelve in the Republic of Ireland is 
introduced with the statement that the new legislation would not 
permit the prosecution of the killers of James Bulger.'^^
These comments are interesting firstly because they illustrate the 
extent to which the Bulger case has hijacked the debate on children 
and crime. In an issue as multi-faceted as the age of criminal 
responsibility, it is at least surprising that a single case, in another 
jurisdiction, should be presented as a major stumbling-block to 
reform. Indeed, one of the reasons given by the Scottish Law 
Commission in support of the proposed increase was that it was 
implicit in the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment in the
“Children ‘Escape’ Criminal Charges’ Times Educational Suppletnent 18 
January 2002, p 6
“Republic Draws Up New Laws for Children” Belfast Telegraph June 27 2001. 
On the same point, the Hong Kong Law Commission cites the case in support of 
the argument that there is a need, in Hong Kong, to retain the power to prosecute 
children aged between 7 and 14 in “exceptional cases”: The Law Reform 
Commission of Hong Kong Report on the Age o f Criminal Responsibility, (May 
2000) para 3.24. See http://www.inlb.eov.hk/hkreibrm/repoi-ts/raue-e.doc
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Bulger case"^  ^ that the criminal process was not a suitable mechanism 
for dealing with young children/^
Secondly, these comments suggest the absence of the concept of 
capacity from this debate, at least in the popular sphere. There is an 
underlying assumption that, because T and V committed a heinous 
act, they must have had understanding of that act and its 
consequences. This assimiption is then imputed to all children of 
their age so that none should be given the benefit of an age of 
criminal responsibility preventing his/her prosecution. These 
arguments are weak in a similar way to those used to underpin the 
construction of the Bulger case as an “adult crime”, w h i c h  draw on 
the view that, because the nature and outcome of the criminal act are 
particularly serious, only an adult, or an individual unacceptably 
displaying adult characteristics, could have committed them. Where 
a child commits such a crime, this view is brought to bear and s/he is 
consequently characterised popularly as if s/he had, by virtue of the 
act, actually made the transition to adulthood. This then leads to 
demands that s/he should be processed and sentenced as an adult."^ ^
T V UK; V V UK (2000) 30 EHRR 121
Scot Law Com (No 185), supra, note 36, para 3.15
44 Perhaps unsurprisingly, this is the constmction placed on it by James Bulger’s 
mother, Denise. See, for example, “Howard Loses Court Fight Over Jamie’s 
Killers” Daily Express 3 May 1996, p 12. Certain American states also utilise this 
view in their provision of “waiver” procedures whereby juveniles who commit 
particularly serious crimes can be hied and convicted as adults. See Philip H Witt 
“Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court: The Case of HFI” 2003 Psychology, Public 
Policy and Law 9, 361
For example, the 21,281 coupons sent to the home secretary by readers of The 
Sun calling for life to mean life for T and V and the more than 270,000 signatures
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Michael King frames the issue as a question; “do children exist in a 
special state, qualitatively different from adulthood, in which they 
merit unique status and treatment? Or ar [sic] they small adults, as 
capable of evil as any grown-up and who deseiwe to be treated with 
equal severity?”'^ '’
In fact, it was clear from early in the investigation into James 
Bulger’s death that the perpetrators were children."^  ^ It was a childish 
crime. For example, sweets were found at the scene."^  ^ Neither child 
had made any effort to remove the physical evidence of the crime 
from his clothes."^  ^ So peiwasive, however, was the attempt to 
construct them as non-children, or as adult in relation to the crime, by 
the constant reiteration of its honific nature and of the absolute 
childisliness of the victim that it seems difficult -  even distastehd -  
to recall that they were, in fact, exactly the same age, ten, as Holly 
Wells and Jessica Chapman who were murdered in Soham, 
Cambridgeshire in August 2002.^^ The two cases illustrate the way
collected on a petition by Denise and Ralph Bulger making the same request. “Call 
of The Wild” The Guardian 26 July 1994, p T18
King, supra, note 3, at p 175
Smith, supra, note 32, at p 77; Sereny, Mary Bell, supra, note 11, at p 316
Smith, supra, note 32, at p 65
Six days after the crime, Robert Thompson’s shoes were still blood-spattered; 
Jon Venables’ anorak had blue paint on the sleeve. Smith, supra, note 32, at pp 79 
- 8 0
The construction of the two girls in Soham places the cluonological age of ten 
firmly in the middle of childhood. See for example, “ Holly Wells and Jessica 
Chapman pose for an angelic photo . . . .  The ten-year-olds ... look a picture of 
childhood innocence” “Riddle of Holly and Jessica: An Hour and A Half Later 
They Vanished . . .” The Sun August 8 2002. And “Did Fiend Lure Them?” The 
Sun 6 August 2002 which describes the children’s pastimes which the girls 
enjoyed. By contrast, the characterisation of T and V as, for example, “spawn of 
Satan” (“The Lost Children” Sunday Times 11 November 2001) detracts from their 
status as young children.
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in which the media constmction of age can give the appearance of 
increasing or decreasing it.^ ^
It is the contention of this thesis that better mechanisms for dealing 
with the criminal capacity of children would go some way towards 
alleviating this tendency to condemn out of hand children who 
commit serious crimes in that it would provide a rational basis for 
explaining both their actions and the legal system’s response to those 
actions. It could also allow the ascription of responsibility to 
children to become less absolute so that very young offenders are 
encouraged to take responsibility for their actions, but only to the 
extent that their actual understanding of their crimes allows.
Explaining the Notorietv
It is clear, then, that the Bulger case is treated, by the press, as 
seminal in the popular debate on children and crime. Yet, certainly 
by comparison with its actual legal importance, the case almost 
caiicatures that debate, so overblown are most of the aspects which 
have assumed cultural significance. In legal temis, the case was 
noteworthy for the English courtsclarification of the meaning and
See Amie Solberg “Negotiating Childhood: Changing Constructions of Age for 
Norwegian Children” in Allison James and Alan Prout (eds) Constructing and 
Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study o f  
Childhood (London: RoutledgeFaimer, 1997) [hereinafter Constructing and 
Reconstructing] 126 at pp 133 -  138 for a discussion of the construction of “social” 
age -  how old the child seems by comparison with his/her chronological age.
^ R v  Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Venables; R v same ex 
parte Thompson [1997] 3 All ER 97
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purpose of the sentence of detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure^^ and 
for the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment^"  ^on the trial and 
sentencing of children charged with such crimes generally. Both of 
these points emerged a number of years after the murder. 
Nonetheless, it is the crime itself, with all its macabre symbolism, 
which continues to be spotlighted. Clearly, this has had a 
stigmatising effect on Robert Thompson and Jon Venables, both of 
whom have had to be provided with new identities and also with the 
protection of a lifelong injunction banning the publication of any 
infomiation which might seiwe to identify them.^^ This thesis 
advocates more effective mechanisms for dealing with the child’s 
criminal capacity in an attempt to deflect some of this stigmatisation 
in ftiture cases. It is, however, important, first of all, to attempt to 
understand the reasons for such notoriety attaching in the first place. 
Colin Hay, building on the work carried out by Stanley Cohen in the 
1970s and 80s,^  ^has attempted to explain the reaction provoked by 
the Bulger case in terms of a moral panic. In considering the role of 
the media, he notes that
“[tjhis event is phenomenally newsworthy due to its
somewhat exceptional nature; the ease with which
This is the mandatory sentence for anyone aged under 18 convicted of murder in 
England and Wales: Powers o f Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s 90. See 
Claire McDiarinid “Children Who Murder: What is Her Majesty’s Pleasure?” 
(2000) Q'hn L R 547 for a full discussion of the nature, effect and puipose of the 
sentence.
T V UK; V V UK (2000) 30 EHRR 121
Venables and Another v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Others [2001] 1 All 
ER 90S
Stanley Cohen Folk Devils and Moral Panic: The Creation o f the Mods and 
Rockers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980)
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conceptions of innocence and deviancy can be imputed; 
the resonance that such a ‘story’ is likely to find with 
the experiences of parents and guardians responsible for 
childcare (predominantly women); and above all the 
striking nature of the video footage (presented as 
‘ evidence’).
(a) Visibilitv
Perhaps the single most significant reason for the imparalleled level 
of media coverage which the case generated is the final one cited by 
Hay: the grainy video footage from the shopping centre security 
cameras depicting a small child hand-in-hand with a taller one, 
following another taller child. This image, played and printed 
repeatedly in 1993, has since become an icon for the case: tlii'ee of 
the four books written about the murder use it as their cover 
photograph, for example.^^
Commentators have suggested that its importance lies in the fact that 
it allows viewers to feel present at the commencement of the crime 
itself, where that is taken to be the abduction of James Bulger. 
According to Alison Young “[t]he replaying of the image promises 
the possibility of inteiwention; trauma is experienced due to the gap 
between the image’s promise and the substance of its referent.”^^  
The same view is expressed more simply by Blake Morrison who 
states, in relation to the constant playing and replaying of the video:
Colin Hay “Mobilization Tlirough Inteipellation: James Bulger, Juvenile Crime 
and the Construction of a Moral Panic” (1995) 4 Social and Legal Studies\91, at pp 
205 -  206. Italics in original 
Mark Thomas’, David Jackson’s and David James Smith’s (all three books cited 
supra, note 32)
Young, supra, note 19, at p 132
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“[f]orward and back, forward and back, as if we watched it often 
enough the picture might change and James be there again, safe by 
Denise’s [his mother’s] side.”*^  ^ While stopping short of imputing 
action in the Bulger case itself to viewers, Colin Hay still sees the 
shopping centre video as important in the mobilization of the moral 
panic generated by the case. In his view, newspaper readers and 
television viewers inteipellate themselves into a similar situation and 
this causes them to act in particulai" ways in their own real lives -  by, 
for example, exercising greater vigilance in relation to their own 
children in places such as shopping centres.
The degree of impetus to action generated hy the video, and the stills 
taken from it, is, of course, debatable. Also, it is important to bear in 
mind that the crime itself - the actual murder - was committed 
secretly during the hours of d a r k n e s s . T o  that extent then, the 
sensation generated by the video of being a witness to the crime is 
false. Indeed, given the indistinct nature of the images, even after 
enhancement by the RAF’s Joint Air Reconnaissance and 
Intelligence C e n t r e , i t  is remarkable that they provided any 
assistance whatsoever in identifying T and V. It is undeniable, 
however, that the video’s existence increased the news value of the 
story by making the crime more visible. Crime is often committed 
secretly and reported later, at a time when the only images available
Morrison supra, note 20, at p 46 
Hay, supra, note 57, at pp 208 - 209 
See Young, supra, note 19, at p 137 
Thomas supra, note 32, at p 91
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are, in themselves, if not mundane, then certainly unsuspicious. The 
flowers and teddy bears left outside Dunblane Primary School 
following the killing of sixteen children and their teacher in 1996 or 
Fred and Rosemary West’s house in Cromwell Street, Gloucester in 
1994 with the garden under excavation, after their involvement in at 
least ten murders of young women had been discovered, did not 
convey any sense of a crime in progress albeit that they were, at those 
times, instantly recognisable as symbols for those events. Equally, 
those images have not, arguably, attained the iconic status of the 
Bulger shopping centre video.^ "^
The visibility attaching to the Bulger case was further enhanced after 
the trial when the judge took the decision to allow the identities of 
Robert Thompson and Jon Venables to be revealed. This led to the 
proliferation of two particular photographs, one of each boy dressed 
in school uniform. The photographs’ sanctioned publication added, 
in itself, to the notoriety of the Bulger case given that the identity of 
most child offenders is protected, regardless of the crime 
c o m m i t t e d . I n  a sense these photographs served to complete the 
shopping centre footage by providing its indistinct figures with faces 
and names.
Other images do, of course attain iconic status, though, again, without the sense 
of participating in a crime in progress. The broken fuselage of the plane which 
crashed in Lockerbie is an example.
Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 49 for England and Wales; Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 47 for Scotland
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In themselves, the photogiaphs were unremarkable yet they 
constituted a visual focus for the print and televisual media, allowing 
the adoption of variations on a “face of evil” theme,^^ particularly 
when juxtaposed with photographs of James Bulger. As Alison 
Young notes:
“the media encouraged the spectator to project 
emotions, attitudes and thoughts into those eyes turned 
towards the lens. Certain emotions ai'e ‘preferred’ to lie 
behind the child’s eyes. Into the eyes of James Bulger 
is read innocence; into the eyes of Venables and 
Thompson is read ‘a moral void’, ‘guileful naivety’, 
‘streetwise defiance’ {Mail on Sunday, 13 February 
1994)”.^ ^
Overall, the media utilised the immediacy of the shopping centre 
images to project an initial sense of, if not participation, at least 
involvement. It then created a focus for the strong negative 
sentiment already generated, tluough the school photographs with the 
written “hints” to the readers as to the base nature of the emotion 
lying behind the in fact impassive face of Robert Thompson and the 
in fact smiling face of Jon Venables.*’^  The visibility of the crime, 
through these iconic images, clearly contributed to its supreme, and 
supremely exploited, news value.
For example “Our Children’s Minds Feast on Garbage” The Herald 30 
November 1993 p 15 
Young, supra, note 19, at p 135
See, for example, “James Bulger: The Death of Innocence” Independent on 
Sunday 28 November 1993, p 23 commenting on France-Soir's headline, earlier 
that week “These Two Monsters Could Have Been Your Children”, which, it is 
implied, appeared above the photos.
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(b) imiocence and evil
The other aspect of the crime which, arguably, greatly increased its
newsworthiness has already been cited -  the juxtaposition of
innocence with evil and the opportunity which this presented for a
collective focus on the nature of childhood itself and an outbreak of
national hand-wringing on the state of a country which could produce
two young children capable of such ba r ba r i t y . James  Bulger’s
essential childishness and his portrayal as the smiling face of
innocence provided a foil for such an analysis.^®
The difficulty of reconciling these two images of childhood -  the evil
and the innocent - and the interest which, paradoxically, attaches to
the attempt to do just that, is well expressed by an Australian
journalist, Martyn Harris who wrote, in 1994, in an article sparked by
the petition organised by James Bulger’s parents:
“[t]he paradox of the Bulger case and the reason why it 
was such a destabilising event are that both images of 
childhood are present, each conflicting with the other.
For the parents to feel the rage they need to feel, 
Thompson and Venables, little boys of 10 who play 
with Boglins and watch Thunderbirds, must be 
monsters beyond redemption or pity. And yet, for the 
full force of our vengeful rage to be felt, it is also 
necessary for James, ..., to become another impossible 
abstraction: the avatar of innocence”.^ ^
For example, “Daring to Agree About Our Moral Sickness” Independent 19 
February 1993, p 19; “The Nation Searches its Soul” Independent 20 Febmary 
1993, p 12; “An Indictment o f Fractured Britain” Independent 27 November 1993 
™ “Liverpool Weeps as James Bulger is Buried” Independent 2 March 1993, p 1; 
“Muider Shook World” The Sun October 27 2000
“Are Children Getting Worse?” Sydney Morning Herald 10 September 1994, p 
8A. The style of tliis article suggests that the Australian press and public were as 
familiar with the facts and implications of the Bulger case as their British 
counterparts. This is a further indication of the unprecedented level o f reporting 
which the case attracted.
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The extremes of imiocence and evil identified here constitute a focal 
point for the strong emotions which the case evokes, again affirming 
the story’s unusually high newsworthiness. Nonetheless, Harris 
recognises the truism that, despite their acts, T and V are not wholly 
or only evil, in the same way that James Bulger did not live his life as 
a cipher for the concept of childhood innocence. The realities of all 
tliree lives were much more complex than that representation 
suggests. While imiocence juxtaposed with evil clearly equates with 
newsworthiness then, it fails to present a rounded picture of the 
protagonists to whom it relates and adds nothing to the search for a 
measiue of the child’s understanding of his/her crime.
Nonetheless, murderers of children are, without exception, always 
categorised as especially worthy of condemnation even by 
comparison with those who kill adults. The mere mention of the 
Moors Murderers, Myra Hindley and Ian Brady, for example, still 
evokes a strong emotional response in many quarters despite 
Hindley’s death and the fact that over thirty years have elapsed since 
their crimes. This is particularly tme in cases where, initially, the 
child-victim is reported by the media only as “missing” thereby 
allowing the shared aspiration that s/he will be found a l i v e . T h i s
It is submitted that it is in these circumstances that Colin Hay’s theory of the 
mobilization of a mass sentiment tluough individual readers and viewers o f the 
event “interpellating” themselves into the situation is most perceptible. Hay, 
supra, note 57
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phenomenon was apparent in the cases of both Sarah Payne/^ 
abducted from a field adjoining her grandparents’ home in Sussex in 
July 2000 and subsequently murdered, and of Holly Wells and 
Jessica Chapman7"^
It is predictable and understandable that Myra Hindley, Ian Brady, 
Roy Whiting^^ and Ian Huntley^^ would be characterised as evil both 
by the media and in popular discourse. Because of the nature of their 
crime, Robert Thompson and Jon Venables fall into the same 
category. But it is their extreme youth at the time of the crime which 
gives the ascription of evil a particular interest. The issue which 
seems to have become buried in the plethora of reporting is that, 
while their age renders the crime more shocking, it should, in fact, 
render the peipetrators less, and not more blameworthy.
The notion that youth mitigates offending has been recognised, 
certainly by the English courts, in many cases. In R v Cosgrove/^ 
for example, the offender, who was aged seventeen, was sentenced, 
at first instance, to ten years’ detention under s 53(2) of the Children 
and Young Persons Act 1933 for causing grievous bodily harm with 
intent. He had collided with his victim in a shopping centre and, 
incensed, had then stolen a large Icnife from a store and attacked the 
victim with it causing serious damage to his arm. On appeal, the
“Drivers Sought in Police Hunt for Girl” Guardian, 3 July 2000, p 4 
“Beckham to Help Search for Missing Girls” The Times, 6 August 2002, p 3 
Convicted of Sarah Payne’s murder 
Convicted of the Soham murders 
(1995) 16C rA ppR (S) 76
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sentence was reduced to seven years, primarily because of the 
appellant’s youth. Again, in R v Kamali/^ the sixteen-year old 
defendant was convicted of the same offence as Cosgrove, this time 
for entering a shop and stabbing two boys aged fourteen and fifteen 
respectively for no apparent reason. On appeal his sentence of five 
years’ detention was reduced to four years, partly because of his 
youth.^^
By contrast, in the popular discourse surrounding the Bulger case, the 
extreme youth of the offenders^^ seems to be used against them. The 
impression given is twofold -  first that they were “old enough to 
know better” -  a sentiment often voiced in disciplining children of all 
ages. To that is added the idea that Thompson and Venables’ 
behaviour was so far removed from the traditionally “childish” that 
it, in fact, constituted an affront to adult understandings of the term. 
It was therefore perceived to merit the most severe censure.®^
It is possible to draw a parallel here with one strand of feminist 
criminology usually known as double vilification.^^ This area of 
work embodies the view that women who commit serious crimes are
78(1993) 1 4 C r A p p R ( S ) 2
7^  See also Attorney-General’s Reference (No 24 of 1991) (Mark Anthony 
Wollcocks) (1992) 13 Cr App R (S) 724, at p 728 and R v James Frazer (1992) 13 
Cr App R (S) 705 at p 706
8*^ Both boys were over the age of criminal responsibility by only a few months. 
Indeed, Michael King has conunented on the fact that a mere quirk of the British 
political process made their prosecution possible at all. King, supra, note 3, at p 
183
8* See, for example, “Author Defends Book After Criticism by Bulger Family” The 
Scotsman 6 Febraaiy 1997, p 3
87 For a full discussion o f the application of this theory to child offenders see Claire 
McDiarmid “A Feminist Perspective on Children Who Kill” 1996 Res Publica 2, 3
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effectively judged and punished twice: once for the crime itself and 
then again for the extent to which they have failed to confoiin to the 
female gender role which requires women to be “docile, soft, passive, 
nurturant, vulnerable, weak, narcissistic, childlike, incompetent, 
masochistic and domestic, made for child care, home care and 
husband care.”^^  This can be seen in the nature of the criticism 
directed against women who commit heinous crimes, by comparison 
with their male counterparts.
An article in the Daily Mail following Rosemary West’s conviction
for murder illustrates this point. The writer asks:
“[s]o how do we react to Rosemary West? With horror. 
Disbelief. A profound sense that the acts were against 
natur e. More than merely against nature, that they were 
against the nature of women.
Rosemary West is not only a woman, she is also a 
mother.
... So Rosemary West has shocked our deepest instincts, 
broken the most important taboos.” '^^
It is the contention of a number of feminist criminologists that views
such as these are carried into the criminal process so that women who
offend violently and seriously are treated more harshly. As Susan
Edwards explains:
“ ... women, whether as suspects, defendants or 
offenders, are dealt with in accordance with the degree 
to which their behaviour deviates from what is expected
8^  Catherine A MacKinnon “Feminism, Mai-xism, Method and the State: An 
Agenda for Theory” 1982 Signs 7, 515 at p 530
8“* “A Woman, A Protector, A Mother .......  And A Monster” Daily Mail 23
November 1995 p 11
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of them in their appropriate gender role. Thus, the 
expression “women on trial” denotes a lived experience 
which is double-edged, encompassing not only a 
consideration of the female defendant’s passage tlrrough 
the criminal justice system, but also the way in which 
mens rea and culpability, though issues based on fact -  
are nevertheless (like mitigation and sentencing 
process) influenced by the degree to which the female 
defendant in question is a good wife, mother and 
homemaker, honest, decent and moral, and above all, 
feminine.”^^
This theme has been explored, at some length, by a number of 
commentators in both the academic and the popular spheres.^'’ It 
clearly has resonance in the Bulger case where the attribution of 
“evil” to Robert Thompson and Jon Venables placed them outside the 
realm of “nonnal” childhood and cleared the way for them to be 
treated pailicularly severely in the criminal process and in relation to 
the “tariff’ or minimum period to be served in custody to satisfy the 
demands of retribution, set by the Home Secretary.^^
8^  Susan S M Edwards Women on Trial: A Study o f the Female Suspect, Defendant, 
and Offender in the Criminal Law and Criminal Justice System (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984) at p 1
8^  See, for example, Helena Kennedy Eve Was Framed: Women and British Justice 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1992); Ann Jones Women Who Kill (London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1991); Ann Lloyd Doubly Deviant, Doubly Damned: Society’s 
Treatment o f Violent Women (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1995); Ilene Nagel 
“Sex Differences in the Processing of Criminal Defendants” in Allison Morris (ed) 
Women and Crime: Papers Presented to the Cropwood Round-Table Conference, 
December 1980 (Cambridge: Cropwood Conference Series No. 13, 1981) pp 104 - 
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87 This was set at fifteen years by the then Home Secretary, Michael Howard. This 
period was one-and-a-half times the existing lifespan of T and V at the time of the 
crime and paid minimal heed to the principle of English sentencing law in relation 
to juveniles that “[I]t is important .. .that the court should not impose a sentence 
which, the far end of it, would to young men [sic] like [the defendants] seem 
completely out of sight.” R v Storey and Others (1984) 6 Cr App R (S) 104, at p 
107.
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(c) Childhood Itself in a State of Flux
As has been shown, the media coverage of the events suiTounding the 
death of James Bulger was unprecedentedly wide-ranging, going 
beyond simple reporting of the facts to stir up a moral panic around 
youth crime general ly .The  case occurred at a time when there was 
a growing perception that children were maturing (too) early^  ^ and 
the murder, regarded in some quarters as proof that young children 
were committing ‘adult’ acts, became a springboard from which to 
expound on the nature of modem childhood itself.^^ The case 
“initiated a reconsideration of the social constmction of ten-year-olds 
as ‘demons’ rather than ‘innocents’”^^  and, more generally, placed 
the whole concept of childhood under a spotlight. It is important to 
note, as will be discussed in more detail subsequently, that, in the 
early 1990s, childhood was beginning to be revealed, within 
sociological discourse, as an institution in a state of flux, which 
translated into an unease about children generally. For some then, 
two young children demonstrating an ability to kill served to 
concretise an inchoate feeling of alarm about the capabilities of the 
“modem” child. Robert Thompson and Jon Venables became the 
whipping boys for their generation.
88 See for example “Present Imperfect: Myths of National Decline Disguise the 
Real Political Agenda” The Times 24 Febmary 1993 p 17 
8^  Haydon and Scraton, supra, note27, at p 443 
See, for example, “Brainwashed by Hysteria” The Times 24 Febmary 1993, p 16 
Haydon and Scraton, supra, note 27, at p 447
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Overall, then, it is clear that, for a number of reasons including the 
immediacy of the images available to illustrate the coverage and the 
age and projected “evil” of the perpetrators especially in 
juxtaposition with the age and “innocence” of the victim, the Bulger 
case was newsworthy in the extreme. This was exploited by the 
media, propelling the case to the forefront of the news agenda in such 
a way that it has retained this position since, as a point of reference in 
relation to current issues relating to children and crime to an extent 
which is disproportionate to its actual legal importance. The legal 
coding of the event as “murder”^^  and of T and V as “responsible” 
(through the application of the doli incapax presumption) served only 
to fuel this condemnatory approach. It is submitted that better 
mechanisms for dealing with the child’s criminal capacity might 
seiwe to defuse this highly charged response for the future so that, 
where the child’s understanding of his/her act, its consequences and 
its social context is limited, this is reflected in the degree of 
responsibility which s/he is required to take for it. In this way, the 
scope for a child, whose youth mitigates the offence, to be perceived 
popularly as “getting away with it” may be diminished.
That, then, concludes this lengthy examination of the societal 
response to the murder of James Bulger, its length being justified by 
the extreme nature of the response itself. It is appropriate now to turn 
to the second of the three cases selected for discussion.
See King, supra, note 3, especially at pp 170, 174 and 175 -  6
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Case (2): Stabbing of Moras Brown by Mary Cairns, 1973^^
It is important to note at the outset that this case differs from the 
other three cases considered here in two key respects. First, Mary 
Cairns did not kill the victim and secondly, she pled guilty to the 
assault charges so that there was no trial. The facts were as follows: 
in September 1973, Mary Cairns, along with her sister Linda aged 
fourteen, pled guilty at Glasgow sheriff court to assaulting ten-year 
old Morag Brown, a neighbour who lived in the same tenement in 
Glasgow, by pulling her hair and kicking her. Mary, who was eight 
at the time of the offence on June 1973, also pled guilty, on her 
own, to stabbing Morag on the body with a knife, severely injuring 
her. There was evidence that, prior to the assault, Mary and Morag 
had been friends but that an argument had ensued after Mary called 
Morag “the dunce of the class” and Morag responded by hitting her. 
Later, on the common stair where all three girls lived, Linda Caims 
began to fight with Morag who was fighting back when Mary 
appeared with the knife and stabbed her. The wound partially 
punctured one of her lungs but, despite its potential seriousness, 
sealed itself, allowing Morag to make a full recovery.
Cairns v HMA, supra, note 7
“18 Months for Girl o f Nine who Stabbed Friend” Glasgow Herald 19 
September 1973 p 3
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This case took place not long after the children’s hearings system, 
set up by the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, had been brought 
into operation in Scotland in 1971. The commission of an offence by 
a child is a ground for refeiTal to a children’s hearing^^ but where the 
offence is particularly serious the reporter to the children’s panel and 
the procurator fiscal have concurrent jurisdiction. In Mary Caims’ 
case, the decision was taken to refer the matter to the sheriff court 
and the sheriff sentenced Mary to eighteen months’ detention under s 
57(2) of the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937. For 
present puiposes the interesting aspect of the case is the nature of the 
public outcry which it generated.
On hearing the sentence, Mary Caims was earned from the dock, by 
a policeman, screaming for her mother. Indeed, the Glasgow Herald 
reported that “[h]er screams and calls could be heard for minutes 
after she left the court”.^  ^ This point was given prominence in the 
reporting of the case, even being picked up by the national press. 
There was criticism of the sheriff for failing to impose a sentence 
which would have allowed Mary Caims to stay at home subject to 
supervision by the social work department. The appeal was 
conducted on the basis that it would have been more appropriate for
The system is discussed in detail in chapter 4
In 1973, this was in teims of s 32(2)(g) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, 
now s 52(2)(i) o f the Children (Scotland) Act 1995
7^ “18 Months for Girl o f Nine Who Stabbed Friend” Glasgow Herald 19 
September 1973 p 3
8^ See “Girl Aged Nine Given 18 Months’ Detention” The Times 19 September 
1973 p 1
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the sheriff either to have refened the case directly to a children’s 
hearing, or to have taken its advice on the appropriate sentence.^^ In 
the post-Bulger world, it is difficult to conceive of a public backlash, 
led by the press, against the severity of a sentence for a serious crime 
committed by a child, yet this is the position which obtained in 
Glasgow in 1973. The victim’s sister is quoted as having said “[m]y 
mother thought the sentence was a bit stiff’, a n d  the Director of 
Social Work in Glasgow accepted that his department was at fault for 
failing to provide proper support to the convicted child and her 
family when the sentence was handed down.^^^
In giving its decision in the appeal against sentence, the High Court 
felt it necessary to emphasise those aspects of the case which 
demonstrated the seriousness of the crime over the accused’s status 
as a young child, in order to justify the sheriffs decision. In fact, it 
strenuously defended the actions taken by the sheriff stating that it 
could not “be held that the sheriff erred in deciding that custodial 
treatment ... was ... appropriate” It also defended the decision to 
prosecute the child instead of referring her to a children’s hearing, 
pointing out that it was recognised by Parliament ... that there might 
be cases where by reason inter alia of the nature of the alleged 
offence it was appropriate that the child should be brought before a
^ Cairns v HMA, supra, note 7, at p 46
“Appeal for Girl (9) to be Released” Glasgow Herald 19 September 1973 p 1 
“Authorities Blamed in Case of Detained Girl” Glasgow Herald 20 September 
1973 atp 1
Cairns v HMA supra, note 7, at p 46
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court of law.”’ Nonetheless, despite all but stating that the sentence 
imposed by the sheriff was fully justified in light of the 
“premeditated, deliberate and serious”’’^"’ nature of the assault and 
observing that “among the wave of sympathy for the applicant which 
has been generated in some quarters some of that sympathy might 
have been reserved for the victim of the assault,””’^  it substituted a 
sentence of probation for the residential order which the sheriff had 
made, on the basis of the further infomiation presented to the court at 
the time of the appeal.
Overall, its consideration of the case is predicated on a constmction 
of Mary Caims as a vulnerable child, whose own best interests were 
of importance to the interests of justice. Throughout the judgment 
she is referred to as “the girl” or “the young girl” or “the child” and a 
paragraph is devoted to “looking at the case simply on the basis of 
the child’s own interests””’^  albeit that it is accepted that that could 
not be the sole consideration.
It would appear, therefore, that, in 1973, this welfare-driven 
mentality gripped the country such that even children who committed 
serious crimes were brought within its scope in the popular sphere to 
such an extent that the courts required to take it on board also. The 
image of the child-offender projected here — as a vulnerable child
Ibid at pp 44 - 45 
Ibid at p 45 
Ibid at p 45 
Ibid at p 48
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with unmet needs of her own -  is the polar opposite of the 
démonisation of Robert Thompson and Jon Venables.
Case (3) Manslaughter of eighteen-month old baby by Nicola G, 
1991’ ’’^
The third case to be considered here occuixed in roughly the same 
time frame as the murder of James Bulger and is included here 
because of its very different treatment. On 5”^ March 1992, Nicola G 
was convicted of the manslaughter of a boy aged eighteen months. 
The facts’®^ were that on 8*’^ January 1991, Nicola, then aged eleven 
was babysitting for two children, a girl aged four and the girl’s 
younger brother, Sean, the victim. The children’s mother was under 
the impression that Nicola was thirteen years old however it was 
accepted in court that, even had this been true, “she was plainly far 
too young ... to be left in charge of those children”.”’’’ When Nicola 
anived, the children were not in bed and Nicola agreed with their 
mother that she would put them to bed later. Nicola’s cousin, aged 
thirteen, aii’ived shortly afterwards and was concerned because 
Nicola told him that she had “yaiiked” Sean. He came back later 
with other children and helped to clean what appeared to be dried 
blood from the comers of Sean’s mouth, although Nicola said that it
R V Nicola G, supra, note 9 
'“8 The facts are summarised closely from the report of her appeal against sentence, 
ibid atpp 350 - 351 
Ibid, at p 350
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was chocolate. The cousin thought that Sean appeared frightened of 
Nicola,
The cousin and the other visiting children then left, leaving Sean and 
his sister in Nicola’s care and, when their mother returned home at 
about 11.15 pm, Nicola told her they were fine. Later, the mother 
went into Sean’s room and found him cold and motionless. He had, 
however, been tucked up bed in an apparently nonnal position for a 
child who was asleep presumably, although this is not stated 
expressly, by Nicola. He was pronounced dead on anival at hospital. 
The post-mortem examination revealed that Sean had died of 
“cardio-respiratory failure caused by obstruction of the air passages”, 
His nostrils had been pinched closed, his mouth obstmcted and his 
throat gripped. He had abrasions and bmises to his face and scalp 
which were probably caused by his head being forcibly stmck against 
the side of the cot as well as marks on his back consistent with it 
striking the end of the cot in a forcible manner.
It is interesting to note that these injuries, which at least indicate a 
fairly violent assault, are played down in the report of the appeal. 
Hutchison J, giving the coinf s judgment, notes: “[i]t has to be said 
... that the other injuries [those to the face, scalp and back], though 
not insignificant, were not grave or indicative of a particularly 
serious assault. The evidence was that death could have resulted in a
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very short period after the application of some restriction to the 
breathing passages.”’
The other particularly interesting aspect of the case is the legal
interpretation of the crime itself. It was proved that Nicola was
responsible for Sean’s death and, although she was originally charged
with murder, the jury convicted her of manslaughter “on the basis, it
is assumed, of absence of specific murderous intent”.” ’ In imposing
the original sentence however, the trial judge had said:
I ought to make one important finding before I proceed 
to sentence, and that is this: I am satisfied that what 
happened to Sean, finally, was not due to a simple, 
single and temporary loss of self-control, it was the 
culmination of an attitude which Nicola had fonned 
towards Sean from a fairly early stage in that evening, 
and there is no evidence to suggest that Sean was 
particularly troublesome or fr actious during the course 
of that evening when he was in Nicola’s care.” ^
At the appeal against sentence, the defence sought to argue that these 
remarks were not warranted by the evidence but the Court of Appeal 
considered that the trial judge was in the best position to form this 
view of the evidence if he thought it justified. It is arguable 
therefore, that the trial judge came as close as he could, without 
denying the jury’s findings outright, to suggesting that Nicola had, in 
fact, intended to kill Sean. Similarly to the treatment of the injuries 
inflicted on Sean then, it appears that an effort had been made to
"U W , atp 351 
" ' / W ,  atp 350
' ‘7 Turner J, quoted ibid, at p 354
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construct this crime in the least serious way possible. It is submitted 
that part of the reason for this may be the jury’s - and indeed the 
appeal court’s - disinclination to categorise an eleven-year old child 
as a murderer. Despite the trial judge’s opinion, even the Crown had 
conducted this case on the basis “that it was to be assumed that what 
had led Nicola to kill the child was her inability to cope with his 
behaviour that evening.”^
Finally, the way in which the court identified the child-criminal as 
Nicola G allowing her to be referred to at all points simply as 
“Nicola” is a mechanism by which her status as a child is 
emphasised. It is common practice for criminal defendants to be 
referred to by their surnames. The “official” reason for the use of 
surname and initial here is, presumably, to preserve her anonymity, 
as is the norm in cases involving children. Robert Thompson and Jon 
Venables were, however, identified as “T” and “V” throughout the 
proceedings in which their identities were protected. Since children 
are almost always called by adults by their Christian names only, 
“Nicola” is treated more like a child.
The paradox of the child who commits a serious crime has already 
been mentioned. In the Bulger case, the “crime” element is dominant 
in almost all discourses. In Nicola G’s a better balance is struck 
between the fact that Nicola was a child and the fact that she had 
committed an offence, albeit that this was achieved by restricting the
Ibid, atp 354
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seriousness of the crime of which she was ultimately convicted. In 
fact, the criminal justice system strives to accommodate her as a 
child. The constmction of the child-offender which can be read from 
this case accepts a degree of vulnerability and a consequent need for 
protection, albeit that this is tempered by an awareness of the nature 
of the criminal act and the need to respond to it.
The Court’s of Appeal’s judgment on the appeal against sentence 
demonstrates a particular awareness of welfare considerations^in 
relation to Nicola. It took into account, for example, a social 
background report which concluded that she '''need[ed] an element of 
control and consistent boundaries which ha[d] not been demonstrated 
to date within her family.”  ^ An effort was made to ensure that the 
element of dangerousness which Nicola might continue to present 
was not overemphasised. The undesirability of spending the 
period until her eighteenth birthday in an institution for disturbed 
children, when viewed from Nicola’s point of view, was also 
discussed. Overall, the judgment, sites Nicola very firmly within a 
traditional conception of childhood and attempts to strike a balance 
between her interests, as those are, patemalistically, detennined by 
others such as Northumberland social seiwices, and the public 
interest.
' The topic of welfare is considered in its own right in chapter 4 
Nicola G, supra, note 9, at p 351. Emphasis added.
" V W , atp 353
Additionally, it appears that this case received almost no coverage in 
the national media therefore there was no orchestrated public 
response. In a report on the incidence of children who kill in 
England and Wales, at the time of the Bulger case. The Times gave as 
an example “an 11-year old girl who battered and suffocated an 18- 
month old baby to death.”’ It is submitted that this is likely to be a 
reference to Nicola G’s case yet, as such, it is isolated. The role of 
the media is a key factor in the constmction of individual cases then 
simply because, if the public is not informed about a paificular case, 
it is unable to have a collective interest in its outcome. The courts’ 
eye to the public interest does not, therefore, have to be as focussed 
as in a high profile case.
Case (41 Manslaughter of George Burgess bv Peter Henrv Barratt and 
James Bradlev. 1861
Robert Thompson and Jon Venables’ and Nicola G’s cases then 
illustrate almost simultaneous yet very different constmctions of the 
child-criminal, occumng at the end of the twentieth century. It is 
interesting now to consider a much older case to examine what can 
be pieced together of the societal response at that time.
On l l ”^ April 1861, in Stockport, Cheshire, Peter Hemy Barratt and 
James Bradley, both then aged eight, killed two-year old George
“Society Tempers Justice with Mercy in Dealing with Juvenile Killers” The 
Times 20 Febmary 1993, p 6
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Burgess,”  ^ a child who appears to have been a stranger to them. 
They met him, by their own confession, playing beside a pub, near 
where he was living at the time and they took him on a walk which 
finished near a brook at the bottom of a track known as Love Lane. 
The evidence indicated that the two boys had removed all of their 
victim’s clothing and had then whipped him with a stick from a tree 
causing bloody weals across his back and buttocks and injuries to his 
head. The latter might have been serious enough to render him 
unconscious. Death resulted from the child’s face being pressed 
against a stone in the water of the brook causing “suffocation from 
drowning”.
Before George Burgess’s death, the three children were seen by two 
witnesses. The first observed that the youngest child was crying and 
that one of the older boys appeared to be dragging him along. The 
second saw them after they had amved at their destination and 
noticed that the youngest child was naked and that the two older 
children were pulling him towards the brook. Her thirteen-year old 
son, who was with her, saw one of the boys hit the toddler with a 
stick.
This case, then bears striking similarities to the Bulger case in terans 
of the ages of the tlnee children involved, the abduction of an 
unknown child, the enforced walk and the witnesses who noticed
All of the information on this case is found in Sereny, “B and B”, supra, note 10 
and in Wilson, supra, note 10, chapter 18
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something unusual and, potentially, amiss yet did not intervene. The
case also appears to have generated much public interest, despite the
more limited communications available at that time. Gitta Sereny
notes that over 1,000 people followed the victim’s coffin to the
cemetery and that, on the second day of the inquest into the death, the
room where it was being held was “bursting with people”.
When questioned by the police about the crime, B and B confessed
quite readily, seeking only to ensure that each implicated the other
equally with himself. In all these circumstances then, and given that
the death penalty would have been the mandatory sentence for a
conviction for murder at that time, it might have been expected that
the boys would have been condemned out of hand both in the social
context and, perhaps especially, by the legal system. It is therefore
particularly interesting to compare the comments of the trial judge in
Robert Thompson and Jon Venables’ case with those of the presiding
High Court judge at Chester Summer Assizes in 1861.
In 1993 Morland J said:
“Robert Thompson and Jon Venables,
The killing of James Bulger was an act of unparalleled 
evil and barbarity. This child of two was taken from his 
mother on a journey of over two miles and then, on the 
railway line, was battered to death without mercy. Then 
his body was placed across the railway line so it would 
be run over by a train in an attempt to conceal his 
murder. In my judgement your conduct was both 
cunning and very wicked.
The sentence that I pass upon you both is that you 
should be detained during Her Majesty’s pleasure . . . .
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You will be securely detained for very, very many years 
until the Home Secretary is satisfied that you have 
matured and are fully rehabilitated and until you are no 
longer a danger.
Let them be taken down.”119
In 1861, Sir Charles Compton said
“I am afraid you have been very wicked, naughty boys, 
and I have no doubt you have caused the death of this 
little boy by the brutal way in which you used him. I 
am going to send you to a place where you will have an 
opportunity of becoming good boys, for there you will 
have a chance of being brought up in a way you should 
be, and I doubt not but that in time, when you come to 
understand the nature of the crime you have committed, 
you will repent of what you have done. The sentence is 
that each of you be imprisoned and kept in gaol for one 
month, and at the expiration of that period you be sent 
to a Refoiinatory for five years.”
The contrast is striking. In 1861, the judge clearly attempts to
communicate in language which the boys could understand and he
emphasises the rehabilitative element in the sentence. Sereny also 
indicates that he implicitly directed the jury towards applying the doli 
incapax presumption to bring in a verdict of guilty only of
manslaughter and not murder. “He could not help expressing his
opinion, he said, that it seemed straining the case to charge such 
young children with the crime of wilful murder.” Here then is an 
example of the use of the concept of capacity to tie the child’s actual 
understanding of his act to the responsibility for it imposed on him by 
law. The judge implies that there was not sufficient evidence to
Quoted in Smith, supra, note 32, at pp 226 -  227
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support the inference that the boys acted “wilfully” and, in his 
sentencing remarks, infers that they have yet to come to an 
understanding of the nature of their crime. This suggest that he did 
not regard them as having that understanding when they earned out 
the crime.
In 1993, the judge’s words seem to have been directed as much to 
assuaging the public desire for vengeance as to the two boys 
themselves. Blake Morrison has questioned the strength of the 
phrase “unparalleled evil and barbarity” noting that the crime was 
“[hjorrendously cruel, certainly, but “unparalleled evil”?’^  ^ Robert 
Thompson and Jon Venables may have understood them, but the 
words made no attempt to present the hopeful prospect for their 
future outlined by Sir Charles Compston 132 years earlier, nor did 
they show much recognition of the principle of English sentencing 
law that “the trial court should not impose a sentence so long that it 
would seem to the young men involved, particularly if they were not 
outstanding intellectually, that the far end of it was out of sight”.
In 1861 then, the judge’s connnent that the two boys would “in time” 
come to understand the nature of their crime, at least implies that 
their actual understanding of the crime had been considered by the 
court and found wanting. Given the eventual outcome, this provides
Moixison supra, note20, at p 229
R V Netliercote (1991) 12 Cr App R (S) 749 at p 752, referring to Conway 
(1985)7 CrAppR(S) 303
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some support for the view that asking such a question within the 
criminal trial may seiwe to diminish stigma.
These cases illustrate the difficulty for the legal system in responding 
appropriately to children who offend. The Bulger case responds to 
the crime. The trial judge calls it an “act of unparalleled evil and 
barbarity.” Even the attempt made by the court to respond to T and 
V as children — raising their seating so that they could see better, for 
example -  was struck at by the European Court of Human Rights as 
adding umiecessarily to their already heightened di scomfor t .Mary  
Cairns, on the other hand, was treated as a young child with unmet 
needs of her own. The court’s attempts to focus attention on the 
offence are largely lost in the press coverage. The media 
construction ultimately prevailed in that the custodial sentence 
imposed as first instance was quashed on appeal despite the High 
Court’s stated opinion that the sheriff was not to be criticised for 
imposing it.
As cases, Nicola G, and B and B, both balance the dual status of the 
“child-criminal” better but, in Nicola G’s case, this is accomplished 
by actively downplaying the seriousness of the crime. B and B are 
treated very compassionately, and expressly as children, although the 
crime is marked in the imposition of one month’s imprisonment in 
addition to the rehabilitative element of detention in a reformatory.
T V UK; V V UK, supra, note 42, at p 180 (para 88)
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Overall, these cases indicate that the status of being a child presents a 
number of challenges to the legal system, even without engaging 
with the question of understanding of the crime and its consequences 
which this thesis regards as central. The complexities and the tension 
inherent in the status of “child” have also troubled sociology, leading 
to a conflict within the discipline itself, between the “traditional” and 
the “childhood studies” constmctions. The way in which this conflict 
has manifested itself demonstrates that childhood is an institution 
currently in a state of flux, and begins to explain the difficulty which 
children present to the law. Also, this work adds detail to the picture 
of children drawn by the law, in which the definition relates purely to 
clnonological age. It is important to see children in as rounded a 
fashion as possible in order to decide how best the law can respond to 
them. Finally, the sociology of childhood lays bare as assumptions 
not necessarily grounded in fact, certain widely held expectations of 
children, which tend to obscure the reality of their lives and to 
determine the way in which adults, and institutions like the criminal 
justice system, interact with them. It is helpful to question these.
For all of these reasons, then, the sociological approach to childhood 
is important in the context of this thesis and will now be examined.
The Sociologv of Childhood
The perspectives which sociology, - the study of society - has taken 
on childhood, are important in the context of the social response to
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children who commit serious crimes in that they both influence and 
reflect the societal reaction to such children. As Ailene Skolnick 
indicates “[p]olicies and decisions concerning children ultimately 
derive from conceptions of childhood.”
Although it has been noted that “in 1990 the sociology of childhood 
was only just beginning to emerge as a distinct sub-discipline,”’ '^’ it 
is not strictly fair to imply that, prior to then, the matter had been 
ignored by sociologists. The position was rather that certain 
assumptions were (and, indeed, continue to be) made about children 
and childhood which became so embedded as to be considered 
“natural” to all c h i l d r e n . T h i s  “traditional approach” to childhood 
has been criticised by sociologists working on “the emergent 
paradigm” who argue that it fails to give children a voice. Here, 
then is the first indication of a tension at the heart of the study of 
childhood. As Alan Front and Allison James note “[t]he history of 
the study of childhood in the social sciences has been marked not by 
an absence of interest in children this has been far from the case 
-  but by their silence.”’^ ^
Arlene Skolnick “The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development 
and Social Context” 1975 Law and Contemporaiy Problems 38, at p 38 
'24 Pi'eface to Second Edition of Constructing and Reconstructing, supra, note 51, 
at p ix
Jens Qvortnip “A Voice for Children in Statistical and Social Accounting; A 
Plea for Children’s Right to Be Heard” in Constructing and Reconstructing, supra, 
note 51, 85 [hereinafter “Voice”] atp 85
Allison James and Alan Front “Introduetion” to Constructing and
Reconstructing, supra, note 51, 1 atpp 2 -  6
Allison James and Alan Proiit “A New Paradigm for the Sociology of 
Childhood? Provenance, Promise and Problems” in Constructing and
Reconstructing, supra, note 51,7 [hereinafter “New Paradigm”] at p 7
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Thus, particularly in the 1980s and early 1990s, a body of work was 
being built up, under the loose heading of “childhood studies”, 
seeking to challenge certain elements of the traditional approach. For 
a number of reasons, some of which will be examined here, the 
traditional approach has, over a prolonged period, gained such wide 
acceptance in both popular and academic discourses that it was and, 
in many respects still is, regarded as a description of children’s true 
and natural state. One of the aims of childhood studies was to expose 
this as, at best, a partial tmth, and to reveal the assumptions on which 
it was based as socially constructed rather than scientifically 
verifiable “facts”.
Interestingly, however, an area which has never endorsed wholesale 
acceptance of the traditional approach to children is the criminal 
law.’ ’^’ Particular caution is therefore required in challenging the 
traditional approach because it is arguable that the criminal law, 
unlike sociology, is not yet ready to move beyond it, never having 
fully endorsed it in the first place. As will be discussed more fully in
Leena Alanen Modern Childhood? Exploring the ‘Child Question ' in Sociology 
(Jyvaskyla; Institute for Educational Research, 1992) at p 20
For example, Jens Qvortnip “Childhood Matters: An Introduction” in Jens 
Qvorhup, Marjatta Bardy, Giovannie Sgritta and Helmut Wintersberger (eds) 
Childhood Matters: Social Theory, Practice and Politics (Aldershot; Avebury, 
1994) [hereinafter Childhood Matters] where he challenges, inter alia the 
“omnipotence o f the family” in children’s lives (at p 13) and the ways in which 
dependence and paternalism characterise children’s lives, at pp 20 - 21. See also 
Martin Hoyles The Politics o f Childhood (London: Journeyman, 1989) ch one, 
particularly atp 10
For a discussion of ways in which English criminal law has tended to ignore 
children’s status as children and tieat them very much as adults see Haydon and 
Scraton, supt'a, note 27, atpp 419 -4 2 3 .
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chapter 3, Scots criminal law has a tendency simply to ignore the 
child’s status as a child.
The Traditional Approach
It is important, first of all, to isolate the key elements constituting the 
traditional approach. Perhaps the primary component of the 
traditional approach is that children are perceived as undergoing two 
distinct but not unrelated processes: (1) socialization and (2) 
psychological development.’ ’^ Both of these processes emphasise 
the role traditionally assigned to childhood as a period of preparation 
for adulthood. In addition, developmental psychology employs 
research methods drawn from the natural sciences to reach and 
support its conclusions’^^  and this, in itself, appears to have 
reinforced its claim to scientific “truth” concerning children. 
Socialization’^  ^ is the process thiough which children acquire the 
trappings of the culture into which they are bom and become 
members of adult society. It may be characterised as a training in the 
ways of the world or viewed, more normatively, as the modification 
of the individual’s behaviour to conform with the demands of social 
life. The process begins in infancy and is deemed complete once the 
child has attained adulthood, albeit that s/he will continue to
See Chris Jenks Childhood (London: Rontledge, 1996) especially atpp 13 - 30 
See Skolnick, supra, note 123, passim 
For a critique of socialization discourses, from the childhood studies 
perspective, see Alanen, supra, note 128, at pp 80 -  90
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assimilate aspects of social functioning in much the same way 
throughout his/her lifespan.
Developmental psychology,’^ '’ on the other hand, builds on the 
newborn child’s incompetence and dependency in order to construct 
a theory of childhood as a series of phases in each of which children 
acquire additional skills and abilities, whilst cementing the set 
acquired in the previous phases, such that, at the end of the 
development process, children are turned fi*om individuals lacking 
ability in all spheres, into competent, rational and fully autonomous 
adults.
The predominance of these two processes in traditional accounts of 
childhood has created an overarching presumption, hegemonic in 
many discourses, that the overriding practice in which children are 
engaged is that of “becoming” adult, such that all of the individuaTs 
experiences as a child are valued in teims of the qualities which they 
are perceived as generating in the adult whom the child becomes.
In other words, “the concept of socialization acts as a kind of 
suppressor of childhood’s present tense, orientating analysis either 
towards the past (what went wrong with socialization) or the future 
(what the goals of socialization should be).”’ ’^’ This has meant that 
childhood is perceived as “the period of growth, the period in which
This thesis considers the theories of Jean Piaget and Erik Eriks on in chapter 2. 
See, for example, Anne Murcott “The Social Construction of Teenage 
Pregnancy; A Problem in the Ideologies of Childhood and Reproduction” 1980 
Sociology o f Health and Illness 2, 1 at pp 3 -  4
Prout and James “New Paradigm”, supra, note 127, at p 28
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the individual in both the physical and moral sense does not yet exist, 
the period in which he [sic] is made, develops and is formed.” 
Such definitions of the child as a non-person contribute to children’s 
marginalization within mainstream society on the, somewhat 
spurious, basis that there is no need to pay very much attention to 
individuals who do not yet exist.
This perception that children are, in some way, incomplete until they 
attain the goal of adulthood has also meant that traditional sociology 
tends to consider children primarily in relation to adults. 
“[Sjociological loiowledge is based on data that concerns the actions 
and experiences of adults but not of children ... and social theory 
continues to be written in which everyone is presumed to be an 
adult.”’ As Jens Qvortmp notes “[w]hen we find children 
described it is practically always done with reference to their parents’ 
situation. ... The socio-occupational background of children ... is in 
fact a description of their parents’ status.’'”’ In the context of the 
criminal law, this assimilation of children with their parents has led 
to criticism of the parents of those who offend which has the effect of 
focussing attention away from the child’s own responsibility for 
his/her actions.’'”
Émile Durklieim “Childhood” in Cluis Jenks (ed) The Sociology of Childhood: 
Essential Readings (Aldershot: Gregg Revivals, 1982 (1992 reprint)) 146 atp 147
Solberg, supra, note 51, atp 142 
Alanen, supra, note 128, atp 1
Qvortnip “Voice”, supra, note 125, at p 90. Emphasis in original.
For example, s 8 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 introduced “parenting 
orders” which could be imposed on parents of children who had been convicted of
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A further assumption going hand-in-hand with the child solely as the 
object of socialization and psychological development, rather than 
the agent of his/her own destiny, is that s/he will occupy certain 
spaces, with both a physical and a metaphorical dimension, in which 
these twin processes can take place. Traditional sociology 
considered the family (or the home) and the school, almost 
exclusively, as the key sites, with little consideration of the actual 
importance of such institutions in the experience and lives of 
individual children themselves.’'’^  Children required to be socialized 
primarily by their nuclear family and to be educated by school. In 
this way, their participation in these processes is constructed as more 
passive than active.
The central role accorded to the family and the school can be 
illustrated by a cursory examination of early sociological texts in this 
area. Part II of Ritchie and Roller’s Sociology o f Childhood, f o r  
example, which was first published in 1964, is entitled “Social 
Settings for Childhood” and contains chapters entitled “The Primacy 
of the Family as Culture Carrier”’'’'’; “Adult Non-Family 
Participants”’'’^  and “The Child and the Classroom.”’'’'^  In a similai'
offences. The Scottish Executive plans to extend this measure to Scotland: Anti- 
Social Behaviour etc (Scotland) Bill, Part 9
See James and Prout “New Paradigm”, supra, note 127, at p 22 
Oscar W Ritchie and Marvin R Roller Sociology o f Childhood (New York: 
Appleton-Centmy-Crofts, 1964)
Ibid, atp 76
Ibid, at p 94. While this title may suggest an outward-looking approach, the 
family is still treated as the primary element with other participants examined by 
reference to it.
Ibid, at p 112
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vein, Bossard’s Sociology o f Child Development^^'’ devotes over 200 
pages to the family together with a chapter on “School Situations and 
Child Development”.’'’  ^ Some more contemporary commentators 
continue to emphasise the importance of the family’'’^  or to consider 
the child as, solely, a family member.’ ”^
With regard to schooling, in Skolnick’s words “[f]or us, school is the 
“natural habitat” of childhood, the school child is the child”.’ ’^ The 
difficulty in tenus of societal perceptions of the child, with investing 
the school with such centrality is that those children for whom it is 
not fundamental, for whatever reason, and who consequently truant 
are identified as having committed a “status offence”, an action 
which is deemed wrong by virtue solely of the status of the actor. 
Truancy is a status offence because adults camiot “commit” it. Only 
children are required to attend school. The failure to confoim to 
mainstream “childislmess” which tmancy represents may, however 
be sufficient to begin the process of labelling as “deviant”.
The point which childhood studies seeks to make is that, while it is 
indeed the case that many, probably most, children spend a
James HS Bossard The Sociology o f Child Development (London: Haipers, 
1948). (Two subsequent editions were published in 1960 and 1966)
Ibid,, Chapter XXII
See, for example Dame Elizabeth Bntler-Sloss “Children in Society” 1989 
Current Legal Problems 71, especially at p 83
See, for example Susan Moller Okin “Women and the Making of the 
Sentimental Family” 1982 Philosophy and Public Affairs 11(1), 65 
Skolnick, supra, note 123, atp 69
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of 
Juvenile Justice (1985) (the “Beijing Rules”) make specific reference to the 
provisions for status offences in signatory states. See Article 3.
See Prout and James “New Paradigm” supra, note 127, at p 14
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proportion of their time within the family and the school, these are 
not necessarily the defining aspects of modern childhood and, more 
importantly, that it is necessary actually to gather data from children 
themselves to ascertain the appropriate level of significance to attach 
to these, and all other institutions in a child’s own life.’^ '’
The physical dimension of children’s allocation to school and the 
family points up a further element of the traditional approach: that 
children inhabit a world separate from adults. This is illustrated in a 
metaphor employed by Jolui Holt, who describes childhood as “a 
kind of walled garden in which children, being small and weak, are 
protected from the harshness of the world outside until they become 
strong and clever enough to cope with it.”’^  ^ Other commentators 
have espoused this view including Iona and Peter Opie whose 1959 
account of The Lore and Language o f Schoolchildren^pr oceeds  
from the assumption that childhood is “a thiiving, unselfconscious 
culture ... which is ... unnoticed by the sophisticated world and ... 
little affected by it.”’^^  This separation, coupled with the 
construction of children as human “becomings” rather than human
See, for example Jiri Kovank “The Space and Time of Children at the Interface 
of Psychology and Sociology” in Childhood Matters, supra, note 129, 101 
John Holt Escape from Childhood (Boston: Holt Associates, 1974) at p 9 
(Oxford: GUP, 1959)
Ibid, at pp 1 - 2
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beings has meant that “children have been attributed with certain 
special qualities and disabilities”.’^ ^
Childhood is often idealised as a golden period of the lifespan in 
which, separated from adults, children are left to indulge in childish 
activities in a carefree and spontaneous manner. They are perceived 
as liberated from responsibility for “adult” concerns such as 
employment and finance. The concept of vulnerability permeates 
this perspective, fuelled by children’s dependency in infancy, and 
translates into welfare-based juvenile justice policy and the 
conferring of special human rights on children which, unlike other 
such rights, allow for an overarching paternalism towards them.’^  ^ In 
these conditions, the concept of childhood innocence has free rein 
partly because, if vulnerable children are separate hom the adult 
world, they cannot be contaminated by it.
These, then, are the basic components and assumptions comprising 
the traditional account of childhood. It is arguable that its level of 
acceptance is so high that it is often constmcted as “normal” in such 
a way that divergence may be perceived as deviant. It is necessary 
now to consider the childhood studies (contrasting) approach to the 
concept.
Jo Boy den “Childhood and the Policy Makers: A Comparative Perspective on 
the Globalization of Childhood” in Constructing and Reconstructing, supra, note 
51, 190, atp 1911
The point about differing constiuctions of rights and the image which each 
projects of the child who holds them is taken up in chapter 4.
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The Childhood Studies Approach
Childhood studies seeks to challenge not necessarily each of these 
individual assumptions, but rather the way in which they are 
accorded the status of “truth” such that it becomes difficult to 
conceive of all children and any individual child as doing anything 
other than pursuing a course to adulthood, guided solely by family 
and educators and attended along the way by vulnerability and a need 
for protection which renders paternalism the only appropriate 
response by the adult community. There is a parallel with earlier 
work on gender’^ ’’ which successfully questioned the naturalness of 
many perceptions of women, such as the view that it was appropriate 
to confine them to the domestic sphere.
While childhood studies specifically characterises contemporaiy 
understandings of childhood as a social construction then, it would be 
wi'ong to regard it as the first body of work to contest these 
understandings. That honour is usually conferred on Philippe Aries 
and his book. Centuries o f Childhood, first published in 1962.’ ’^ 
Ariès’ radical premise was that, until around the twelfth century, very 
little distinction was made between children and adults at all. His 
argument is based largely on the representation of children in early 
European art where they are drawn simply as small adults wearing 
identical clothes and indulging in the same activities as their older
See particularly Alanen, supra, note 128, especially atp 24 
Philipp Ariès Centuries <
Jonathan Cape, 1962, 1973)
o f Childhood (translated by Robert Baldick) (London;
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coiinteiparts. Adults, for example, played games and children 
hunted. Ariès states: “[i]n the world of Romanesque foraiulas, right 
up until the end of the thirteenth century, there are no children 
characterized by a special expression but only men [sic] on a reduced 
scale. ... [T]he men [sic] of the tenth and eleventh centuries did not 
dwell on the image of childhood, and that image had neither interest 
nor even reality for them.”’^  ^ Using the developing iconography as a 
basis, Ariès goes on to trace what he tenus “the discovery of 
childhood”.
It is from these beginnings, then, that research into the changing 
construction of childhood has taken place. Overall, it seeks to 
examine children as a functioning minority group within society with 
attributes, aims and practices unique to it as such, but also with 
characteristics which are shared with the adult world. In other words, 
“[c]ontrary to custom, childhood is not perceived as “the next 
generation”, rather, it is seen as a part of today’s society. Even if it is 
tme that children grow up and become adults, it is equally true that 
they live and lead a life as children. It is astonishing how widely this 
trivial fact has been ignored by the social sciences.”’ '^’
Sociological enquiry into children’s real lives then, yields data which 
can be used to challenge the traditional perspective. For example, in 
an empirical study of the work carried out in the home by a sample of
Ibid, at p 32 
Ibid, chapter 2
164 Childhood Matters, supra, note 129, at p 394
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school-age children in Noi-way, it was noted that “placing children in 
the division of labour at home shows that children’s capacity to work 
is large. ... [The ability to withdraw that labour] indicates a certain 
negotiating power among c h i l d r e n . T h i s  is interesting for a 
number of reasons. The study itself draws the conclusion that by 
giving children actual and complete responsibility for “large” issues 
such as the family’s main meal, and seeing them cany out such tasks 
satisfactorily, the parents’ perception of the child’s age is increased. 
It can also be infened that children are, in fact, in closer proximity to 
“work”, albeit domestic work which tends to be devalued, than the 
traditional conception of childhood permits. Again, such tasks can 
only be perfonned by an individual who is autonomous. Finally, the 
idea that children might negotiate with their parents, whatever the 
inequalities in bargaining strength, belies the traditional view of 
children’s subordination.
The unquestioning acceptance that, in their own interests, children 
should occupy separate play- or education-spaces from adults has 
also been contested, particularly in work on street children in South 
America. As a gioup such children are an empirical demonstration 
that all children are not in fact contained in the spaces (home and 
school) traditionally set aside for them. One commentator has 
suggested that, by their use of the street for survival, such childien 
“confront and touch society’s dominant sector’s views and lives and
Solberg, supra, note 51, at pp 133 - 4
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interfere or tlrreaten to interfere with its major interests. It is ... the 
concern not for children’s but for society’s needs which has given 
importance to the concept and the category of “street children”. 
This also seiwes to demonstrate how children’s vulnerability, a key 
component of the traditional approach, can be extracted from its 
context and used to further adult agendas, under guise of meeting 
children’s needs, a theme which has been pursued by several 
commentators.’^^
It is interesting that, in 1990, childhood studies was described, by two 
of its main exponents, as an “emergent paradigm” yet by 1997, in the 
second edition of the same text, it had become sufficiently 
mainstream to claim for itself the title of “the sociology of 
childhood”. T h e r e  has, then, been a major shift in the 
methodology and the approach taken by sociology to children in the 
recent past.
Taken together, then, these conflicting sociological discourses -  the 
traditional and the childhood studies -  point to the tension at the heart 
of childhood between the child as vulnerable and the child as
Bemio Glauser “Street Children: Deconstructing A Constiuct” in Constructing 
and Reconstructing, supra, note 51, 145, atp 153
See, for example Penelope Leach Children First: What Our Society Must Do -  
and is Not Doing -  For Our Children Today (London: Michael Joseph, 1994) 
chapter 4, in which she argues that the clamour for provision of additional nursery 
places to meet children’s needs masks the tine agenda of allowing their parents to 
work. See also Deborah Gorham ‘“Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon’ Re- 
Examined: Child Prostitution and the Idea of Childhood in Late Victorian England” 
1978 Victorian Studies 353 who suggests that the would-be reformers of Victorian 
child prostitution sought primarily to instil upper class values in working class 
girls.
Allison Prout and Alan James “Preface” to the second edition of Constructing 
and Reconstructing, supra, note 51, at p 1
69
independent agent leading his/her own life. This is an issue which 
will be picked up again in chapter 4. A similar disjunction has also 
been apparent over a much longer period in the philosophical- 
religious discourse relating to children which is also worthy of note.
Original Sin and Original Innocence
Thi'oughout history, the concepts of original sin and original 
innocence have been applied to childhood and, although 
contemporary secular society has largely moved away from the 
umeflective application of either doctrine, shades of each are often 
apparent where children commit serious crimes. This was 
particularly apparent in the Bulger case where the juxtaposition of 
innocence and evil was such a major theme in its own right.
In brief compass, original sin posits that children are bom evil and 
must be educated and disciplined out of that state, generally tlmough 
the indiscriminate use of corporal punishment,’^ ’’ in the religious 
cause of “a rapid saving of a potentially damaged soul before the 
child die[s]”.’^ ’ Original innocence, on the other hand, takes the 
opposite standpoint, apparently being widely promulgated, in the first 
instance, as a result of “the cult of the infant Jesus which symbolises
See, for example, “The Horror o f Dead Children” Financial Times 27 March 
1993, p XXIV; “Save Us from the Cruel Tmth” Daily Mail 5 November 1993, p 4 
For a summaiy of the historical and philosophical development of this view see 
David Archard Children: Rights and Childhood (London: Rontledge, 1993)
Christine Flardyment Dream Babies: Child Car e from Locke to Spoclc (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 1983) atp 8
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childish innocence ... dat[ing] from the seventeenth c e n t u r y . I t  
was expounded in Émile, an early philosophical account of the 
nature of childhood and education, by Jean-Jacques Rousseau who 
described his book as “a treatise on the original goodness of man 
[sic], intended to show how vice and error, alien to his constitution, 
are introduced into it from outside and imperceptibly distort it.”’^ '’ 
The basic premise of original innocence is that children are bom 
good and that corruption and depravity only arise as a result of their 
life experiences. In Rousseau’s words, “God makes all things good; 
man [sic] meddles with them and they become evil.”’^ ^
These bodies of work then -  the sociological and the philosophical -  
demonstrate that it is not only the criminal law which finds difficulty 
in the concept of childhood and in accommodating individual 
children. The sociological literature indicates the danger of making 
assumptions about children; the concepts of original sin and original 
innocence reveal that children are often viewed at extremes (here, of 
good and of evil) in a way which is not the case for adults. The pull 
between the child as competent and autonomous and the child as 
dependent and incapable which is implicit in the work on the 
sociology of childhood, and the extreme moral positions in which 
children are sometimes cast, arising from the philosophical literature
Hoyles, supra, note 129, at p. 12
Jean-Jacques Rousseau Émile (tianslated by Barbara Foxley) (London: 
Everyman, 1993 (1762)) [hereinafter É/zn/e]
Jean-Jacques Rousseau Dialogues [1776] quoted in P.D. Jimack “Introduction” 
to Émile, ibid, xvi at p xxi
175 Ibid, at p 5
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will be reconsidered generally in chapter 4, which seeks to reconcile 
the concepts of “welfare” and “justice” in relation to children who 
offend.
Conclusion
Overall, the cases and the other commentary presented in this chapter 
point to the problems which arise from making presumptions about 
children and from seeking to categorise them rigidly by reference to 
characteristics which are perceived as essential and “natural” to 
childhood, but which may not be applicable at all -  either generally 
or to the individual child. The characterisation of T and V in Bulger 
case, particularly in the social context, adheres quite closely, albeit 
not expressly to the doctrine of original sin. Mary Caims is 
categorised as “small and weak” in terms of John Holt’s metaphor of 
childhood as a walled garden. Efforts are made to describe Nicola 
G’s behaviom* as if it were contained within the boundaries of the 
“childish”’ despite the strain which this places on the facts. Finally, 
B and B aie portrayed as naughty but uncomprehending -  children 
who did not understand the nature of their act. It is interesting that, 
of the four, it is this case in which the sentence imposed arguably 
strikes the best balance between punislrment for the crime’ and
The impression given is that Nicola G lost control of herself because of the 
strain of being required to look after another small child, a responsibility which 
should not be imposed on a child in the first place because, it is implied, only 
adults have the maturity to accomplish this without losing their self-control.
One month in prison
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rehabilitation’^^  in recognition of the accused being children, hi this 
thesis, understanding of the crime is regarded as key to fair outcomes 
and B and B supports this view.
All four of these cases then, point to the need for a better mechanism 
to deal with children who offend within the criminal justice system, 
which will allow those aspects of their status as children which are 
important to a determination of guilt of a criminal offence to be 
canvassed fully by the court but which, at the same time, will ensure 
that the crime itself is not entirely overlooked. It is the contention of 
this thesis that paying more attention to the child’s criminal capacity 
can meet this need. The next chapter explains how this is to be 
achieved.
Five years in a reformatory
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Chapter 2
Children and the Mental Element in Criminal Law
Introduction
The maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea — “no act is 
punishable unless it is performed with a criminal mind, i.e. by a 
person whose state of mind is such that it makes his [sic] actings 
criminal”’ -  is the fundamental principle by which the criminal law 
attributes fault. Its justification is usually in tenus of the unfairness 
of holding an individual responsible for an act of which either s/he 
had no knowledge^ or which s/he was powerless to prevent.^ In 
relation to sane adults, such difficulties as it presents are largely 
related to determining its scope -  should intention include 
foreseeable consequences, for example -  and to proving, effectively, 
what was in another person’s mind. With regard to children and the 
insane however, it acknowledges the unfairness in imputing 
responsibility for the commission of a criminal act where the accused 
did not, thr ough no fault of his/her own, have the ability -  or capacity 
-  to understand or rationalise his/her actions. This chapter 
investigates the attribution of criminal responsibility to children by 
means of the mental element.
' Michael G A Cliristie (ed) Gerald H Gordon The Criminal Law o f Scotland 
(Edinbur gh: W Green, 2000) Vol. lat p 245, para 7.01
 ^Sweet V Parsley [1970] AC 132 
 ^Hogg V MacPherson 1928 JC 15
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Two reasons are here put forward to justify the differential treatment 
of children and adults in this respect. First, on both the traditional 
and the childhood studies views of childhood presented in the 
previous chapter, children and childhood are perceived to display 
different qualities fi'om adults and adulthood. In order to retain its 
moral legitimacy, the crirnirral law must reflect that difference. As 
Neil MacComiick has said “[w]e do not treat [children] differently 
[from adults] because we respect them less. Rather our respect for 
them as moral beings is differentiated in a way that makes proper 
allowance for the differences between mature and immature agents.”'’ 
Second, the notion that children are as responsible for their actions as 
adults is questioned on the basis of their deficit, in tenns of 
understanding and competences, by comparison with their adult 
counterparts.^ Proper consideration of this second issue, which goes 
to the heart of the question of criminal responsibility, presupposes 
some body of knowledge by reference to which those understandings, 
competences and capabilities can be assessed. The position adopted 
here is that the best discipline to which to look in this respect is
" Neil MacCormick “A Special Conception of Juvenile Justice: Kilbrandon’s 
Legacy” The Fifth Kilbrandon Child Care Lecture, 1 November 2001, part 9.
See http://www.scotlaiid.iiov.uk/librarv5/education/ch30-00.asp 
 ^ Some adults may, of course, lack understanding. For present purposes however, 
it is assumed that the criminal law would be inoperable if it could not presume 
mental competence and, hence, capacity over a certain age. The plea in bar of tiial 
on the ground of insanity currently takes account of the inability to understand the 
trial process and/or to instruct a solicitor. Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 
ss 5 4 - 5 7 ;  and see HMA v Wilson 1942 SLT 194
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developmental psychology. This is, however, a position which 
requires some justification.
There is no doubt that, in certain quarters, developmental psychology 
is deeply unfashionable. The material presented in chapter 1, on the 
social construction of childhood, indicates that contemporary 
sociology is sceptical of psychology’s hegemonic grip on the popular 
understanding of childhood. This is partly because of its tendency to 
fragment childhood into sets of abilities, and to treat the child as a 
variable in experimentation, which is not conducive to the view of 
each child as a whole and individual human being, with agency, 
rather than a “becoming” whose position in society is only 
recognised once s/he has attained adulthood.
There is, however, a distinction between developmental psychology’s 
presence as a monolith dictating the developmental path followed by 
all children, at which much of the criticism is directed, and its 
application in drawing conclusions concerning the abilities and 
understandings of an individual child. The monolithic structure is a 
prerequisite of the availability of the data for application in individual 
cases but it is not, as is sometimes assumed, the whole story, hideed, 
within the discipline itself, there is evidence of sideways movement
fi’om the notion of an age-dominated and universal developmental
progression, propounded initially by Sigmund Freud,tow ards a 
more sensitive and nuanced appreciation of the child as an active 
participant in relationships with parents and others from birth/
For example, following work published by P B Balthes et al in 1980  ^
there has been a growing recognition that other variables may be as 
influential as clnonological age. Balthes’ study identified events 
such as world wars, which affect a whole generation’s development 
and significant events in the individual child’s own life such as 
his/her parents’ divorce as exercising a similarly prominent role.^ 
This work also served to emphasise that development continues 
throughout the lifespan shifting the focus away from the child alone 
as in the process of “becoming” adult towards a recognition that 
adults, too, continue to develop.’^
Again, in broadening the focus of the discipline, this time away from 
the child as the object of laboratory experiments, Urie 
Bronfenbreimer’s work has advocated and applied an “ecological”
 ^ See, eg, Sigmund Freud On Metapsychology; The Theoiy o f  Psychoanalysis; 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle; The Ego and the Id; and Other Works 
(Haimondsworth: Penguin, 1984)
 ^Eg Campos et al demonstrated that a mother who appears to be giving “poorer” 
care to her child may, in fact, simply be responding to the baby’s own innate 
characteristics which cause him/her to be particularly unresponsive. It would not, 
therefore, be correct to state simply that “quality of care” creates strong attaclunent 
to the mother in the child. It is a two-way process between mother and child. See J 
J Campos, K C Barrett, M E Lambe, H H Goldsmith and C Sternberg 
“Socioemotional Development” in M M Flaith, and J J Campos (eds) Handbook o f  
Child Psychology, Vol 2: Infancy and Developmental Psychobiology (New York: 
Wiley, 1983)
® P B Balthes, H W Reece and L P Lipsitt “Life-Span Developmental Psychology” 
1980 Annual Review o f Psychology 31, 65
 ^The work of Campos and Balthes is discussed in Ann Birch Developmental 
Psychology from Infancy to Adulthood (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1997) from which 
this information was obtained.
This is also a facet of Erik Erikson’s theory, to be discussed subsequently
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approach. This involves devising tests which operate in the 
environment familiar to the child and which take account of more 
actors than simply the experimenter and a single experimentee at any 
one time.”  Thus, the child is more likely to behave “naturally” and 
the data yielded to be correspondingly more accurate.
These examples indicate that developmental psychology does, itself, 
develop. They may also suggest that criticisms of the discipline for 
representing development and, by implication, childhood itself, as 
fixed and prescriptive of the experience of all children, are 
misconceived.
This chapter will draw on developmental psychology to substantiate 
some of its claims concerning the abilities and understandings of 
children accused of crime. This is on the argument that such data has 
its place within the criminal process because it is specifically directed 
towards establishing how and, indeed, despite its overtones of “good” 
and “bad”, “normal” and “abnormal”, how well the child functions 
and understands in various areas. There are precedents for the use of 
such information in this way.’  ^ Indeed, it has been suggested, 
specifically in relation to adolescents, that “understanding the nature
” Urie Bronfenbrenner “Developmental Research, Public Policy and the Ecology 
of Childhood” 1974 Child Development 45, 1
In HMA V S, (unreported) (9 July 1999) (High Court) (plea in bar) 
http://wwvv.scotcQurts.gov.ulc/oirinions/845 99.html at p 8 (of internet copy), 
evidence given by a psychologist was “helpful” in linking the child-accused’s 
impairment to his ability to fonction in the court environment. See the fuller 
discussion of this case in chapter 3
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of psychological development ... will help improve policy-making, 
judicial decision making and legal practice.
The work of two theorists in particular - Erik Erikson and Jean Piaget 
- will be considered because their work examines development over 
an extended period -  in Piaget’s case from birth to the end of 
adolescence and in Erikson’s over the whole of the lifespan. This is 
helpful because it gives a flavour of the continuing nature of 
development, and developmental acquisitions over a prolonged 
period, but within two self-contained bodies of work. Because of 
their claim to comprehensiveness then, these theories provide a 
model for the applicability of developmental psychology in general, 
within the criminal process.
Of Piaget, it has been noted that “the vast majority of critical studies 
[of his work] contain a tribute to the man whose great intellectual 
scope provided such a monumental contribution to our understanding 
of child development.”’'’ His theories and experiments are basic to 
much subsequent work, even if that work does not necessarily 
endorse his findings in their entirety.’^
Thomas Grisso and Robert G Schwartz (eds) Youth on Trial: A Developmental 
Perspective on Juvenile Justice (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
2000) at p 7. Emphasis added. This book arises from the work of the MacArthur 
Foundation’s Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice 
which exists primarily to conduct research into “adolescents’ capacities as trial 
defendants and the culpability of adolescent offenders” through the application of 
developmental psychology (at p 4). The Network is comprised of experts in 
psychology, sociology, public policy and law.
Birch supra, note 9, at p 78
Eg Margaret Donaldson imdeilook work to challenge Piaget’s claim that a child 
aged between two and seven was “egocentric” or unable to see any other point of
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Erikson, on the other hand, has been selected for inclusion because 
his work is in the psychoanalytic tradition of Freud’ who is widely 
regarded as the “father” of modern psychology. Erikson’s theory is, 
however, premised on studies of children themselves, whereas 
Freud’s was developed from case studies of his adult patients. 
Erikson’s work is also directed more towards the social forces which 
drive development, in contradistinction to Freud’s which, as is well 
known, defined development in psychosexual tenns.
It may be useful, at this stage, to provide an overview of the salient 
aspects of their respective theories. The theory of the mental element 
in crime in relation to children which is put forward in this chapter 
could apply to a child of any age.’^  Piaget and Erikson’s theories are 
both predicated on the assumption that children move tlnough a 
series of phases in each of which they acquire new skills and build 
upon those from the previous phase. The phases follow 
consecutively one from another. The view taken in this chapter is 
that the child-accused requires certain understandings to be able to 
participate in the trial process at all and that, beyond that, fairness to 
him/her dictates that the court should assess certain specific issues
view than his/iier own. Margaret Donaldson Children’s Minds (London: Fontana 
Press, 1978).
Hemy W. Maier Three Theories o f  Child Development: The Contributions o f  
Erik H. Erikson, Jean Piaget and Robert R. Sears and Their Applications (New 
York, Evanston and London: Harper and Row; Tokyo: John Weatherhill Inc., 
1969) atp 17
The thesis as a whole nonetheless supports the retention of an age of criminal 
responsibility, on political grounds, to prevent any possibility of a very young child 
being prosecuted solely to assuage public opinion. This is discussed more fully in 
chapters 3 and 5.
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related to his/her understanding of the crime in context in order to 
determine his/her criminal responsibility. It is therefore necessary to 
summarise the whole of Piaget’s and Erikson’s theories so that it is 
clear where the developmental acquisitions which are key to these 
understandings fit into their overall schemes. This information can 
then be applied when the relevant issues arise later in the chapter.
Jean Piaget’s Theorv of Intellectual Develonment
Piaget viewed childhood as a linear progression thiough four phases, 
characterised by the child’s refinement of old skills and his/her 
problem-solving approach to new challenges. The child’s attempt to 
deal with a new situation or concept is tenned “accommodation”; 
his/her attempt to build this novelty into his/her existing intellectual 
framework, “assimilation”. As indicated, on Piaget’s model, the 
child has to pass through four developmental phases in a set order 
which does not change fi'om child to child. In the “average” case, 
children do so within a range of clearly defined chronological ages. 
The four stages are as follows: 
fll Sensorimotor Phase (birth to two vears):
During this phase, the child learns mainly by using his/her senses. It 
is wrong, however, to suggest that the child does not demonstrate 
“intelligent” behaviour because Piaget’s obseiwations indicate that 
very young children do assimilate discoveries. He gives the example
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of a child who learns that a distant object can be brought close by 
pulling the mg on which it is situated and who then repeats this 
operation the next time a similar situation arises. Overall, however, 
the child lives, almost entirely, in the present. This stage comes to an 
end as the child acquires speech and language and, accordingly, the 
begimiing of the ability to understand that a word may represent an 
object.
(2) Pre-Operational Phase (two to seven vears)
This phase is characterised by imaginative play as the child’s 
intellectual ability to see things symbolically, in the mind alone, 
when they are not physically present, develops. The child’s 
reasoning ability is, however, still limited. For example, Piaget 
conducted many experiments to establish that children at this stage 
cannot understand that a quantity of a commodity (water or clay for 
example) stays the same even if it is reshaped or placed in a 
differently shaped container. To a considerable extent then, seeing is 
still believing.
(3) Concrete Operations (seven to 11 years)
During this phase the child acquires the ability to classify objects and 
to understand that there are broad categories with more specific sub­
categories subsumed within them (e.g. “daisies” within “flowers”). 
Although the child begins to recognise logical relationships between 
objects, s/he still largely requires to have the objects physically 
before him/her in order to do this. For example, it would not be
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sufficient to make a series of statements to a child of this age, as is 
sometimes done in logic problems, from which an adult would be 
able to deduce that a named individual was taller than others. The 
child would require actually to see the people concerned concretely 
in front of him/her to make this assessment. The ability to 
understand at an abstract level, by making mental representations of 
statements made to him/her, is not yet present.
(4) Formal Operations 01  onwards)
It is during this phase that “the child becomes capable of reasoning 
not only on the basis of objects, but also on the basis of hypotheses, 
or of propositions.”’^  hi other words, the child develops the ability to 
deal with intellectual and logical problems by thought alone. The 
main developmental acquisition of this stage is “reversibility” or the 
ability to dissect a series of actions carried out as a sequence and to 
start with any one of them, working tlu ough from end to beginning as 
easily as vice v e r s a . T h e  child could previously perfomi this 
function if s/he had the objects to be manipulated present, physically, 
in front of him/her. During this fourth stage, s/he develops 
intellectually sufficiently to do it by thought alone.
Piaget’s theory, then, relates specifically to intellectual development. 
Psychoanalytic theory, Erik Erikson’s area, is more concerned with
Jean Piaget “The Stages of the Intellectual Development of the Child” in Alan 
Slater and Darwin Muir (eds) The Blackwell Reader in Developmental Psychology 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1999) 35 [hereinafter “Stages”] atp 41 
Maier, supra, note 16, at pp. 135-36 and 139. Reversibility will be discussed 
more folly in relation to capacity later in this chapter.
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emotional development. The child will obviously be developing on 
both these levels simultaneously. Erikson’s theory is useful, 
therefore both in its own right and because, taken alongside Piaget’s, 
it broadens the enquiry into the child’s developmental acquisitions 
and treats him/her more holistically.
Erik Erikson’s “Eight Stages of Man” ’^’ [sicl
In common with all psychoanalysts in the Freudian tradition, Erikson 
regards the developmental process as being driven by the interactions 
between three forces: the id, the superego and the ego. The id is the 
individual’s baser instincts and consists of everything “which would 
make us mere creatures”. ’^ It is countered by the superego, which 
coiTesponds, very hroadly, to the individual’s conscience.^^ The 
superego is comprised of values and rules for living which the child 
absorbs, largely unconsciously, from his/her parents’ (or, 
presumably, main carers’) attitudes and ways of being. It also 
contains cultural deposits and signs of the child’s grandparents’ 
creed, to the extent that his/her parents have incoiporated this into 
their own superegos. The child may also assimilate material gleaned 
from other adults who are significant in his/her life.
Erik H Erikson Childhood and Society (New York; WW Norton, 1963) chapter 7 
Ibid, atp 192.
Ibid, atp 193
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By contrast with the id and the superego, which are part of the 
unconscious, the ego is the “central principle of organisation in 
man’s [sic] experience and action.”^^  It is the conscious organising 
force which mediates, balances and organises the id’s tendency 
towards selfish and depraved behaviour and the superego’s opposing 
pull towards excessive moralism. One of the ego functions is to draw 
together all the knowledge and skills which the child acquires as s/he 
develops and to organise them for future application/'’ Thus, the ego 
exercises c o n tro l  over id and superego impulses.
Erikson divides the lifespan into eight phases and regards each of 
them as sites of conflict between two opposing ends, one of which 
will contribute to the growing personality’s stability, the other which 
will cause lasting problems if it is allowed to predominate. The 
recognition that development continues into adulthood is a striking 
feature of Erikson’s theory which he himself describes as a “unique 
contemporary discovery.
The eight phases are:
III Basic Tinst Versus Basic Mistrust (up to age 1 )
If the child receives a high standard of basic care in the first year of 
his/her life so that his/her needs are met appropriately and promptly
Ibid, atp 415 
Ibid, atpp 193-194  
Ibid, atp 261
s/he will develop a feeling of tmst both in the primary caregiver^*  ^and 
in the wider social context in which s/he lives and a sense of hope for 
the future. In order to inculcate this, parents need to convey a strong 
sense that there is a meaning to what they are doing. If mistrust is 
allowed to predominate in this phase, because of inconsistent care, 
the child will ultimately become insecure and suspicious.
(2) Autonomv Versus Shame and Doubt (roughly ages 1 to 3)
This outcome of this phase is dependent on the external restraint 
exercised over the child as s/he gains some autonomy and power over 
his/her own life through the ability to walk and the ability to exercise 
conscious control over the expulsion of bodily waste. The child has, 
however, previously enjoyed his/her dependency and experiences 
shame at rebelling against it. “From a sense of self-control, without 
loss of self-esteem comes a lasting sense of goodwill and pride; from 
a sense of loss of self-control and of foreign over-control comes a 
lasting propensity for doubt and shame.”^^
131 Initiative Versus Guilt Iroughlv ages 4 to 5)
Initiative is an enhancement of autonomy in that the child now begins 
to plan activities thr ough choice for the pleasure of being “active and 
on the move.”^^  In the previous phase, s/he often acted out of 
wilfulness or defiance. The child needs to be eased into an
Erikson assumes that this will be the mother. 
Erikson, supra, note 20, at p 254 
atp 255
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understanding of roles and institutions in the culture within which 
s/he lives, otheiwise the superego will become overly restrictive of 
his/her action and s/he will experience excessive guilt. S/he may also 
hate his/her parents where they fail to live up to his/her own exacting 
standards.
14) Industrv Versus Inferioritv (roughly ages 6 -1 1 )
During this period of early schooling, the child is impelled to learn 
and to produce all the time. The role of peers is particularly 
important and the child gains confidence from the positive responses 
of those around him/her. S/he aims for superlatives -  being, for 
example, the best, strongest, or funniest in as many spheres as 
possible. Throughout this phase, the child is actively working to 
improve his/her ego processes. While striving to succeed, the child 
fears failure. Any area of functioning where s/he feels mediocre may 
result in the predominance of the feeling of inferiority which impedes 
confident development.
15) Identitv Versus Role Confusion (Adolescence) (roughly ages 12 -  
18)
In adolescence, the young person is seeking to find his/her place in 
the world and to integrate, through frenetic activity on the part of the 
ego, all that s/he has previously identified with during his/her 
childhood. Where the negative force towards role confusion 
predominates, s/he suffers uncertainty, creating an insecure base from
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which to take decisions on important matters such as career or life 
partner.
16) Intimacy Versus Isolation (Young Adulthood) (20s and 30s)
Erikson’s concentration in this phase is on finding an appropriate 
marital partner^^ -  or more broadly on the positive pull to experience 
love and commitment. Henry Maier, commenting on Erikson’s sixth 
phase notes that “[gjraduation from adolescence requires a sense of 
identity; graduation from the first phase of adulthood requires finding 
a sense o f shared identity The sense of isolation develops where
the individual remains single, or without a significant relationship, 
and is thus, in Erikson’s analysis, placed at a distance from his/her 
peers.
17) Generativitv Versus Stagnation (Middle Adulthood) (40 -  64)
Generativity consists primarily in “establishing and guiding the next 
generation.” ’^ Where the individual is childless or, for other reasons, 
not concerned in directing the lives of his/her own children, despite 
Erikson’s apparent view that this is a less usual course, s/he will 
instead be directing natural gifts towards creativity and productivity 
in other areas. The negative outcome, where the pull to generativity
His work is, however, perhaps of its time (1963) in its failure to entertain the 
possibility of a fulfilling same-sex relationship.
Maier, supra, note 16, at p 70. Emphasis in original.
Erikson, supra, note 20, at p 287
is not realised often involves a “pei-vading sense of stagnation and 
personal impoverishment.”^^
18) Ego Integrity Versus Despair (Late Adulthood) 65+
It is only in old age that the ego is finally developed and, assuming a 
transition thiough, particularly, middle adulthood with the positive 
pull predominating, the individual attains what Erikson calls ego 
integrity. The individual is satisfied with the achievements of his/her 
life. On the other hand, where despair is the dominant pull, the 
individual realises that an insufficient period of the lifespan remains 
to find a route to ego integiity by starting again and living life in a 
different way.
These, then, are the developmental theories which will be applied in 
this chapter. Clearly they do not constitute a comprehensive 
summary of the whole of developmental psychology -  this would be 
an impossible task. Their puipose is rather to provide a flavour of the 
infoimation which the discipline can make available to the criminal 
process in order that this can be built upon in relation to the specific 
questions of understanding to which the chapter now turns its 
attention.
Ibid, at p 287
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Overview of the Mental Element for Child-Accused
It is the overall contention of this thesis that the child’s criminal 
capacity is key to his/her rational, de-stigmatising treatment as the 
accused in criminal proceedings. This chapter engages with the 
mental element of criminal offences in Scots criminal law where the 
accused is a child, seeking to conceptualise it in such a way that the 
need to establish that the child-accused understands his/her criminal 
act in context is given a central position and properly assessed in 
each individual case. This point is often obscured where 
“straightfoiward” mens rea is the only aspect considered. The 
chapter therefore seeks to unpack the mental element, dividing it into 
tlmee separate elements:
(1) a tlneshold of understanding and development which must be 
passed before the child can proceed to trial. This is conceived as 
three preconditions. In function, the preconditions resemble the plea 
of insanity in bar of trial which operates to determine whether an 
accused is able to be tried. That plea is only used where the defence 
deems it appropriate. The preconditions, on the other hand, must be 
applied, without exception, in every case of a child-accused;
(2) the child’s criminal capacity. In order to be criminally 
responsible, the child must have criminal capacity or, in other words, 
must have understood his/her action to be wrongful, and carrying 
consequences both physically, in tenns of causation and criminally.
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in tenns of sanctions. The child’s criminal capacity is examined as a 
set of capacity points, predicated on these broad issues, in relation to 
each of which the child may have a greater or lesser degree of 
understanding and ability. Criminal capacity then, and criminal 
responsibility which is contingent on it, are both relative concepts; 
and
(3) mens rea. This is conceived as a purely factual matter which the 
prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt in the same way 
as it is required to prove that the accused actually earned out the 
criminal act. So far as possible, all aspects of understanding, which 
are sometimes subsumed under the heading of mens rea, are 
considered instead as elements of the child’s criminal capacity.
Preconditions
Introduction
The puipose of preconditions is to create a threshold which, if it is 
not met, debars children from proceeding to trial, no matter the 
charge, on the grounds that their lack of understanding of the trial 
process, its purposes and its legitimacy, and of their own actions in 
their social context, is such that any trial would be, in Antony Duffs 
pliraseology, a “travesty”.^  ^ The concept of preconditions is derived
R.A. Duff “Law, Language and Community: Some Preconditions of Criminal 
Liability” 1998 OJLS 18, 189 [hereinafter“Preconditions”] atp 194
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from Duffs 1998 article on the topic but, as applied in this chapter, it 
also bears a resemblance (and no more than that), in tenns of the 
function which it might seiwe in the criminal process, to the plea of 
insanity in bar of trial.
For Duff, preconditions are “the conditions which must he met if the 
trial is to be possible, or legitimate, at all.’” '’ If they are not satisfied 
then any ensuing trial would be similarly futile to the attempt to play 
football with no ball or to lecture, in English, on philosophy, to 
visiting Poles who speak no English.^^
In simplified fonn. D uffs theory of preconditions is two-pronged, 
requiring (1) understanding of legal language and concepts; and (2) 
inclusion in the community promulgating the law. The first 
precondition derives from his conviction that “[a] criminal trial 
purports to be, and ought to be, a rational process of communication 
in which the defendant is actively involved”.^  ^ If, for any reason, it is 
impossible to achieve this quality of communication, then the trial 
will lack moral legitimacy. Convicting a French-speaking accused 
after a trial conducted in English with no access to an inteipreter 
would be an example of this, hi that event, there would, in effect, be 
no communication with the defendant whatsoever -  and certainly not 
a rational, active dialogue.
193
Ibid, atp 193 
Ibid, at p 194
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In order to facilitate this level of communication then, it is necessary 
that the accused should understand the language and the concepts of 
the law, at a sufficiently deep level to pennit full participation in the 
adversarial process and its legal arguments. Duff accepts that there 
is, inevitably, a difference in the level of understanding, which it is 
appropriate to expect from lawyers and from lay-persons. '^^ The 
process of understanding for the latter group is assisted by the use of 
“thick” concepts such as “murder” and “theft” which have a technical 
legal meaning but which are also commonly used with a meaning 
approximating to the legal one. The deployment of such concepts 
allows the participation of the accused in the process by providing a 
common point of departure with the legal language.^^ Thus, an 
accused person is likely to understand at the outset of his/her trial that 
“murder” consists in killing another, even if his/her awareness of the 
need for, and legal definition of, intention and/or recklessness is 
lacking. The accused could discuss “murder” using such a restricted 
definition and this is enough to satisfy Duffs precondition of 
understanding.
In Duffs view, the necessary understanding is only demonstrated 
however, where the accused is sufficiently comfortable with the legal 
language and concepts, to adopt these into his/her normal, first- 
personal speech in such a way as to show, not only his/her
Ibid, at p 200
atpp 200- 201
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comprehension, but also his/her acceptance of their normativity for 
him/her personally/^ This fits with Duffs conviction that the law, in 
a sense, belongs to those whom it constrains and that their obligation 
to obey it stems from this sense of ownership/’’
The leads into the second precondition -  of community inclusion -  
which rests on Duffs theory of communitarianism'” -  that law is a 
product of the community which it binds and that, accordingly, 
community endorsement is what imbues it with hoth moral 
legitimacy and normativity for individuals/^ As he says,
“one account of the moral conditions of the obligation 
to obey the law, and of being answerable tlnough the 
courts, is expressed in tenns of community. The 
defendant is obligated to obey the law in virtue of his 
membership of a community whose law it is; and he 
[sic] is answerable through the courts to his fellow 
members of the community for his alleged breaches of 
that law.’”^
The precondition is applicable where the strength of the criminal 
law’s moral entitlement to hold the accused to account is in doubt by 
virtue of his/her alienation from the community to which the law 
automatically applies, because s/he belongs to “unjustly
"W W ,atp 199 
""/W ,atp  199
See R A Duff Punishjnent, Commimication and Community (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), [hereinafter Community'] particularly chapter 2
43
Duff “Preconditions,” supra, note 33, at p 197 
Ibid;^ atp 197
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disadvantaged, impoverished and alienated groups’”'’ within that 
community.
Duffs concern here is, therefore, with social exclusion, and with the 
unfairness of subjecting those who are, effectively not part of the 
political community to the authority and sanction of its law.'’^  In 
order to identify such groups, he questions the voice in which the law 
is expressed. In other words, who is perceived as speaking and in 
what accent? If the answer to that question is “oppressive 
institutional powers in which [severely impoverished and 
disadvantaged groups] have no share”'”’ then, while such groups will 
still have the necessary understanding of the law - this is unaffected 
hy social exclusion - it may not be reasonable to suggest that they 
could really speak it, in the first-personal fashion required. Such 
groups are too marginalised to share the core values of the 
community.
This is an interesting idea and, superficially at least, one which 
appears to relate directly to children who, as a group, are not even 
notionally included in the community speaking the law. Participation 
in the democratic process as an elector is denied until the age of 18'’^  
and, while it is tme that children are ever-present within society, they
Ibid, at p 204
For Duff, a political community is one which is bound together inter alia by 
consciously shared values and aspirations. See Community, supra, note 41, at pp 
4 7 - 4 8
Duff “Preconditions,” supra, note 33, at p 204
Representation of the People Act 1983 s 1. The writer is grateful to Jean 
McFadden for providing this reference.
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are not usually accorded “full” membership/^ Power is largely 
directed away from them. The approach taken to them is often 
paternalistic. This can be seen in the difficulty for lawyers acting for 
children as to whether they are simply acting for them -  representing 
to the court the child’s own wishes and interests -  or whether they 
should in fact be advocating for their own perception of the child’s 
best interests.'’^  The latter is paternalistic; the former respects the 
child’s agency.
By the same token, the voice of the law - the interests perceived as 
“speaking” it -  will not belong to a c h i l d . O n  this view, then, it is 
unlikely that children could ever satisfy the precondition of 
community inclusion as conceived by Duff. Should this weaken the 
criminal law’s moral hold over them? In other words, is it morally 
acceptable to make them subject to that community’s criminal law, 
and the state-sponsored imposition of sanctions which it entails?
Whilst not seeking to diminish the potential unfairness in the lack of 
status accorded to children, it is submitted that, as a precondition for 
the criminal trial, exclusion fi’om the political community is not fatal
In Scotland, for example, they do/liave legal capacity until the age of sixteen. 
The Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s 1(1), states that “a person under 
the age of 16 years shall ... have no legal capacity to enter into any tiansaction.”
Anne Griffiths and Randy Kandell “Reconceiving Justice? Children and 
Empowerment in the Legal Process” in Simon Halliday and Peter Sclmiidt (eds) 
Human Rights Brought Hojne: Some Socio-Legal Studies o f Human Rights in the 
National Context (Hart) (forthcoming)
This point may be similar to tire argument presented by some commentators at 
the time of the Bulger case to the effect that a jury of Robert Thompson and Jon 
Venables’ true peers could only consist o f 10-year old children. See “James 
Bulger’s Murderers Must Get Justice From an Adult World” Independent 29 May 
1994,p 18
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morally. Much of the world which children inhabit is created and 
expressed in adult terms, yet this does not prevent their participation 
in social life, at their own level. Children are used to listening to, and 
interpreting the adult voice, language and concepts and should he 
given credit for this ability.
To an extent, this objection to Duffs exclusion of the disempowered 
from the communitarian reach of the law, draws on the, rather 
problematic, feminist theory of standpoint epistemology, which 
asserts that individuals placed low down in a hierarchy develop a 
particular Icnowledge and understanding of their situation because 
that is necessary to their survival within the relevant structure. In 
other words, standpoint epistemology “privileges [the lowly] status 
by claiming that it gives access to understanding about oppression 
that other cannot have. ... The experience of [having this status] ... 
reveals truths about reality that [the more privileged] do not see.’” ’
This theory has been criticised, inter alia, for its tendency to 
prioritise the experience of women over that of men and to constmct 
the fonner group only as victims.^^ Despite this, it does provide a 
basis from which to argue that children’s knowledge and experience 
of membership of society is equally rich to, if different from, that of 
adults. Accordingly, it is submitted that it would actually be 
detrimental to children’s interests as rational agents to remove them
Kathleen Bartlett “Feminist Legal Method” 1990 Harvard Law Review 103, 829 
at p 872
^^Ibid, atpp 873 - 877
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fi'om the criminal process on the gionnds of exclusion from the 
powerful élite. Such a step would deny the reality of children’s lives 
as young members of the society in which they live, albeit that their 
(political) participation in that society is often restricted by adults. 
This does not mean that the issue of membership of the community is 
not relevant to the morality of subjecting a child to the criminal trial 
-  rather that, as will be outlined subsequently, it is necessary that the 
precondition should be conceived in different tenais.
Overall, for Duff, the moral rationale for preconditions is that the 
accused must be tried as a "responsible citizen”^^  and failure to 
satisfy the preconditions disqualifies him/her hom this status. His 
theory however specifically applies to “sane adults”. I t  is therefore 
necessary to consider how best to conceptualise a similar tlneshold 
for child-accused.
Pre-Conditions for Child-Accused
Clearly, there are many aspects of the trial and the criminal process, 
not to mention the criminal act itself and the state of mind which 
accompanies it, with which children may have conceptual and 
comprehension difficulties. The majority of these are considered in 
this chapter as part of the child’s criminal capacity. The distinction 
in purpose between “capacity points” and the issues which are here
Duff “Preconditions,” supra, note 33, atp 195 
Ibid, atp 203. Emphasis added.
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theorised as preconditions is that the latter are regarded as so 
fundamental to the moral undeipinning of the trial that, if they are not 
satisfied, it cannot proceed.^^ The difference in content will be 
considered subsequently in this chapter.
(T) Pre-Condition of Understanding
The first precondition which is applicable to children is that they 
should understand the legal language and concepts deployed in their 
trial and, by extension, the trial process itself in such a way and to 
such an extent that their active participation is facilitated. As applied 
in this chapter, this precondition is, in certain respects, similar to the 
test for the plea of insanity in bar of trial which asks “whether [the 
accused] is fit to instruct a defence and fit to follow the proceedings 
in ... court.”^^
Following the case of T v UK; V v it is an accepted legal
principle that children must have sufficient understanding to enable 
them to participate actively in their criminal tiial. The particular 
importance of the achievement of a certain level of development in 
language in satisfying this test was highlighted in the Scottish case of 
HMA V where the accused, S, aged 1 3  years at the time of the
This does not mean that in all such cases, the child’s actions will have no 
consequences whatsoever within the criminal justice system -  merely that the trial 
cannot proceed. Chapter 5 argues that, in certain circumstances, it would be 
appropriate to refer child-accused who do not satisfy the preconditions to a 
children’s hearing.
HMA V Wilson, supra, note5, at p 195
(2000) 30 EHRR 121
Supra, note 12 This case will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
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trial^  ^was charged with murder but found to be insane in bar of trial. 
S suffered from a developmental delay causing him, inter alia 
“particular problems with language development”. He also had 
“impaired verbal memory function”.*^  ^ As a result, “[h]e [would] not 
follow dialogue during court proceedings if [it was] not adjusted to 
levels normally understood by a nine year old child.
The judge in the plea in bar of trial made two comments which 
highlight the legal and moral fundamentality of such abilities. First, 
he stated that: “[t]he question [was] not whether it would be possible 
to have the accused understand the case being made against him in 
ideal circumstances, but whether he could participate to the necessary 
degree in a trial which was conducted in accordance with the 
necessary fonns and procedural rules.”*"^ It is clear from this that, in 
Lord Caplan’s opinion, both the child-accused’s abilities and the trial 
process itself are to be considered as they actually are -  not as they 
could be in an ideal situation. Whilst certain concessions could be 
made by modifying aspects of the trial to accommodate the child’s 
developmental deficits,^^ a fit between the two cannot be forced. 
Where the mismatch is too great, the trial cannot proceed.
S was 12 at the time of the offence
HMA V S, supra, note 12, at p 5 (of internet copy). This information is taken 
from the expert testimony o f a chartered clinical psychologist, Ms Jemiy Mumo, 
who had examined S on behalf o f the Crown.
Ibid, atp 5 (of internet copy)
Ibid, at p 9 (of internet copy)
The judge could, for example, ask counsel to formulate their remarks in language 
tailored to the understanding of the child-accused.
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Lord Caplan’s second important dictum in HMA v S, was: “[i]n 
particular [an accused child] should not be expected to sit passively, 
like an object, while adults take exclusive control of his defence.” '^^  
This seiwes to demonstrate that the existence and quality of the 
child’s legal representation is insufficient to remedy his/her own 
difficulties with language and comprehension. A child who 
understands little or nothing of the language used, or who is so 
uncomfortable and afraid that s/he is disabled from following and 
contributing to the trial,^^ is unable to participate actively.
Language skills are not, however, the whole story in relation to this 
precondition. Because legal debate is conducted at an abstract level, 
a child’s ability to understand it, in all its complexity, is also in doubt 
because the acquisition of abstract reasoning skills -  i.e. the ability to 
perceive by thought alone without any concrete referent - occurs 
relatively late in childhood. This is an issue which Piaget specifically 
examined. He found that it is only during the fourth phase^^ that the 
child begins to develop the ability to understand and reason by 
thought alone, a skill which, it is submitted, is vital to the ability to 
follow a trial, where almost the whole argument will be made using 
concepts rather than concrete objects. Even if the actus reus of the 
offence could be represented concretely -  perhaps because it had
HMA V S, supra, n o t e  12, a t  p 7 ( o f  in t e r n e t  c o p y )
As was the European Court of Human Rights’ finding in relation to Jon 
Venables. See T v UK; V v UK, supra, note 57, para 95 (re Jon Venables) (para 87 
in judgment in respect of Robert Thompson)
In effect, during adolescence which, for Piaget, begins around the age of 11.
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been recorded by CCTV — grave difficulties would remain with the 
representation of both the mens rea and the explanation of the act’s 
relationship to the definition of the relevant criminal offence, to take 
two obvious examples, in anything other than abstract tenns. Even 
Duffs thick concepts may not provide much assistance for children 
because, as George Fletcher notes: “[a] child could easily draw you a 
picture of stabbing, poisoning, or stealing, but it would be hard 
pressed to explain to you in words the boundaries of the crimes of 
homicide or theft.”^^
The child’s abilities in both language and abstract reasoning then are 
cmcial to his/her ability to understand the trial process sufficiently to 
participate actively in it. If either of these abilities is lacking, or there 
is some other issue hindering the child’s active participation, the 
language precondition will not be satisfied.
(2) The “Communitv Membership” Preconditions 
Two further preconditions are applicable to children: (a) empathy and 
(b) knowledge of criminality. Both are underlain by the 
communitarian perspective attributable to Duff and require the child 
to have evolved into an appreciation of his/her membership of the 
society in which s/he lives and of the fact that such membership 
places certain obligations on him/her.
(al Empathv
Basic Concepts o f Criminal Law (Oxford: GUP, 1998) at p 78
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The empathy precondition requires that the child has a reasonably 
developed understanding, or at the very least, an awareness, of the 
way in which his/her actions can impact adversely on others and an 
appreciation of how it would feel to be in the position of the victim 
suffering those haiinful effects.^^ S/he must also be able to apply that 
appreciation to restrain or aiTest hannful acts which s/he is 
considering, or in the process of, committing. As discussed above, 
children are not accorded full membership of adult society. The 
development of empathy, however, signifies their own 
acknowledgment of their membership of an interconnected 
community.
This conception of empathy is close to Adam Smith’s theory of 
moral sentiments^^ which has itself been associated with a theory of 
development -  “the development of conscience tlirough the 
internalisation of social norms, as well as a theory of how the morally 
developed individual is able to ascend fiom moral conformity to 
moral autonomy.” ®^ The theory of moral sentiments requires moral 
judgments about the propriety or impropriety of action, or feelings, to 
be made by the individual, as an “impartial spectator,”^^  projecting
Psychopathic personality types may also cause an inability to empathise. This is, 
however, a different issue from the case of a child who has not yet developed an 
understanding of his/her place in his/her conununity.
Adam Smith Theoiy o f Moral Sentiments (edited by Knud Plaakonssen) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
Jerry Z Muller Adam Smith In His Time and Ours: Designing the Decent Society 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) atp 100
In Smith’s theory, this is an “ordinary person when he [sic] is in the position of 
observing the behaviour of any person with whom he has no special comiection and
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him/herself into the position of the agent or the “patient” (the person 
experiencing the feelings), this being the only way of judging 
whether an action or a feeling is just or unjust. On Stephen Dai*waU’s 
analysis of Smith’s theory, “[w]hat is distinctive about injustice is 
that it is properly resented and resisted, and this is something we can 
assess only from the perspective of individual patients.
Because, in Smith’s view, human beings wish to put themselves in a 
position of “shared sympathy” with others, they learn, by honing the 
skill of projection, to modify their own emotions to bring them into 
line with those of their colleagues. Another person’s extreme grief 
on the death of a loved one, for example, is experienced by the 
impartial spectator also as grief, but not on the same scale. Similaiiy, 
because the bereaved person realises, by projection, that his/her own 
emotion, in this situation, is much stronger than that of other people, 
s/he tries to modify it.^  ^ As individuals become more skilled in the 
art of projection, they attain the status of the impartial spectator and 
develop the ability actually to restrain themselves from acting in 
certain ways by reference to their appreciation of other people’s 
feelings. The impartial “spectator is biased neither towards 
[him/herself] nor towards those affected by [his/her] actions. ...
whose behaviour does not affect him any more or less than it affects anyone else.” 
T D Campbell “Scientific Explanation and Ethical Justification in the Moral 
Sentiments^' in Andrew S Skinner and Thomas Wilson (eds) Essays on Adam Sinith 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) 68 at p 71 
Stephen Darwall “Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith” 1999 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 28(2), 139 at p 143 
See Muller, supra, note 70, at p 102
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[His/her] imaginative identification with ““the sentiments of the 
impartial spectator”” provides the motivation which leads [him/her] 
to temper “his/her mutinous and turbulent passions.
Clearly, then, Adam Smith saw the ability to project imaginatively 
and then, on the basis of the infonnation so acquired, to temper 
action, as one which individuals had to develop. Children require to 
acquire it in the first place, a point which is acknowledged in Piaget’s 
theory of intellectual development. In Piaget’s second (pre- 
operational) stage, one of the characteristics which he notes is 
“egocentrism”^^  where all of the child’s activities are centred on 
his/her own body and s/he camiot understand that there are other 
perspectives than his/her own.^  ^ Initially, then, the child lacks the 
ability to empathise. Until s/he develops it, the precondition remains 
unsatisfied.
(h) Knowledge of Criminalitv
The other precondition stemming from the principle of 
communitarianisni is the need for the child to have some awareness 
of the meaning, and consequences, of criminality. The child may be 
able to understand, at a basic level, that a particular action is wrong
Ibid, at p 103
Although he later recast it more as “lack of reversibility of action”. Piaget 
“Stages,” supra, note 18, at p 39
It has subsequently been suggested that Piaget may have underestimated the 
ability of children in this respect. See Martin Hughes and Margaret Donaldson 
“The Use of Hiding Games for Studying the Coordination of Viewpoints” 1979 
Educational Review 31, 133 in David Messer and Julie Dockiell (eds) 
Developmental Psychology: A Reader (London: Arnold, 1998) at p 279
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but if s/he has no understanding that his/her actions operate within a 
broader societal framework which, in itself imposes certain 
obligations on him/her, then subjecting him/her to a trial, one purpose 
of which is to uphold those broader obligations, would clearly lack 
moral legitimacy.
Both Piaget^^ and Erikson accept that, for the younger child, adult 
commands will constitute the primary source of normativity.^^ It is 
implied in psychoanalysis and explicit in Piaget’s work that, initially, 
all such rules are regarded by the child as something external to 
him.^^
Piaget specifically studied children’s perception of, and respect for, 
rules, in particular those applying in their own games^® as one of his 
main areas of research into moral development.^* He found that very 
young children have a deep, almost sacred respect for rules and 
instructions given by adults and older children. They regard these 
as unalterable and expect that punishment will be visited on them for 
any breach. The content of the mles means little to them, and rules
It should be noted that Piaget conducted his research into moral development 
almost exclusively on children aged between six and twelve. This was because of 
the difficulty of constructing a set of moral dilemmas which younger children 
could understand. Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment o f the Child (tianslated by 
Marjorie Gabain) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1932 (1975)) [hereinafter 
Moral Judgment] at p. 120. It seems to be implied, therefore, that he assumed 
moral maturity at or around the age of twelve.
See, ibid, for example at p 47
Ibid, passim, particularly at pp 18 and 188
Ibid, Chapter I, pp 1 - 103
The other two areas were lying and the child’s relationship with others. Ibid, at 
pp 135 -  171 and Chapter III, pp 195 - 325 
For example, ibid, at p 114 
Eg, ibid, at pp 51 -  53 and 104
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which relate to concepts such as the instmction to “be good” are a 
source of anxiety to them because their intellectual development is 
not sufficiently advanced to provide them with a referent.^"* 
Commands related to objects, such as “don’t touch the fire” are 
regarded as a property of the object itself, which again emphasises 
their external nature.^^
On a similar theme, with reference to his second phase, '^* Erikson 
notes the need for very clear boundaries to be set by pai'ents,^*' thus 
implying that the child, although seeking to behave autonomously, is 
as yet unable to establish such moral guidelines for him/herself.^^ It 
is in his third p h ase , th a t  the superego undergoes a rapid period of 
development^^ so that, instead of the child acting in accordance with 
the requirements of his/her parents and/or culture as a purely external 
source of constraint, their commands and values begin to be 
internalised. Here, then, is the psychoanalytic origin of the child’s 
conscience.
Thus, the primaiy moral code for younger children is unquestioning 
obedience to their elders. This almost total reliance on others for
Maier, supra, note 16, at p 125
See also Piaget, Moral Judgment, supra, note 77, at pp 250 - 261, where he 
discusses “immanent justice” - “automatic punislunents which emanate from things 
themselves” (at p 250)
The phase is characterised by a conflict between autonomy on the one hand and 
shame and doubt on the other. It usually occurs between the ages of 1 and 3.
Erikson, supra, note 20, at p 251
Erikson also states that, if there is excessive parental control, the child will feel 
powerless and unable to exercise any autonomy at all which will have adverse 
repercussions for his/her self-esteem.
Characterised by the opposing pulls of initiative and guilt and usually occurring 
around ages 4 and 5
Maier, supra,note 16, at pp 46 - 47
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definition of “good” and “bad” tends to suggest that they are not in a 
position to be held responsible for the actions resulting from the 
external commands. Piaget draws a distinction between constitutive 
and constituted rules .Consti tutive rules require an understanding 
of the “spirit of the game” - of an overarching ethos in accordance 
with which constituted rules -  effectively “the letter of the law” - are 
made. Until the child begins to appreciate the existence and content 
of the constitutive rules, s/he cannot fairly be held responsible for 
breach of constituted mles. In other words, the child requires some 
idea of his/her own as to why an action is wrong.
This will occur once the child begins to internalise values and rules 
and to evaluate them for him/herself. Piaget considers that this will 
happen as past of the gradual shift from “unilateral respect” for adults 
to “mutual respect” between equals. For him, the whole of moral 
development echoes the transition in intellectual development from 
egocentrism - utilising the self as the primary referent in everything - 
to membership of socie ty .his tead of simply accepting the word of 
others as to how to behave, the child begins to take an active part in 
making the rules, in association with others.
This process of development is important with regard to the child’s 
understanding that certain actions are criminal because it 
demonstrates that, initially, the child has a very naiTow understanding
Piaget, MoralJudgment, supra, note 77, at pp 92 - 93 
Ibid, at p 53
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of wrongfiilness, seeing it as directly linlced to the objects to which it 
relates or as emanating from older individuals. S/he lacks the 
understanding that such instmctions have a context in two senses. 
First, s/he lacks the narrow understanding that there is a reason for an 
instruction, for example, not to touch the fire, other than the absolute 
authority of an adult. Secondly, and a fortiori, s/he lacks a broad 
understanding of the need for certain instmctions to be obeyed by all 
members of a society, if that society is to continue to function in a 
peaceable fashion.
In practical tenns, this means that the child may understand that s/he 
is prohibited from doing certain things -  for example, attacking other 
children -  but have no understanding of why this is a rule. 
Specifically s/he will not link the prohibited act (which is wrong to 
him/her because a particular adult said it was) with the involvement 
of the police (who are, to him/her, adult strangers uncomiected to the 
original prohibition) in enforcing the boundaries which the 
community has set. Since the criminal process and sentencing are 
even more remote from the act, these are even further outside his/her 
comprehension.
Taken together, then, these tliree preconditions - understanding of 
language, empathy and knowledge of criminality - constitute the 
tlireshold for the subjection of a child to a criminal trial. All three 
must be satisfied -  it is not sufficient, for example, to establish that
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the child can empathise if s/he lacks the language and abstract 
reasoning skills necessary to follow a criminal trial.
Distinguishing Preconditions for Criminal Capacity and Criminal 
Capacity from Mens Rea
Assuming however, that these preconditions can be met and that the 
trial proceeds, the court must still approach the mental element as a 
matter which is in issue. Two further aspects must be detemiined: 
(1) the child must have criminal capacity; and (2) s/he must have the 
mens rea for the specific offence with which s/he is charged.
Before going any further, it is important to draw out the distinction 
between the three aspects of the mental element. Criminal capacity 
has an overlap with, at one end, the preconditions and, at the other, 
mens rea. In relation to the preconditions, the overlap is specifically 
between the two community membership requirements and the 
investigation into the capacity points (which will be outlined 
subsequently) of distinction between right and wrong and 
understanding of criminality and criminal consequences. The 
evidence led on the preconditions will also be of relevance to the two 
capacity points with which they overlap. Chapter 5 will consider 
how best to approach this difficulty procedurally however, provided 
the evidence led on the preconditions is available to the court 
investigating capacity, no insurmountable problem arises. Apart
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from this, the preconditions are self-contained and must be 
determined prior to all other aspects of the trial process.
Preconditions are a novelty in the criminal process. Capacity and 
mens rea both already exist yet the distinction between them is rarely 
drawn. Indeed, if capacity is considered at all, it is often regarded as 
subsumed within mens rea. For example, Merrin v where the 
High Court was required to determine whether a child aged under the 
age of criminal responsibility could commit an “offence” in any 
circumstances, decided that s/he could not do so, on the basis of 
his/her inability to formulate mens rea or dole^^ with little or no 
reference to her criminal capacity per se, as a different, or separate 
concept, hi the same vein, a leading (English) textbook discusses the 
“character conception” of responsibility in contrast to the “capacity 
conception” but both under the broad heading of '^mens rea”.'^  ^ The 
distinction between mens rea and capacity may well not be 
significant in relation to a sane adult, in respect of whom no question 
of lack of understanding or rationality arises. It is, however of 
considerable importance in ensuring that children are only held 
responsible for criminal activity where they have sufficient 
understanding of what they are doing.
Merrm v S 1987 SLT 193 
Ibid, at p 196
C M V Clarkson and HM Keating Criminal Law: Text and Materials (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at pp 117 - 119
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Capacity is directly related to understanding; mens rea is, at base, 
simply a component element of the crime, which must be proved, as 
a fact, by the Crown beyond reasonable doubt, in the same way as the 
actus reus. Victor Tadros’ analysis of the distinction between two 
different aspects of responsibility - “attribution-responsibility” and 
“capacity-responsibility” - under the criminal law is helpful in 
drawing out this distinction.^*^
Attribution-responsibility “concerns the way in which [a particular 
consequence, state of affairs or action] came about: say whether it 
was done intentionally, recklessly or, alternatively was a mere 
accident, or whether it was justified or excused.” Capacity- 
responsibility, on the other hand, “concerns the kind of agent who 
performed the action” and whether s/he is “the sort of individual who 
is regarded as responsible in criminal law.”^^  It is submitted that 
attribution-responsibility is concerned with the “attribution” of mens 
rea. Capacity-responsibility, on the other hand, recognises that there 
is a notion of responsibility, relevant in criminal law which is not 
specifically tied up with the accused’s ability to formulate mens rea. 
If the act is not “brought about in an appropriate way” the agent lacks 
attribution-responsibility. If the agent is “not an appropriate subject 
of criminal responsibility”, s/he lacks capacity-responsibility. Using 
these concepts, Tadros demonstrates that the doctrine of insanity
Victor Tadros “Insanity and the Capacity for Criminal Responsibility” 2001 
Edinburgh Law Review 5, 325 
Ibid, at pp 326 - 327
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need not to be contingent on whether the accused has sufficient 
rationality to foimulate mens rea, as is sometimes taken to be the 
case, but rather on whether s/he is a responsible agent.
The position in relation to children is that capacity and mens rea play 
two different roles, each of which is necessary to the establishment, 
or othei-wise of a child-accused’s responsibility for a criminal 
offence. Capacity relates to his/her understanding; mens rea, 
effectively, to the completeness of the Crown’s case. In this thesis, 
mens rea is defined very narrowly so that, as far as possible, any 
aspect of understanding which would normally be subsumed under 
that heading is considered instead as an aspect of capacity.
It is logical to consider capacity first because, if it is deemed to be 
completely absent, there is no need to consider mens rea (or, indeed 
actus reus) at all because the child is simply incapable of committing 
crime. As Peter Cane explains,
“The law absolves certain categories of persons from 
responsibility for failure to meet its standards because 
they lack minimiun general capacity; but it sets the level 
of minimum capacity needed for legal responsibility 
very low. People whose capacity exceeds that 
minimum level are held responsible regardless of the 
extent to which their general capacities exceed the 
minimum. This is not to say that differences in abilities 
and resources are irrelevant; but they are relevant to 
deciding how to treat responsible persons, not to 
attributing responsibility. In legal terms, differences in 
capacity are relevant to sanctions, not liability.
Peter Cane Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart, 2002) at p 76
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In fact, however, this chapter argues for the relative conception of 
capacity, in relation to responsibility itself, which is implicit in 
Cane’s view, in teims of which the child-accused could have some 
capacity without being as responsible for his/her actions as an adult. 
A child-accused with less capacity is less responsible and therefore 
subject to lesser sanctions. The consequences of this 
conceptualisation of the issue for decision-making within the 
criminal process will be discussed in chapter 5.
Currently, the criminal law’s primary engagement with the child’s 
capacity is in relation to the age of criminal responsibility, which will 
be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. It is not, however 
coiTect to say that “law” in general can deal with issues of age, 
maturity and development only in a blanket and broad-brush fashion, 
such as that represented by the age of criminal responsibility or the 
age at which marriage is peimitted.^^ hi many areas, the civil law has 
taken a much more nuanced approach, requiring, for example, an 
individualised assessment of the competence of a child to give 
informed instruction to a solicitor*and conferring an obligation on 
courts and children’s hearings to take account of the views of the 
child by reference to his/her maturity.*®* The paradox of imposing 
criminal responsibility in a blanket fashion, at eight, whilst
CuiTently 16: Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s 1 
Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991 s 2(4A) (inserted by Children 
(Scotland) Act 1995, [hereinafter “C(S)A 1995”] sch 4 para 53(3)
C(S)A 1995 s 16(2)
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recognising, in other areas of law, the individualised way in which 
childi'en acquire abilities, knowledge and competencies is apparent. 
While this thesis supports, on political giounds, the need for an age 
of criminal responsibility, linlced to capacity, this chapter examines 
one possible alternative way for the law to conceptualise capacity, 
unconstrained by the bright line which the age of criminal 
responsibility represents.
Defining the Child’s Criminal Capacitv
It is fundamental tenet of the criminal justice system that only those 
who are “responsible” should be subjected to sanctions. 
Responsibility is tested by the trial process generally on two grounds: 
(1) did the accused, in fact, behave in a particular fashion 
accompanied by a specified mental attitude? and (2) did that 
behaviour and attitude together constitute a breach of the criminal 
law? The additional issue which capacity builds into the equation is 
whether, regardless of the answers to question (1) and (2), there are 
any grounds for holding that the accused person is unable to take 
responsibility for his/her “crimes” because of characteristics specific 
to him/her as an individual which prevent him/her from fully 
understanding, or rationalising*®  ^his/her behaviour. This part of this
The ciment law on insanity, for example, makes a direct linlc between 
rationality and responsibility. See Hume i, 37; HMA v Kidd 1960 SLT 82; 
Brennan v HMA 1977 SLT 151
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chapter examines what it is that requires to be established in order to 
answer this third question where the accused is a child.
Before proceeding to do this, it is important to note that capacity per 
se is not the only possible device for dealing with this third issue, 
which effectively amounts to a question of the fairness of attributing 
responsibility to an individual who, on the available evidence, has in 
fact committed an act which constitutes a criminal offence. One 
other possible mechanism would be an examination of the accused’s 
character.
Instead of looking at the criminal act in isolation, character 
responsibility considers it as an expression of the accused’s 
underlying character.*®  ^ As Jeremy Horder has clarified however, 
this does not mean that evidence of a previously unimpeachable 
character will serve to exonerate completely an accused who, in the 
manner of Dr Crippen,*®"* has committed a heinous crime. Rather the 
character conception “limits the inquiry into culpability to aspects of 
character manifested by actions themselves', nothing more or less.”*®^ 
This view is appealing in certain respects because, despite its 
concentration on the act, it still entails a more all-embracing 
examination of the accused as a person than other approaches to the
For an exposition of the principles of character responsibility see Michael D 
Bayles “Character, Puipose, and Criminal Responsibility” 1982 Law and 
Philosophy 1, 5
Dr Crippen murdered and decapitated his wife but previously had apparently led 
a quiet and law-abiding life. See hllp^/www.met.police.uk/historv/crippen.htm 
Jeremy Horder Provocation and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 
atp 133. Emphasis added
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mental element. It also allows for disposals to be tailored to the 
accused as an individual, taking into account the offence, rather than 
making the offence the primary referent. In the search for a theory 
which links punishment, directly and proportionately, to 
responsibility, its advantage is that it does not tag issues of character 
onto the end, as part of a plea in mitigation, after the determination 
that the aecused is criminally responsible has been made through 
his/her conviction.*®® Rather such issues are of the essence of the 
conviction itself.
With regard to child-accused, however, the overriding disadvantage 
of the character conception of responsibility, which gives an edge to 
the capacity approach, with its investigation of current abilities and 
understandings, is the fact that the child’s character is unlikely, as 
yet, to be “settled”, therefore sanctioning by reference to it may 
produce fundamentally uneven results. Of course, this makes the 
assumption that, in adulthood, individuals all arrive at some settled 
state, something which is, in itself, open to question. Nonetheless, 
this point about malleability was recognised, in relation to children, 
by Hume,*®  ^ whose own conception of the mental element -  dole -  
which will be discussed more fully in the next chapter, has some 
resonance with character responsibility. The character of a child who
For a full discussion of the benefits of a character approach see Nicola Lacey 
State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (London: Routledge, 
1988) especially chapter 3
Hume describes “persons under age” as being “naturally deficient in 
intelligence, and in firmness or maturity o f will. Hume i, 30. Emphasis added.
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commits a heinous crime is, potentially, still redeemable because 
his/her ways of being are less fixed than those of his/her adult 
counteipart. It is therefore not as useful to make decisions on 
responsibility based on that character. For this reason, the character 
approach is not here examined any further.
Defining Capaeitv
What is meant by the term “criminal capacity” generally? H L A 
Harf s well-known exposition of capacity, or the conditions in which 
a person can be required to take moral responsibility for his/her 
actions,*®  ^is a useful starting point from which to examine the child’s 
capacity.
Hart’s concept has been explained in these teims:
“[t]his conception of responsibility consists in both a 
cognitive and a volitional element: a person must both 
understand the nature of her actions, knowing the relevant 
circumstances and being awai e of possible consequences, 
and have a genuine opportunity to do otherwise than she 
does -  to exercise control over her actions, by means of 
choice.*®®
It is clear then, that understanding of the aet in context and its 
consequences, together with the ability to control one’s actions are 
the key elements. A similar position obtains in relation to children
HLA Hart Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy o f Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), especially ch 1 
Lacey, supra, note 106, at p 63
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although, because their understanding in general is more questionable 
than that of adults in the first place, it is necessary to spell out in 
detail exactly what it is that they are required to understand, and 
which abilities they need to have, to be held criminally responsible. 
This goes well beyond the enquiry into the presence or absence of 
mens rea and allows lack of appreciation of, for example, the 
secondary consequences of a serious assault (ie death) -  a lack of 
appreciation which may be entirely appropriate to the child’s age and 
developmental status - to be examined, in the standard case, as part 
of the criminal proceedings against the child.
How, then, are the relevant understandings and abilities to be fleshed 
out to provide an explanation of the concept of capacity? To have 
criminal capacity at all, the child must have at least a smattering of 
ability in, and/or understanding of, each of the “capacity points” 
which will now be examined. This list is indicative of the areas 
which the court requires to investigate and is not intended to be 
exhaustive. If the child-accused is completely lacking in all of the 
abilities or understandings then s/he does not have criminal capacity 
and must be acquitted. In practice, it is unlikely, in this event, that 
s/he would satisfy the preconditions for criminal liability
The Capacitv Points 
fa) The Volitional Element
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The volitional element in capacity requires that the accused 
genuinely had a choice as to whether to act illegally or not or, in 
other words, that s/he had the ability to control his/her actions. It 
may seem strange to use it as the starting-^omi for a catalogue of 
capacity points because, in relation to the concept of insanity, there 
has been much debate as to whether any impulse to action is 
genuinely irresistible as opposed to simply not resisted due to 
weakness on the part of the accused. Indeed, the Scottish Law 
Commission has recently argued, in its Discussion Paper on Insanity 
and Diminished Responsibility, that there should be no volitional 
element in a revised version of the defence.**® Even commentators 
who are strongly in favour of a robust set of insanity principles are 
not supportive of the volitional prong to the defence,*** primarily 
because of the difficulty of measuring the inesistibility of an 
impulse.
What is under discussion here, however, is not so much the issue of 
irresistible impulse conceived as a, literally, oveiivhelming urge with 
which the individual is simply unable to avoid compliance. Instead, 
the concern in this section is the inability of the child to conform 
his/her actions to the societal norms represented by the eriminal law 
because o/his/her lack of development of the appropriate, internal.
Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on Insanity and Diminished 
Responsibility (Discussion Paper No 122) (Edinburgh: The Stationery Office, 
2003) at paras 2.47 -  2.51
See Richard J Bonnie “The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defence” 1983 
American Bar Association Journal 69, 194 atp 196
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restraining and controlling mechanisms. It is appropriate to consider 
the approach taken by developmental psychology to this matter.
In psychoanalytic theory, the ego is central to the child’s ability to 
control his/her impulses and, until it is sufficiently developed to 
allow him/her to exercise conscious control over the id and the 
superego, s/he camiot be held responsible for actions stemming from 
an wTzcontrolled id or superego impulse. In Erikson’s second phase* *^ 
(which runs from the end of babyhood until the nursery and pre­
school years and is characterised by conflict between a (positive) 
sense of autonomy and a (negative) sense of doubt and shame) the 
negative pull towards doubt and shame might suggest that the child is 
beginning to be aware of “doing something wrong”, in a loosely 
moral sense. In fact, however, both the positive and the negative 
pulls are id impulses and therefore essentially instinctive. The ego is 
only beginning to develop to take conscious control over them. The 
process of ego development is ongoing into adolescence (Erikson’s 
fifth phase),**  ^ and his fourth phase (commencing in the early 
primary school years and continuing until puberty) is a period of 
particularly rapid ego development. The ego becomes dominant as 
the child aims is to consolidate and refine all existing developmental 
acquisitions and to be the best in as many spheres as possible.**"*
Erikson, supra, note 20, at pp 251 - 254 
See ibid, at pp 261 -  263 
See ibid, at pp 258 -  261
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In psychoanalytic theory, then, the ego synthesises the child’s 
understandings and abilities, allowing him/her to organise all 
developmental acquisitions and to deploy these in achieving new 
skills. The ego also plays a central role in allowing the child to 
c o n tro l  action and to make moral choices. Accordingly, it is 
important that the child’s level of development in this respect should 
be assessed as an integml part of his/her criminal capacity. The more 
developed this central, organising concept, the greater the degree of 
criminal responsibility which can be imputed.
The ego’s counterpart, in Piaget’s theory of intellectual development 
is cognition, which is treated as a purely mental process. (Ego 
development is influenced by emotional processes as well.) 
Cognition is the conscious mind’s attempt to organise all that the 
child perceives, thinks or does, throughout childhood and later life, 
into a cohesive system, so that earlier developmental acquisitions can 
be applied to solving novel problems. Piaget sites the earliest 
indications of cognition towards the end of his second (pre- 
operational) stage**® yet regards it as still developing very actively in 
adolescence. Full maturity of cognitive thought occurs, for him, only 
around the age of 14 or 15.**®
Any approach to capacity, then, needs to take account of the 
existence of such an organising concept, be it ego or cognition, and to
Between the ages of, approximately, four and seven. See Maier, supra, note 16, 
atp 125
Ibid, a tp  150
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consider how well this is developed in the particular child-accused 
before the court. Without it, the child’s understandings will be 
partial and possibly insufficiently connected to support the 
imputation of capacity to any meaningful degree.
The ego and/or cognition, then, represent an overarching concept 
governing all of the child’s understandings and the ways in which 
s/he deploys these in rationalising action. There are also a number of 
more specific matters which a child-accused requires to understand 
before it is appropriate to hold him/her criminally responsible. These 
will now be considered.
(b) Distinction Between Right and Wrong
It is fundamental that a child-accused should understand that his/her 
action is wrong. This corresponds to Hart’s requirement of 
understanding of the nature of the act. The difficulty for the criminal 
law is in establishing in what sense and to what degree. Where this 
question has been asked at all traditionally, it has tended to be 
considered one-dimensionally because of the criminal law’s 
preference for black and white tests to which a straightforward “yes” 
or “no” answer can be given.
hi Scotland, after Hume and Alison, it appears that there has never 
been any systematically applied test -  nor indeed any particular
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concern about this deficiencyJ^^ In England, until its abolition in 
1998,'^^ the doli incapax doctrine made the legal presumption which, 
as an intrinsic element of its case, the prosecution had to lead 
evidence to rebut, that children aged between 10 and 13 (inclusive) 
were /«capable of dolus or evil. The presumption, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter, therefore covered some 
of the appropriate ground but also constituted a good example of the 
difficulties and inconsistencies arising where the issue was reduced 
to a single question. In the standard case, this question would be 
whether the child understood his/her action to be seriously wrong, as 
opposed to merely n a u g h t y . A  number of other, often 
contradictory, foiTuulations were also used, however.
What is, in fact, required in relation to this capacity point is a broad 
investigation into a number of related matters, none of which is 
exhaustive of the issue. In order to satisfy the precondition of 
empathy, the child-accused will have a basic, possibly inchoate, 
understanding of the fact that his/her actions can impact adversely on 
another. In order to have (some) criminal capacity on this point, s/he 
should understand that his/her action is wrong morally and legally 
because it causes harm and it is contrary to his/her society’s accepted 
nomis. S/he should also have some understanding of degrees of
This is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 34
See C (a minor) v DPP [1995] 2 Cr App R 166
Eg morally wrong: JBIi and JH (minors) v O’Connell [1981] Crim LR 632; 
knowing the difference between good and evil: B v R 1960 44 Cr App R 1
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wrongfulness -  that it is more reprehensible to kill a baby than a cat 
for example, although each of these may appear to a small child to be 
an animate object taking up the attention of adults which is, in itself, 
unable to communicate effectively, by the use of language.
These issues are bound up with the child’s moral development and 
the way in which s/he develops an understanding of rules and begins 
to internalise concepts of self-discipline'^* and reasons for 
confoiming behaviour to acceptable standards. Until such time as the 
child begins to build on the rules which s/he has been taught to create 
his/her own value system, s/he will have very little understanding of 
the reasons for the proscription of some actions and the sanctioning 
of others.
(cj Causation
The next capacity point is causation. For the imputation of criminal 
capacity, the child must have some understanding of his/her 
behaviour as the trigger to a chain of causation. For example, a child 
who throws a bottle out of a fifteenth floor w i n d o w m u s t  
understand that this action may have knock-on effects, such as 
serious injury to a passer-by or damage to property, which are 
directly attributable to the act and for which, therefore, s/he is
Modem child-rearing manuals point out that very young children caimot be 
expected to have any self-discipline and that it only becomes firmly established in 
later adolescence. See Cluistopher Green Toddler Taming: A Parents ’ Guide to the 
First Four Years (London: Vermilion, 1990) at p 42 
See Piaget, Moral Judg?nent, supra, note 77, at p 53 
As happened in W v HMA 1982 SLT 420
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responsible. The point made by the defence in a 1749 case where the 
twelve-year old accused was convicted of murder remains valid; 
“[cjhildren are more ignorant of natural operations ... [which] are 
only picked up by experience. ... [They] are not supposed to know, 
because, in fact, they seldom know the natural effect of any of their 
actions.” '^ '*
An assessment must be made of the extent to which the child 
understands the physical mles of causation and, particularly of 
his/her understanding of his/her agency in bringing about remoter 
consequences. For example, in an assault, the child-accused is likely 
to have understood that striking a victim with a baseball bat would 
cause injury. It may be less clear, however, whether s/he understood 
that the same act might cause internal injuries which in turn might 
cause death. Again, s/he may have no understanding of the finality 
of death as an absolute state, from which the victim cannot be 
resuscitated. S/he may not have any understanding of the extent to 
which committing a crime such as theft can cause emotional distress 
to the victim. Factual issues of this nature require to be investigated 
in all crimes.
Developmentally, the argument being advanced here is that the child- 
accused must be able intellectually to link up the action with the 
result flowing from it. This process requires the child to have
HMA V Alexander Livingston 1749 Maclaurin No 55, at p 116
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mastered Piaget’s concept of “reversibility”, an ability which s/he 
begins to develop in Piaget’s fourth p h a s e b u t  which is only 
perfected during adolescence.
As was noted previously, this ability allows the child to separate out 
a series of actions earned out as a sequence and to start with any one 
of them, working tlirough the process in any order. The child is 
always able to come back to his/her starting point and this discovery 
helps him/her in his/her understanding of the whole of an event as a 
series of connected parts. The developmental advance in the fourth 
phase is that the child acquires the ability to conceptualise the 
process which s/he is dissecting so that s/he can see how the 
operation works by thought alone. Previously, this was only possible 
where the relevant objects were physically present. Because the 
ability to return to the begiiming is never lost, the child can 
experiment with different means of accomplishing a task. In this 
way, s/he discovers the existence of more than one perspective and 
his/her interest in which means can bring about which ends is 
s t i r red .Rever s ib i l i ty ,  then, enhances the child’s ability to 
understand the relationship between two events, such as an act and its 
consequences.
of formal operations (commencing at approximately age 11)
Piaget sites the development of reversibility in his third phase of “concrete 
operations” which, on average, covers the period from seven to 11 years. It is not, 
however until the fourth phase -  the final one identified by Piaget -  that the child 
can perform reversibility exclusively by thought. Until then, s/he needs actually to 
see and to manipulate objects in order to understand how they work and their 
relationship to each other. In the fourth phase, an explanation may be enough.
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(d) Understanding of Criminality and Criminal Consequences
Satisfaction of the precondition of knowledge of criminality implies 
that the child-accused understands that his/her membership of a 
society allows intervention, on behalf of that society, by the police 
where s/he has committed a wrongful act. To have some criminal 
capacity on this point, s/he must also understand that police 
involvement begins the criminal process, which may ultimately lead 
to the imposition of a sanction for breach of the criminal law -  
society’s agreed behavioural boundary. The child may not, of 
course, understand in quite these terms! S/he should, however, know 
that seriously wrongful acts engender the involvement of the police 
as a first step towards the imposition of punishments such as loss of 
liberty. For a very small child, this is arguably so remote from the 
physical consequences of the act as to be justifiably beyond his/her 
consciousness.
In assessing the child’s ability and understanding in respect of this 
capacity point, then, the psychological issues covered for the 
knowledge of criminality precondition will be revisited, particularly 
the issue of the child’s understanding of rules and the extent to which 
s/he has made the transition fr om merely following adult commands 
and sticking rigidly to the “constituted” mles to an understanding of 
the spirit underlying the rules.
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A child who is completely without an understanding of the interface 
between doing wrong as a matter purely for those concerned, and 
doing wrong as a societal issue, lacks criminal capacity on this point.
A number of commentators regard rationality as the key to capacity, 
at least as fai' as adult-accused are concerned. Tadros, for example, 
uses it coupled with self-control, to ground his concept of capacity- 
responsibility'^^ and Richard Bonnie, in his examination of the moral 
basis of the insanity defence notes that “it is fundamentally wrong to 
condemn and punish a person whose rational control^^^ over his or 
behaviour [is] impaired.”'^  ^ For Jolni Gardner, rationality is not only 
central to criminal capacity but also, at a much more basic level, to 
the status of being a human being because human beings require it of 
themselves to give reasons for their ac t ions . 'Rat ional i ty goes 
beyond the understandings already discussed in that it facilitates the 
ordering of thought and allows the actor to explain his or her actions.
Gardner’s concept of “basic responsibility” requires that an actor has 
the ability to have, and to deploy, reasons for acting whilst s/he is 
actually doing so and then to use those same reasons in explaining, or 
giving a good account of, those actions at a later date. Gardner’s 
view is that while it is reassuringly human to wish to avoid the
Tadros, supra, note 96, at p 346 
Emphasis added
Bonnie, supra, note 111, at p 195
Jolui Gardner “The Mark of Responsibility” 2003 OJLS 23, 157, at p 158
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unpleasant consequences of one’s actions, actors seek to do this by 
the use of rational explanation. “As rational beings we cannot but 
aim at excellence in rationality.”'^' Human actors therefore, do not 
simply wish to avoid punislmient but rather to demonstrate that their 
reasons for acting were so good, so justified, so reasonable that 
punisliment is not deserved. At his/her trial then, the accused must 
be able to explain to the court the reasons for his/her actions at the 
time of the offence. In this way, basic responsibility applies at both 
points in time: during the commission of the crime and during its 
explanation to the court.
There are difficulties with the application of rationality to children. 
Gardner himself identifies infancy as a factor which may effectively 
eliminate basic responsibility.'^^ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in Émile, 
his outspoken treatise on children and child-rearing, states that 
childhood is “the sleep of reason”, w h i c h  might suggest that it is 
inappropriate even to attempt to impute rationality to the very young. 
If, however, rationality in some way equates with humanity, then 
although it is clear that children’s reasoning ability is not as 
developed as that of an adult, it is necessary to credit them with some 
rationality. Its extent in the individual case is, again, a matter for 
investigation. Developmentally, Piaget’s concept of reversibility 
which has already been discussed, and which is not perfected until
'" '/W , atp 158 
at p 162
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (London: Everyman, 1993) (1762) atp 84
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late adolescence, demonstrates the considerable period which the 
refinement of reasoning ability occupies in the lifespan. Children, 
then, are rational but in different degrees depending, inter alia, on 
age.
Finally, it is worth noting that if the court canies out an inquiry into 
the child’s reasoning abilities -  the extent of his/her rationality -  then 
the likelihood is that this will lead it into some exploration of why the 
child committed the crime. In general, motive is not relevant to the 
criminal law. The Scottish courts have not been impressed by 
submissions that setting a dog on young boys was done as a joke' 
nor that vandalism of nuclear installations is justified by the belief 
that nuclear weapons are contrary to international law.'^^ As is clear 
from the previous chapter, however, some serious violent crimes 
committed by children provoke even greater outrage than those of 
their adult counterparts and, alongside that, because of the position in 
which children are often placed in society, as primarily vulnerable 
and in need of protection themselves, there is a greater demand to 
understand “why” they acted in such an apparently uncharacteristic 
fashion. Examining how such a child reasoned to the conclusion 
which led him/her to act, may provide some answers.
If) Mens Rgfl-Related Capacitv Points
Quimi V Lees 1994 SCCR 159 
Jolm V Donnelly 1999 SCCR 802
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The issue of mens rea in this tlireefold formulation of the mental 
element (preconditions, capacity, mens rea) will be discussed in the 
next section. As far as possible however, all issues of understanding 
are to be stripped fi'om mens rea and considered as part of the child’s 
criminal capacity. This means that certain issues, which are closely 
related to mens rea and, therefore, usually subsumed within it, may 
have to be considered instead, or as well, as part of the child’s 
capacity.
Perhaps the most likely one is the child’s developmental ability to 
intend. In fact, the child’s basic ability to intend, in teims of desiring 
an outcome and taking steps to attain this, is one of the earliest 
capabilities developed. Piaget identifies the very first stirrings of the 
notion of intention during the second stage of his first “sensorimotor” 
phase ' i . e . ,  on average, during the second month of the child’s life. 
Previously the child has taken in food, expelled waste products, cried 
and slept purely as reflex actions necessary to his/her survival. As a 
result of the repetition of these reflex actions, sometimes, by 
accident, in a slightly different way from previously, the baby learns 
to carry them out voluntarily. S/he has the first glimmering of an 
understanding that a certain action may lead to a certain result. 
Piaget terms this a “primary circular reaction”.
Roughly from birth until the age of two. 
Maier, supra, note 16, at p 105
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At a more sophisticated level, intention depends on the development 
of the ego and the child’s cognitive abilities, as discussed in relation 
to the volitional element of capacity, because intention requires that 
the child should bring together his/her desire for a particular outcome 
with his/her ability to think through the means of bringing it about. 
To be turned into an intention, these elements require some 
organisation - the role played by the ego and cognition.
This indicates that the basic question of intention can be allocated to 
mens rea and dealt with very narrowly, because even the youngest 
children have an awareness of the principle of seeking to effect a 
desired end. Other issues, such as the child’s understanding of 
bringing about direct, but undesired consequences through an 
intended act, will require fuidher investigation. These may be 
covered under other capacity points such as causation and knowledge 
of criminality and consequences but, to the extent that they are not, 
should be investigated in their own right.
Similarly, with regard to recklessness, it will be necessary to 
investigate the child’s understanding of risk, a point which is closely 
related to his/her understanding of causation.
Mens Rea
In the model of the mental element adopted by this thesis, all that is 
left for mens rea to do, after the preconditions and capacity points
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have been dealt with, is to provide a justification for the imputation 
of fault to the child on the basis that a harm proscribed by the 
criminal law occurred as a result of behaviour which s/he had 
intended or known about or as a result of a risk which s/he had 
recklessly taken. This is because the same moral difficulties arise as 
with adult-accused if the child is completely unaware of his/her role 
in the commission of a criminal offence, a matter which has been 
described as “the public scandal of convicting on a serious charge 
persons who are in no way blameworthy.” '^ ^
As far as possible, mens rea is seen as a purely factual matter, 
without which there is no case to answer. As Lord McCluskey 
stated, in a case where a plea of automatism had been led: “I know of 
no exceptions, other than statutory ones, to the rule that the Crown 
must prove mens rea beyond reasonable doubt. ... If there were to 
be no such evidence at all the proper verdict ... would be a simple 
verdict of “not guilty.””'
In theory, in this chapter, mens rea is conceptualised as divested of 
all questions of understanding, which are, instead, considered as part 
of the child’s criminal capacity. Mens rea therefore becomes the 
narrowest possible concept. Thus, if the child “meant” to hit his/her 
sibling with a wooden brick, for example, this would, prima facie, 
constitute the mens rea of assault - issues of his/her understanding of
Sweet V Parsley, supra, note 2, at p 149 
HMA V Ross 1991 SLT 564 at p 575
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the causation of injury or the distinction between right and wrong 
having already been dealt with as part of the investigation of 
capacity.
In certain respects, this view of mens rea corresponds to the principle 
of “ideal suhjectivism which was originally conceived by JWC 
Turner in the 1940s and taken on board by Glanville Williams in his 
systematic exposition of English criminal law,'"''' becoming, for a 
period over the middle years of the twentieth century, the main 
academic perspective on mens rea}^^ Jeremy Horder has explained 
the concept as follows:
[ujnder “ideal subjectivism, a defendant will not be 
found guilty of a crime to which moral stigma attaches, 
unless he or she intended his or her conduct to bring 
about (or was aware that his or her conduct might bring 
about) the forbidden consequence in question. The 
subjective mens rea must “correspond” with the exact 
nature of the actus reusy^^^
Thus, the accused is made responsible, both morally and legally, for 
only those consequences of an action which were exactly and directly 
in his/her contemplation when s/he carried it out. For example, 
during police inteirogation Jon Venables indicated that he and Robert 
Thompson had continued to hit James Bulger with bricks because 
“James just kept on getting back up again. He wouldn’t stay
Glanville Williams Criminal Law: The General Part (London: Stevens & Sons 
Ltd, 1961) (First edition published in 1953)
Jeremy Horder “Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens Rea” 1997 
MLR 113,95 atp 95 Ibid, atp 97
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down”.'"'^  Ideal subjectivism could take on board the intention to 
make him stay down without necessarily adding into the equation the 
virtual certainty of death which such an attack would engender.
In fact, the ideal would be for the court to be required to ask only 
“Did this child intend / know / behave recklessly?” receiving the “yes 
or no” answer which was regarded as so deficient in relation to 
capacity. In practice, however, it is impossible to narrow the matter 
down to this extent. Ideal subjectivism ultimately foundered because 
of the sheer difficulty of achieving its aims. The existence of mens 
rea is usually determined objectively, by an examination of the 
suiTounding circumstances, because of the impossibility of Imowing 
what was actually in the mind of another. This is, however, what 
would be required for ideal subjectivism to operate effectively. By 
the same token, even the thinnest possible concept of mens rea 
caimot avoid taking on board some extrinsic issues since this is 
dictated by the definition of mens rea in individual crimes.
Antony Duff has drawn a distinction between “intended” 
consequences, which correspond to the narrowly drawn concept of 
intention described here, and “intentional” consequences which 
include foreseeable outcomes. As he has shown, it is all but
David James Smith The Sleep o f Reason: The James Bulger Case (London: 
Arrow, 1994) atp 125
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impossible for the criminal law to utilise one of these concepts 
exclusively, without touching on the teirain occupied by the other.
In Scotland, following the case of Dmrv v murder
exemplifies this difficulty. The issue which the court was required to 
decide in that case related to provocation where the loss of self- 
control was induced by infidelity. The High Court re-examined the 
mens rea for murder and decided that, in order properly to 
differentiate it from culpable homicide, it was necessary not only that 
the accused should have intended to kill but that that intention should 
have been wicked. Cases of provocation were therefore not, strictly 
speaking, murder reduced to culpable homicide but never, in fact, 
murder in the first place because the intention accompanying them 
was not wicked.
In a case of murder involving a child-accused then, asking the 
“yes/no” question as to whether s/he intended to kill would not be 
sufficient to satisfy the mens rea element. The court would still have 
to hear evidence from the prosecution to substantiate its factual claim 
that that intention was wicked, even if the issue of the child’s 
understanding of wickedness had already been canvassed during the 
investigation of his/her capacity. Issues as to the scope of intention, 
while strictly matters of law, might create a similar overlap with
R A Duff “Intention, Mens Rea and the Law Commission Report” 1980 Crim 
LR 147
2001 SLT 1013
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capacity which can only be resolved fairly to the child-accused 
through examination under both headings.
For example, the English law on murder, which requires intention (or 
“malice aforethought”) has generated a considerable literature, both 
judicial and academic,'"''' as to what should be included within the 
scope of intention. The cuiTent received view is set down in the case 
of R V Woollin'"'^  which held that only outcomes which are a virtual 
certainty of the intended act may be regarded as subsumed within the 
defendant’s intention. In order to treat a child-accused fairly then, 
the court would require to hear factual evidence as to whether the 
death of the victim was a “virtual certainty” following from the 
accused’s act in order to make out the mens rea. But, in relation to 
capacity, it would also require to hear testimony as to whether the 
child was able intellectually to understand this.'"'^
The position in relation to recklessness is even more complicated 
because, to a gieater extent than intention, recklessness rests on key 
understandings of risk and of the likelihood that an action will create 
a risk. It may be that children regularly act recklessly because their 
experience is more limited than that of adults and they therefore 
require to test boundaries and to establish for themselves, by 
experimentation what behaviour constitutes a risk. The case of HMA
Antje Pedain “Intention and the Terrorist Example” 2003 Crim LR 579; RA 
Duff Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy o f Action and the 
Criminal Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990)
[1999] 1 AC 82
This would be covered by the causation capacity point
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V s ,  has, in fact, endorsed the suggestion that a different standard for 
recklessness might be applied to children in appropriate cases.
Scots law currently adopts an objective perspective on recklessness 
so that behaviour is reckless, if other (reasonable) people would 
regard it as being so.'^° This suggests that it is possible to identify a 
quality of recklessness - i.e. what it is that reasonable people regard 
as reckless - which is sufficient to satisfy the mens rea, but which is 
divorced from issues of understanding.'^' The difficulty is that 
children’s lack of understanding and experience may cause them to 
act even more recklessly than their adult counteiparts. This creates a 
situation which is dangerous to the preservation of the peaceful 
society but where their lack of understanding renders it particularly 
difficult to criminalise their behaviour. As Stewart Field and Mervyn 
Lynch have suggested “the yomig, the inexperienced and the 
mentally disordered may all in different ways lack the capacity to 
foresee at least some of the risks that the prudent person might 
perceive as ‘obvious’ or indeed ‘obvious and serious’.” '^  ^ The 
consignment of issues of understanding to the arena of capacity 
however allows both issues to be dealt with more easily. The
This is discussed in the next chapter. 
See Robson v Spiers 1999 SLT 1141
151 That is to say, it is reckless to drop a bottle from a fifteenth floor window, or to 
chase bullocks along a road and reasonable people would recognise it to be so 
simply by judging the behaviour. The issues of the accused’s understanding of risk 
is separate from this and could not be part of the judgment made by the reasonable 
person because the accused is unknown to him/her.
Stewart Field and Mervyn Lynch “The Capacity for Recklessness” 1992 Legal 
Studies 12(1), 74 atp 76
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dangerous behaviour is curbed because the child’s participation in a 
risky activity without due regard to the dangers, judged objectively, 
is enough to satisfy the mens rea and therefore to criminalise the 
behaviour but the response of the criminal justice system is tempered 
by its investigation into his/her actual understanding of his/her 
actions. Where the child genuinely has little or no understanding of 
the risks, it is unlikely that s/he would satisfy the preconditions, 
particularly of empathy, for subjection to the criminal trial in the first 
place.
The approach to the mens rea of loiowledge depends, even more for 
children than for adults, on what it is that the specific crime requires 
the accused to know. In reset, for example, the requirement that the 
accused knew that the goods were stolen may be satisfied without too 
much difficulty, as a bare statement of fact, provided it is read in the 
child’s terms, stripped of any imputed understanding of the technical 
legal aspects of the crime of t h e f t . I t  is particularly important that 
the precondition of understanding sufficient to facilitate participation 
is met in such cases, especially if the Imowledge called for is 
complex or specialised because, if the child cannot understand the 
crime, s/he will be unable to answer it. Beyond this, issues of 
understanding belong to capacity.
Conclusion
Or, a fortiori, embezzlement or fraud
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This chapter has argued that the child’s understanding of the crime in 
context is key to the imputation to him/her of any degree of criminal 
responsibility. It has therefore sought to reconceptualise the mental 
element in crime, where the accused is a child, to clarify the specific 
understandings which the child requires in order to be held criminally 
accountable. It has drawn extensively on the theories of Jean Piaget 
and Erik Erikson to demonstrate that children acquire and refine 
understandings and abilities tlnoughout childhood, that these are 
acquired on an individualised basis and that, accordingly, it is not 
appropriate to make assumptions about what any individual child- 
accused might or might not understand without specifically 
investigating this. The two theories taken together also demonstrate 
that the child is developing in several areas simultaneously. Piaget is 
concerned with intellectual and moral development - Erikson with 
the emotional dimension.
Understanding is important in two particular respects. First, the court 
must establish whether the child can be tried at all. This requires that 
s/he should understand enough of the legal language and the concepts 
used in the trial, to be able to participate actively. Equally, however, 
for the trial to be meaningful and fair, the child must have begun to 
acknowledge his/her position as a member of a community which 
both generates and then enforces its boundaries using the criminal 
law. Without this understanding, the child-accused will not 
understand the justification for being tried -  that is for scmtinising
141
his/her action, against one other person, which s/he may regard as 
private, in a foiinal, often public forum, with the power to impose 
sanctions including the deprivation of liberty. The chapter argues 
that this requires that the child-accused should be able to empathise 
with others to the extent of understanding the need to exercise control 
over his/lier own behaviour to avoid causing harm to those others. 
The child must also have some understanding of the purpose, effect 
and trappings of criminality including the role of the police. These 
three understandings are gi'ouped together as preconditions which 
constitute a threshold for proceeding to the trial itself.
If the child-accused meets the preconditions, it is appropriate to try 
him/her. Within the trial process, the chapter specifically separates 
out criminal capacity from mens rea, requiring that the court actively 
investigates the former. This investigation is predicated on the 
attempt to ascertain the child’s understanding of the act in context 
and is achieved by the investigation of the six capacity points listed 
and explained in the chapter viz: the volitional element, the 
distinction between right and wrong; causation; understanding of 
criminality and criminal consequences, rationality and the mens rea- 
related capacity point. The chapter seeks to indicate the role which 
developmental psychology might play in establishing these points.'^"'
The nature of the evidence required to establish the points is discussed in more 
detail in chapter 5.
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Finally, the Crown must prove, as a factual issue, beyond reasonable 
doubt, in the normal way, that the child-accused carried out the actus 
reus of the crime with the necessary mens rea. Mens rea which, as 
the chapter argues, is sometimes regarded as subsuming all and any 
relevant issues of understanding, is here conceived in the most pared 
down fonnulation possible. As far as possible, all issues of 
understanding are stripped from it and considered as aspects of 
capacity.
The child is criminally responsible if s/he committed the actus reus 
with the relevant mens rea and s/he has some understanding of the 
capacity points. Responsibility is, however, a relative concept which 
varies by reference to the level of capacity imputed in each individual 
case. Chapter 5 considers the implications of this.
This chapter, then, has presented a model for investigating the child’s 
imderstanding in order to establish his/her criminal capacity and, on 
the basis of this, the degree of criminal responsibility which s/he can 
take for his/her actions.
The threefold characterisation of the mental element put forward here 
allows the criminal process to respond to the child as an individual 
with certain developmental deficits whilst, at the same time, 
responding appropriately to his/her criminal act(s). This tension 
between the child as vulnerable and in need of protection on the one 
hand, and as the perpetrator of serious wrongful acts on the other, is
143
present in all aspects of the criminal process’s engagement with 
children. The next chapter examines the way in which Scots criminal 
law has dealt with this difficulty.
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Chapter 3
The Treatment of Children in Scots Criminal Law
Introduction
Thus far, this thesis has been concerned with two main themes. The 
first is the tension inlierent in the status of "child-criminal" arising 
from being, simultaneously, vulnerable and in need of protection and 
capable of seriously anti-social, sometimes violent, behaviour. The 
second is the search for a mechanism within criminal law to take 
account of the child’s actual understanding of his/her criminal act in 
context so that an appropriate level of criminal responsibility can be 
imputed to him/her. This chapter examines the approach taken by 
Scots criminal law to children who commit serious crimes both 
historically and in contemporary times. In particular, it will consider 
the place of the child’s criminal capacity but it will also touch upon 
the importance or, conversely, in some cases, the apparent 
irrelevance, of the accused’s status as a child. The chapter is 
organised chronologically commencing with the institutional writer, 
Mackenzie and ending with cases decided in Scotland under the 
Human Rights Act 1998. It also draws on comparative material to 
elucidate certain of the points discussed including, specifically, a 
discussion of the doli incapax presumption as it was applied in 
English law until 1998, since this is a good example of the 
difficulties arising from addressing capacity only in a very narrow
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sense. Overall, the chapter seeks to demonstrate the need, and the 
scope, in the modern law, for a broader and more detailed 
investigation of the child-accused’s understanding of his/her alleged 
criminal acts.
Before proceeding to examine the capacity issue per se however, it is 
useful to provide a brief overview of some of the other historical 
currents in relation to children who offend, both in Scotland and 
comparatively. In particular, it is helpful to identify the nature of the 
punishments historically imposed on children.
Historical Oveiwiew
The mles of the criminal law have always been of general application 
to both adults and children. It is as much murder, for example, if a 
child kills with wicked intention as if an adult does so. 
Differentiation between the two groups therefore arises, if at all, in 
relation to the application of the law. For example, it is known that 
the Anglo-Saxon king, Athelstan, passed a law specifying that no 
child under fifteen could be executed unless he had resisted or fled.  ^
Similar leniency is discernible in the Netherlands in the sixteenth 
century where there is some evidence that children aged under twelve
' J.W. Cecil Turner (ed) Kenny's Outlines o f Criminal Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1966) (nineteenth ed) [hereinafter Kenny'] at p 78, n 7. 
Athelstan lived from 895 - 940 AD and became king of the whole of England in 
925. Blackstone also credits Athelstan with setting the age of legal responsibility 
at twelve, in all cases of theft, for a greater sum than twelve-pence. Sir William 
Blackstone Commentaries on the Law o f England (London: Thomas Tegg, 
Cheapside, 1830) Vol. IV, (17th edition) [hereinafter IV Blackstone] atp 23
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“either did not appear in court or received such light punishment that 
it was not worth registering" and “[cjhildren between age twelve and 
fifteen received milder punishments than adults”^
The general rule in Scotland which was, in principle, applicable to 
adults and children, was that capital punishment was mandatory for 
offences such as murder, theft and fire-raising. One consequence of 
this was that it applied to crimes which seem minor by modern 
standards. For example, because theft was a capital crime, hanging 
could be imposed for pocket-picking.^ In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, in England, there is evidence of this, the 
ultimate penalty, actually being carried out against very young 
children. Kenny reports that “a boy of eight was hanged in 1629 for 
burning two bams and it appears that a brother and sister aged seven 
and eleven respectively were hanged for felony at King’s Lynn in 
1708”.^
In Scotland, lesser punishments were known as “arbitrary pains" and 
the courts had discretion in deciding what to impose once it was clear 
that the death penalty was not to apply. The punishments to which 
children were subjected, having been ‘saved’ from the gallows 
however, seem barbaric when judged by modem standards. For
 ^ Josine Junger-Tas “The Juvenile Justice System: Past and Present Trends in 
Western Society” in Ido Weijers and Antony Duff (eds) Punishing Juveniles: 
Principle and Critique (Oxford: Hart, 2002) 23 at p 25
 ^ In his discussion of the legal tieatment of minors, Plume mentions the case of “a 
lad of about eighteen”, Walter Ross, who had the death sentence passed for such an 
offence in 1786. Hume, i, 30 
Kenny, supra, note 1, atp 80. Blackstone makes reference to the same case: IV 
Blackstone at pp 23 - 24
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example, in 1493, Thomas Gotliraston, aged eight, was sentenced to 
be scourged to the effusion of blood for the murder of John Smith -  
because the law could not justify imposing the death sentence on 
someone of his age.^ Again, in March 1701, two boys, Duff, aged 
fourteen and Millar, aged about twelve were convicted, along with 
two “grown men” of breaking into the Earl of Home’s house and 
stealing a quantity of plate. The libel against the two boys was only 
found relevant to infer an arbitrary pain.*^  In other words, there was 
not enough evidence to convict them of the capital crime of theft by 
housebreaking. One of the men was, however, “condemned to die”. 
Duff and Millar were sentenced to be “scourged at the gibbet, at the 
time of his execution and Duff [was to] stand for an hour with an ear 
nailed to the gibbet in the presence of Millar.”  ^ It also seems to have 
been common practice to impose a “transportation pardon” on 
children convicted of capital crimes.^ They were transported to penal 
colonies abroad, sometimes for life,^ this being considered humane 
by comparison with hanging.
 ^Maclaurin Arguments and Decisions in Remarkable Cases Before the High Court 
o f  Justiciary, and Other Supreme Courts, in Scotland (Edinburgh: J Bell, 1774) atp 
747
Criminal procedure at this time required a debate on the relevancy of all libels. 
Having heard argument, the judge then pronounced an interlocutor, on the basis of 
which the matter was remitted to an assize to determine guilt or imiocence. John 
W Cairns “Elamesiicken and the Major Premiss in the Libel, 1672-1770: Criminal 
Law in the Age of Enlightenment” in Robert F Hunter (ed) Justice and Crime: 
Essays in Honour o f the The Right Honourable The Lord Emslie (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1993) 138 atpp 143 -  144 
 ^Hume i, 33
® See examples given by Hume i, 31 -  34; Alison i, 664 - 5 
 ^Alexander Livingston 1749 Maclaurin no 55
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This, then, provides a flavour of the historical approach to children 
who offend and of the context within which the institutional writers 
were operating. It is appropriate, therefore, now to examine their 
work.
Institutional Writers
The institutional writers have been key to the development of Scots 
law. Between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries, tlu'ee 
attempts to set down the principles specifically of criminal law in a 
comprehensive and accessible fashion are notable, each of which has 
acquired the status of an institutional writing - a primary source of 
law. The first edition of The Law and Customs o f Scotland in 
Matters Criminal by Sir George Mackenzie is dated 1678, Baron 
David Hume published the first edition of his Commentaries on the 
Law o f Scotland, Respecting Crimes in 1797 and Archibald Alison’s 
Principles o f the Criminal Law o f Scotland appeared in 1832. Of 
these, Hume is pre-eminent, perhaps because Alison’s account is 
notably derivative of his.
All three writers paid close attention to the question of crimes 
committed by children. It is, therefore, interesting that there has been 
very little contemporary commentary on this aspect of their work. 
The Scottish Law Commission did ground its discussion of the age of 
criminal responsibility in Hume and Alison, but it was at pains to 
argue that they were concerned solely with the imposition of
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punishment and not at all with capacity or mens rea}^ This chapter 
contends that this is too limited a reading of Hume and Alison. It is 
true that they were primarily concerned with the issue of punishment 
but the argument here put forward is that they justified its imposition 
at various ages by reference to the child’s understanding of issues 
which would come under certain of the capacity points identified in 
the previous chapter. It is, therefore, arguable that capacity was seen 
as an integral part of the process of deteimining and applying 
punishment.
The Law Commission’s Report makes no reference to Mackenzie. 
This is a surprising omission because it leaves the Commission’s 
analysis of the historical foundations of Scots law in this area 
incomplete. Also, and more importantly, Mackenzie’s view on 
children who offend is noticeably different to Hume and Alison’s but 
strikingly similar to the recommendation ultimately made by the 
Commission — that children should be immune from prosecution up 
to the age of twelve. It is appropriate, therefore now to examine the 
content of these thi'ee institutional writings with regard to child- 
offenders.
Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on Age o f Criminal Responsibility 
(Discussion Paper No. 115) (Edinburgh: TSO, 2001) paras 2.8 -  2.10; Scottish Law 
Commission Report on Age o f Criminal Responsibility (Scot Law Com No 185) 
(Edinburgh: TSO, 2002) paras 2.2 -  2.3
' ' The relevant age will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.
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Dole
111 order to understand the position of Hume and Mackenzie in 
relation to the child’s criminal responsibility and liability it is 
necessary firstly to have an understanding of the way in which the 
mental element, which consisted in “dole,” was conceived generally 
in their time.^  ^ By the time of Alison, the beginning of the shift 
towards the modem concept of mens rea is discernible, at least in 
relation to certain crimes
Hume’s whole analysis of the criminal law of Scotland commences 
with a discussion of “the nature of crimes”,c e n tra l  to which is this 
concept of “dole” which he defines as “that comipt and evil 
intention, which is essential (so the light of nature teaches, and so all 
authorities have said) to the guilt of any crime.” Although he uses 
the word “intention”, thus suggesting a concept similar to the modern 
mens rea requirement,^^ he goes on to qualify his explanation in this 
way:
“Now, in delivering tliis precept, those authorities are not to 
be understood in this sense, as if it were always necessary 
for the prosecutor to bring evidence of an intention to do the 
very thing that has been done, and to do it out of enmity to 
the individual who has been injured. In this more
See Lindsay Farmer Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order: Crime and the 
Genius o f Scots Law, 1747 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997) [hereinafter Genius] atpp 132 - 133 
See ibid, at p 160 with regard to homicide 
Hume i, 21.
Hume i, 21.
J Irvine Smith and Ian MacDonald have suggested that “[t]he doctrine of mens 
rea ... existed in Scotland from medieval times”: “Criminal Law” in The Stair 
Society An Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 
1958), Volume 20, chapter XXI, at p. 280. This does, however, seem to be slightly 
mis-stating the case.
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favourable sense to the prisoner, the maxim cannot be 
received into law; for it would screen many great offenders 
from the due punishment of their transgressions. And I 
think it is only true in this looser and more general, but a 
practical and reasonable sense, ... that the act must be 
attended with such circumstances, as indicate a coiTupt and 
malignant disposition, a heart contemptuous of order, and 
regardless of social duty.”^^
Hume’s understanding of the mental element of crime, in the foim of
dole, then, is of a pervasive wickedness of character^ ^  which, he
appears to be implying, would be necessary before an individual
would be motivated to commit a crime -  any crime -  in the first
place. It fits most closely with the character conception of
responsibilty discussed in the previous chapter, in its pervasiveness in
an individual, although it picks up only negative aspects of character.
It is also a more objective concept than modem formulations of mens
rea. If the accused has committed a wicked act, then, the argument
goes, his generally “cormpt and malignant disposition” can be
implied from this.^  ^ There is little place for subjective concepts, such
as “intention” which, in contemporary criminal proceedings, require
the Crown to prove, at least notlonally, what was actually in the
accused’s mind at the time of the criminal act.^^
Hume says
Hume 1 ,2 1 -2 2
See Michael G A Cluistie (ed) Gerald H Gordon The Crvninal Law o f Scotland 
(Edinburgh: W Green, 2001) at para 7.02 
Farmer Genius, supra, note 12, atp 133
See also, in relation to dole, Lindsay Farmer “The Criminous and the 
Incriminating: Narratives of Guilt and Innocence in Scottish Criminal Trials” 2000 
Juridical Review 285, [hereinafter “Criminous”] at pp 294 - 5
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“[i]f indeed the thing happen accidentally, and in the 
prosecution also of some lawful act, from which the 
panel cannot reasonably have any apprehension of the 
hann that ensues, this is exclusive of the notion of guilt: 
There is no malus animus, no vice or corruption of 
purpose, to fix an evil character on his deed. But if the 
circumstances indicate a wicked and malignant spirit, a 
resolution to do some violent and atrocious mischief; 
here, though the event prove more disastrous than the 
pannel was absolutely bent upon, or though it take a 
course somewhat different from what he intended, it is 
clear, that in many cases it will be quite the same, in the 
estimation of law, as if he had foreseen and intended all 
that happens.
In Hume’s view, the fact of embarking on such obviously 
unacceptable courses of conduct in the first place makes the accused 
a worthy object of punisliment, and the criminal law would be failing 
in its purpose if it did not exact this. The accused’s specific state of 
mind in relation to the act actually committed, the point with which 
modem mens rea is concemed, is not relevant.
This, then, explains the principles of the mental element for Hume. 
Although it is his analysis which is examined here, the concept is 
applicable to Mackenzie’s work, which will now be considered. 
Mackenzie
Mackenzie deals only with the category of “minors”, though he does 
not specifically identify the ages included in this gioup.^^ At the 
outset, he notes that the issue of whether minors may be punished for 
their crimes is “contraverted amongst the Doctors”^^  and, perhaps as
Hume, i, 22 - 24
For Hume and Alison, minority commenced at fourteen. 
Mackenzie, I, I, 7
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a consequence, his own account expresses a number of differing 
views on the issue. The received view, in Mackenzie’s time, appears 
to have been that punishment is only appropriate at all where there 
has been “contrivance,” (by which he apparently means conscious 
deviousness or scheming) and, even then, only if dole can be 
proved.^"  ^ More importantly from the point of view of the issues 
explored in this thesis, there is also a clear indication that the child’s 
ability to generate dole -  in a sense, his/her “capacity” for 
wickedness - must be investigated by the courts. It will not be 
assumed or inferred from the offence.
Mackenzie draws a distinction between what would today be Icnown 
as mala in se - “Crymes [sic] against the Law of Nature, such as 
Murder” and mala prohibita - “meerly [sic] Statutory Crymes, such 
as usury, forestalling of mercats &c.”^^ . For the former category, a 
minor is liable but not to the standard punisliment; for the latter no 
punishment is appropriate unless “malice supplements age,”^^  a point 
which can only be proved by very strong evidence. It is unclear why 
the child’s punisliment is to be limited for crimes contrary to natural 
law. The inference it that it is simply obvious that it should be. The 
Calvinist view was that “although the natural law was inscribed on 
the conscience of man [sic], human understanding could be deficient
Mackenzie I, I, 7. This requirement for proof of dole has overtones of the doli 
incapax presumption which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
Mackenzie I, I, 7
‘hibi malitia supplet aetatem'’ Mackenzie I, I, 7
154
as a result of original sin”.^  ^ Perhaps the child’s understanding was 
perceived as deficient anyway.
Mackenzie specifies that children should not be punished for ait and 
part involvement in a crime because this requires “judgement and 
contrivance” on their part and ultimately “depends upon Acts of the 
judgement, wherein minors may be mistaken, because of their 
fragility and less age.”^^  Mackenzie therefore recognises the power 
exercised by adults over children and assumes, it appears, that 
responsibility for crimes committed by adults and children together 
rests primarily with the adult.
Mackenzie’s own views on the criminal capacity of minors are 
trenchant and interesting, and, apparently, different from those of the 
“Doctors” in certain key respects. He is particularly concemed with 
the child’s ability to participate in the trial, and his discussion 
foreshadows the debate arising from the right to a fair trial contained 
in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights over 300 
years later. Mackenzie cites authority for the view that it is the law 
that a minor cannot be obliged to answer, during minority, for any 
crime by which s/he might “loss” life or limb. This is because s/he 
might omit some defence competent to him/her.^^ For his own part, 
he takes this issue further by arguing that minors should not be 
obliged to answer for any crime committed during their minority.
Farmer “Criminous,” supra, note 20, at pp 294 - 5 
Mackenzie I, I, 7 
Mackenzie I, I, 8
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until they attain majority^^ - a view which is criticised by Hume for 
its dangerous overindulgence of adolescents/^ Mackenzie’s position 
is reached on the basis that, since a minor cannot be obliged to debate 
his/her inheritance tlnough his father {de haereditate paterna) during 
his/her minority, much less should s/he be “oblieged [sic] to defend 
in a criminal pursuit where, in the heat of youth s/he might say, or not 
say, something which would then do him/her harm {ubi calore 
juvenili potest dicere vel tacere quod ei nocere potest).”^  ^
Effectively, then, Mackenzie argues for immunity from prosecution 
for minors on the basis that they lack the skills necessary to render 
the trial process fair. It is particularly interesting that Mackenzie 
adopted this position in 1678 yet virtually the same conclusion was 
reached by the Scottish Law Commission in 2002, at least for 
children aged eleven and under, without any overt reference to his 
work.^^
Because it is minors’ ability to participate in the trial which is in 
doubt, however, it appears that Mackenzie has no qualms about 
calling them to account for crimes committed in minority once they 
attain majority. Perhaps this makes sense in the context in which 
Mackenzie is writing in that, by the time the accused becomes an 
adult, it will be clearer whether or not, in terms of dole, his/her 
character has “settled” to be wicked and depraved.
Mackenzie, I, I, 8 
Hume, i, 31 
Mackenzie I, I, 8
Scot Law Com No 185, supra, note 10, at paras 3.2 to 3.5
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Mackenzie, then, has been widely disregarded by modem 
commentators, certainly in relation to children, but his views are no 
less interesting for that. It is appropriate, now, however, to turn to 
Hume, whose work remains key to Scottish criminal law.
Hume
In his own time, Hume’s Commentaries were an “outstanding 
success” because “for the first time lawyers had access to a 
comprehensive and fully argued account of crimes, defining them, 
explaining their nature, and discussing them on the basis of the 
records of the Justiciary Court.” '^^  Even in modem times, the leading 
work on substantive Scottish criminal law, Gerald Gordon’s The 
Criminal Law’ o f Scotland^^ takes Hume’s position as the starting 
point for its discussion of most common law offences^^ and 
defences^^ whilst the High Court has applied Hmne as a decisive 
authority. In McKinnon v HM A/  ^ for example, a five-judge court 
was convened specifically to consider the law on art and part liability 
in murder cases. In delivering the judgment of the court. Lord Justice 
General Cullen stated, “[i]n considering the law ... it is appropriate 
for us to begin by considering what was stated in Hume on crimes 
conceming art and part of m u r d e r . A g a i n ,  in Brennan v HMA/^
Cairns, supra, note 6, at p 174 
Gordon, supra, note 18
Eg, theft, para 14.01; embezzlement, para 17.02 
Eg, self-defence in murder cases paras 24.03 -  24.07 
2003 SET 281 
Ibid, at p 284.
1977 JC38, atp 43
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one of the leading cases on the Scots law of insanity, Lord Justice- 
General Emslie, giving the opinion of the court, stated “[i]n 
discovering what is insanity within the meaning of our criminal law 
we cannot do better than begin by noticing that Hume treated the 
nature of the plea, ..., thus”,
Lindsay Faimer"^  ^ has noted that the resort to Hume by the courts has 
tended to be pragmatic or instrumental. Thus, where Hume 
represents the position which the court wishes to reach, he can be 
cited as the True position’ regardless of a conflicting line of 
authority. Where this is not the case, he can be disregarded ‘as a 
representative of an earlier age’ It is clear, therefore, that Hume’s 
views camiot be disregarded as iiTelevant in the modem context. 
Alison’s views follow Hume’s very closely in many respects and this 
may be one reason for the primacy of Hume’s account. Nonetheless, 
it is appropriate now to examine the views of both writers on children 
who offend.
Hume and Alison
Hume’s analysis of dole has already been considered. It is implicit in 
that analysis that part of the purpose of dole generally is to establish
Farmer, Genius, supra, note 12, at pp 39 -  40
For example, in Stallard v FIMA 1989 SCCR 248. the court took the view that 
the marital rape exemption, which provided that a husband could not be guilty of 
the rape of his wife, and which was based on a passage in Hume (i, 306) was no 
longer good law.
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which persons ought to be punished, a point which assumes greater 
importance in relation to his treatment of children.
Hume deals with children under the more general heading of “Who 
may commit crimes?”"^  ^ an issue which he raises immediately after 
his treatment of dole because, in his view, the only reason for 
exempting any individual or group from criminal responsibility is the 
absence of dole. As he says, it is “the defect ... of that dole, that 
vicious will or depraved disposition”'^ '^  which alone protects against 
the imposition of legal punisliment.
Applying Dole to Children
On the face of it, then, this concept of the mental element might seem 
to facilitate the conviction of children for criminal offences, because 
even very young children do commit such acts,'^^  and the act itself is 
the primary referent from which dole is to be inferred. In fact, 
however, Hume seems to turn this assumption on its head. Because 
children’s characters are not yet set in stone, due to their lack of 
development, it is not safe to infer dole simply from their actions. 
Indeed, Hume adopts an overtly developmental perspective in
Hume, i, 30.
Hume i, 30.
For example, “[a] boy aged three threw a tantrum in a New Zealand chemist’s 
shop and attacked two women shoppers. He kicked and punched them and hit 
them so hard with his toy truck that both needed hospital treatment, one for a 
fractured skull. Flis mother said “Yeah, he does that sometimes.””
The Week 9 March 2002, p 12
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relation to juvenile offenders in his analysis/^ the main objective of 
which is to determine which children might be eligible for the death 
penalty, which for an arbitrary pain and which are exempted from 
punishiuent altogether by reason of age. Hume states that “minors, 
or persons under age, ... are naturally deficient in intelligence, and in 
fnmness or maturity of the will.”'^  ^ He also recognises the 
individualised nature of these developmental deficits, noting that the 
above principle “is not, however, equally true of all minors; but is 
various according to the several degrees of nonage, and is even very 
different in persons of the same years.”'*^ Since this is his starting- 
point, it is perhaps suiprising that, in common with Alison, he adopts 
rigidly age-bound categories - minor (aged fourteen years and over), 
pupil (aged seven to thirteen), and infant (aged six and under) -  as a 
mechanism for differentiating between broad groups of children.'^  ^
This must, however, have brought its own difficulties. There was no 
centralised system of registration of births at this time^^ therefore, in 
some cases, evaluation of claims of nonage must have been 
problematic, as must attribution of children to one of the three sub-
As does Blackstone in his exposition of English criminal law. IV Blackstone, 
supra, note 1, atp 23 
Hume i, 30 
Hume i, 30
Mackenzie, on the other hand, discusses only “minors” and it is unclear from his 
account whether he includes all children in this category or, as is perhaps more 
likely, whether he is only considering those aged fourteen and over. Mackenzie I, 
1,7
It appears that civil registr ation of births in Scotland commenced on 1 January 
1855: http://www.uenresearch.convsco-crib.htm
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categories identified/^ Generally, on this point, Hume notes that 
“[i]n some of [the cases he cites as examples], the pannel, in his 
declaration, may have pretended to be younger than he was, in order 
to recommend himself to mercy. Ordinarily, the age seems to have 
been judged of from the pannel’s declaration, or his personal 
a s p e c t . I n  one case, Hume mentions the need to obtain a 
testimonial from the parish of the accused’s birth regarding his age.^  ^
Nonetheless, given that Hume seeks to justify the imposition of the 
different punishments available by reference primarily to the 
understanding which could be expected of child-accused at particular 
ages, it is possible to discern here, a historical basis for the provision 
of an age of criminal responsibility linlced to capacity. This flies in 
the face of the Scottish Law Commission’s rather more prosaic 
interpretation of the institutional writers, '^  ^ which was discussed 
earlier in this chapter.
In general, Hume is equivocal in his account of children, first of all 
naiTating the, apparently settled, position in English law and then 
prefacing his account of Scots law by stating, “[a]s for our own 
municipal practice, - I know not whether it can be affinned, that it 
has yet, in all these articles, attained to the same degree of maturity
In England, judges required to examine every accused child individually to 
assess his/her age. A W G Kean “The History of the Criminal Liability of 
Children” 1937 LQR 53, 364 at p 367 
Hume i, 33, footnote
William Jameson, indicted for murder in 1632 and “past saxtene years of age”. 
Hume i, 31
Scot Law Com No. 185, supra, note 10, at paras 2.2 and 2.3
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and precision as that of England.”^^  By the time of Alison, the rules 
seem to have been more firmly set, or certainly Alison’s account 
records them in unequivocal tenns. It is interesting, particularly for 
those who regard young offenders as a peculiaiiy modem problem, 
that Alison commences his treatment by lamenting “[t]he vast 
increase in juvenile delinquency”/^ How, then, did Hume and 
Alison approach this issue of children who offend?
Minors (aged fourteen and over)
Hume and Alison
A W G Kean has suggested, in relation to English law, that “[i]n the 
seventeenth century, the age of discretion became fixed at 14 ... 
[because] Coke dogmatised the results of the Middle Ages and 
subsequent lawyers took his word.”^^  Kean credits Hale with making 
the position absolute. Given that both Hume^^ and Alison^^ provide a 
statement of the English law on children’s criminal responsibility, it 
is quite possible that they too were influenced in this way. Certainly, 
in the 1845 English case of R v Svdnev Smith/°  the judge was able 
to state, “[wjhere a child is under the age of seven yeai's, the law 
presumes him to be incapable of committing a crime; after the age of
Hume i, 31 
Alison, i, 663 
”  Kean, supra, note 51, at p 369 
Hume, i, 30 
Alison, i, 666 - 667 
"’^ 1845) 1 Cox 260
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fourteen, he is presumed to be responsible for his actions, as certainly 
as if he were forty.”*^^
It is clear that minority commenced at fourteen. Its endpoint in 
Hume’s time is, however, more uncertain. He discusses a number of 
cases of accused aged eighteen*^  ^ and also one where one of the 
accused was aged nineteen or twenty.Major i ty may therefore have 
commenced at age 21. According to Blackstone, in English law, 
those under 25 were regarded as minors. '^  ^ In terms of its 
characteristics, Hume, paralleling some modem perspectives on 
adolescence,^^ identifies minority as “that season of life when men 
[sic] are most adventurous, and more peculiarly liable to the 
seduction of evil example”^^  suggesting, because of this, that 
exempting minors from trial during their minority'’^  “not only would 
not be salutary, but would in the end prove the reverse of merciful or 
h u m a n e . I t  is not, however, entirely clear what Hume sees as 
“merciful and humane” in the imposition of the death penalty.
Both Hume and Alison commence their detailed accounts of the law 
on the punisliment of minors with a strong statement that those who
Ibid, per Erie J, at p 260
Eg John Johnson convicted of pocket-picking on 20 June 1786 and Archibald 
Stewart convicted of two acts of house-breaking on 23 June 1791. Hume i, 32 
® Black (aged eighteen) and Macdonald convicted of robbeiy and murder on 17 
June 1813
IV Blackstone, supra, note 1, at p 22. He subsequently refers to the age of 21 as 
“full age” (at p 22)
Ann Birch Developmental Psychology From Infancy to Adulthood (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 1997) atp 203
Hume i, 31
As proposed by Mackenzie and discussed earlier in this chapter 
® Hume i, 31
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have reached fourteen are liable to any punislmient, including death, 
although this is only automatic for certain, particularly serious, 
crimes identified by Hume as “murder, fire-raising, theft and the 
like”^^  and by Alison as “murder, robbery, housebreaking, fire- 
raising, or the like”/^ With regard to capacity, Hume considers that 
these are offences “whereof minors may know the wickedness even 
at those early years”^^  -  Alison, that they are offences “which are 
forbidden, under the highest penalties, by God himself, and contrary 
to the conscience even of inveterate offenders,
For Hume, then, knowledge of wickedness seems to be a prerequisite 
of criminal responsibility. Alison, echoing Hume, is equally 
moralistic, justifying the criminalisation of these offences on a 
religious basis and invoking assumptions drawn from natural law that 
the wrongness of the act will simply be apparent to an offender of 
this age.^  ^ Both writers demonstrate an implicit awareness of a 
process of moral development which brings a child to an awareness 
of the wrongfulness of certain acts. Younger children are not 
expected to have attained maturity of judgment in these matters, 
albeit that the actual awareness itself appears to be innate (though 
requiring to mature).
69 Hume i, 31
Alison i, 663 
Hume i, 31 
Alison, i, 663
Hume’s reference to murder as a crime “against the law of nature” also suggests 
this natural law perspective. Hume i, 31
164
In terms of the analysis of capacity in the previous chapter, then, both 
Hume and Alison require an understanding of the distinction between 
right and wrong, an issue which clearly belongs to criminal capacity 
as the term is used in this thesis. Both writers are prepared to impute 
this, in the general run of cases, to offenders aged fourteen and over. 
It is interesting however, that neither writer is able to provide many 
examples of cases where minors actually proceeded to execution. 
Indeed, Alison comments approvingly on the apparently generalised 
practice of allowing the law to take its course in the imposition of 
capital punishment and then commuting the sentence to 
transportation.^'^ Hume identifies four cases^  ^ where the accused, 
aged eighteen, sixteen, eighteen and nineteen or twenty respectively 
were executed, explaining that these accused “were examples of early 
and irreclaimable depravity.”^^  The implication is that, in other 
cases, the likelihood was that the depravity would be reclaimable^^ -  
that the minor’s apparently evil disposition as evidenced by his/her 
criminal acts could be changed. Here, then, is another hint that 
Hume regarded young people, in the usual case, as particularly
Alison, i, 664. Despite expressing the opinion that “in extreme cases, such as 
murder or fîre-raising, or atiocious rape” (Alison i, 664) tiansportation was 
possibly not appropriate, Alison cites no cases where the death penalty was actually 
carried out.
Macdonald, Macintosh, Black and Macdonald. Hume i, 32, note 3.
It appears that the execution of the first two young people in this list o f four was 
in respect of their role as ringleaders in the Tron Riot of 1812. This is discussed in 
more detail later in this chapter as the spur to the introduction of indusüial and 
reformatory schools in Scotland. See Andrew G Ralston “The Tron Riot of 1812” 
1980 Histoiy Today 30 [hereinafter “Tron Riot”]
This view is shared by Alison who considers that tiansportation gives “youthful 
depradators ... that chance of amendment in another countr y which they have lost 
in their own.” Alison i, 664.
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malleable and capable of change in character, if handled 
appropriately.
Hume expands on his views on the development of criminal capacity
in young people in his discussion of statutory offences. He states
“In the case of crimes which have been made capital by 
statute, such as hearing mass, or striking in presence of 
the Court of Session, it seems to be more doubtful, 
whether there may not be room for a distinction in 
favour of those minors, who are nearer the years of 
pupillarity than majority. And here we are furnished 
with an argument by the statute 1661, c. 20, conceming 
the cursing and beating of parents, both in favour of 
such an indulgence, as in itself a reasonable thing, and 
for fixing on the age of sixteen, as that at which the 
minor shall be punishable with death, for offences of 
this description. For so it is appointed by that 
ordinance, with respect to the transgiessions there 
vindicated; which, though known to every child as great 
immoralities, and deserving the most severe domestic 
coiTection, yet as objects of public trial, and sentence of 
death, are rather the creatures of the law, and not fit to 
be visited with such severity, on any but those who have 
attained to maturity of judgment and discretion.^^
Here, then, Hume appears to recognise the need for the child to
develop an understanding of the criminality of certain actions, before
sentence of death is appropriate. His view seems to be that some
crimes, such as murder, are so absolutely wrong that no child aged
fourteen or over could fail to appreciate their seriousness, therefore
hanging is appropriate. For lesser offences, such as the ones outlined
in this passage, while minors will be aware that such acts are wrong,
this is not enough for the imposition of the ultimate sanction. Only
by the age of sixteen can they be expected to understand their
Hume i, 33
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seriousness in a societal context -  and this understanding is necessary 
for hanging to be imposed.
Each of the institutional writers, then, is equivocal about holding 
children in the oldest age category (over fourteen) criminally 
responsible, to the extent of being punished capitally, for their 
actions. Hume and Alison are concerned with the child’s 
understanding of the wrongness of his/her acts, Mackenzie with the 
fair opportunity to argue his/her defence. It is certainly arguable, 
therefore, that each regarded some aspect of what would today be 
recognised as criminal capacity as key to the justification foi- 
diversion from the gallows. The concern with understanding is not 
necessarily individualised for each child-accused (Mackenzie argues 
for a blanket ban on the prosecution of all minors during their 
minority; Alison approves the generalised practice of commuting the 
death sentence to transportation) however there is still a case to be 
made for the basis of a link between criminal capacity and the 
appropriate degree of punishment fr om the work of each writer.
Pupils (aged seven to thirteen)
Despite being honoured more in the breach than the obseiwance, both 
Hume and Alison are prepared to commit themselves to the existence 
of a rule that minors may be subjected to capital punishment. With 
regard to pupils, Alison is equally definite that they cwanot be
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punished “to the pain of death”/^ He justifies this on the basis of 
their essential redeemability noting that “whatever the depravity of 
the acts committed, complete coiTuption of the heart can hardly have 
taken place.”^^  hiterestingly, for the modern-day “blame-it-on-the- 
parents” lobby, he locates the impetus to criminality in “the influence 
of guilty parents, or elder associates.”^^
Hume, on the other hand, will not even “venture to affinn on the 
credit of such scanty and imperfect material as the record supplies” 
“[wjhether [pupils] are in any case liable to be capitally punished.”^^  
His position is that pupils who are infantiae proximus^^ (aged 
between 7 and IOV2) are probably exempt from capital punisliment. '^^ 
Although he does not cite a single case where a pupil was executed, 
for older pupils he is not willing to rule out completely the possibility 
of the death penalty “how deliberate soever the wickedness, or how 
incorrigible the obstinacy, or how cunning the malice of the offender 
as it appeal's in evidence at his t r i a l . I n  an adult-accused, these 
qualities, which link in with the concept of dole in that they all point 
to defects of character, might be inferred from the crime itself. Hume 
seems here to be implying that something far beyond ordinary 
wickedness, obstinacy or malice would be required to justify hanging
Alison i, 665 
Alison, i, 666 
Alison, i, 666 
Hume i, 33
literally, close to infanthood
Hume i, 35. This view is shared by Blackstone, with reference to English law. 
IV Blackstone, supra, note 1, at 22 
Hume i, 34
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a pupil. These qualities do not particularly address issues of 
understanding but they do require a certain degree of intellectual 
development. They suggest, in effect, a thoroughly rotten character, 
tying in with the general approach, at this time, to the mental element 
identified and analysed by Nicola Lacey in English law,^  ^ as defined 
in tenns of character responsibility.
As examples of acts which might not allow the law "to extend its 
mercy” because they represent “situations of such extreme and 
hopeless depravity.” Hume cites “repeated acts of fire-raising, or . . .  
the murder of a parent, or ... murder by poison, committed by a boy 
of twelve or thirteen years of age.”^^  Here, then, is a further hint of 
Hume’s underlying philosophy of the essentially redeemable quality 
of children who offend. Only those who commit such heinous crimes 
are placed beyond its remit.
With regard to the infliction of arbitrary pains on pupils, both Hume 
and Alison feel themselves to be on solid ground in that no writer 
seems ever to have suggested that this is, in any way, inappropriate. 
Both nonetheless require the practice to be justified by reference to 
the child’s understanding. Alison states that “[pjupils, ..., though 
only nine, ten, or eleven years of age, may be subjected to an 
arbitrary punisliment, if  they appear qualified to distinguish right
Nicola Lacey, “In Search of tire Responsible Subject; History, Philosophy and 
Social Sciences in Criminal Law Theory” [2001] MLR 350 [hereinafter 
“Responsible Subject”]; Nicola Lacey, “Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal 
Law” 2001 Journal o f Political Philosophy 9(3), 249 [hereinafter “Responsibility 
and Modernity”]
Hume i, 34
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from wrong f  Again, this is a naiTO W  concept -  only one small area 
of understanding is targeted -  but it does clearly relate to the child’s 
criminal capacity. If a pupil is unable to draw this distinction, s/he 
cannot be punished. Hume, similarly to his treatment of minors, 
allows punishment only for “crimes whereof [pupils] may know the 
wickedness”,
Alison also records the type of tariffing which occun ed in an effort to 
ensure that more “hardened” young criminals were more severely 
punished, noting that “[i]t has not been unusual to transport children 
of eleven and twelve years, where their character seemed hardened, 
and to imprison them where they did not appear so completely 
depraved.” ®^ The direct link between responsibility, in the character 
terms which dole highlights, and punishment is apparent here.
It is also clear from Hume’s account that he envisages the doli 
incapax presumption operating in relation to pupils. He exempts 
those who are infantiae proximus fr om the ambit of the death penalty 
because they “can har dly be supposed capable of the full and capital 
degree of dole.”^^  By the same token, he notes that children aged 
over IOV2 , who satisfy the “knowledge of wickedness” test and who 
are “proved to be capable of dole” are liable to any arbitrary pain 
which “shall be adequate ... to the ends of correction and example.”^^
Alison, i, 665. Emphasis added.
Hume i, 35
Alison, i, 665
Hume i, 35
Hume i, 35
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In this regard, both Hume and Alison make reference to the 1749 
case of Alexander Livingston^^ who was convicted, at the age of 
twelve, of the murder of twelve-year old Alexander Henderson 
having been specifically found, by the jury, to be doli capax. The 
case was one of those reported by Maclaurin in his Arguments and 
Decisions in Remarkable Cases Before the High Court o f Justiciary, 
and Other Supreme Courts, in Scotland?"^ Given that, in the mid­
eighteenth century, cases were not reported in any systematic 
fashion,^^ the fact that Maclaurin chose to include this one indicates 
its interest at the time.
In common with the style of the official record of the time,^  ^
Maclaurin’s report sets out in full the arguments of the Crown and of 
the defence and then gives the judgment of the court in its briefest 
possible foim viz, “January 8 1750. The court banished him to the 
plantations for life.”^^  It is therefore necessary to read between the 
lines of the, obviously slanted, submissions made on behalf of the 
prosecution and the defence in order to discern matters of general 
relevance to the law in this area.^^
There are two interesting aspects of the case fioin the perspective of 
general criminal law. First, there is no finding in fact that Alexander 
Livingston actually inflicted the fatal stab wound on Alexander
supra, note 9 
supra, note 5
Caiins, supra, note 6, at p 148 
Ibid, at p 149
HMA V Alexander Livingston, supra, note 9, at p 120 
Cairns, supra, note 6, atp 149
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Henderson. In fact, the jury finding was “not proven that the panel 
was the person who stabbed or wounded him”.^  ^ The conviction for 
murder appears instead to have been obtained on the basis that he 
was, at least, art and part liable. No other person is, however, 
implicated at all, as having been the principal actor. Second, it seems 
to have been proved that Alexander Henderson provoked Alexander 
Livingston by punching him on the face.^ ®^  The level of
development of the doctrine of provocation in Scots law at this time 
is not entirely clear -  Lindsay Farmer notes that it was recognised in 
the late eighteenth c e n t u r y - but, at least on the face of it, it would 
appear that this might, in itself, have provided a reason to rule out the 
death penalty in this case.*^  ^ histead, however, argument was 
directed to the ambiguity of the jury finding on Livingston’s actual 
involvement in the stabbing and, importantly, on his youth. The 
memorial for the defence specifically appeals first to the need for the 
child to develop morally so that, even in relation to crimes against 
nature, s/he cannot be held as accountable as his/her adult 
counterparts and, second, to the child’s more limited understanding 
of the consequences of his/her actions because of his/her more 
limited experience of “natural operations”.
HMA V Alexander Livingston, supra, note 9, at p 101 
Ibid, atp 113
Farmer, Genius, supra, note 12, at p 153 
On the position in English law see Jeremy Horder Provocation and 
Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992)
HMA V Alexander Livingston, supra, note 9, at pp 115 - 116
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This is the only case cited by either Hume or Alison in which a 
finding of doli capax is mentioned. It is therefore disappointing that 
there is virtually no discussion of its import. The Crown simply 
relies on the fact that “the jury have explicitly given their judgement 
that he is doli capax” in conjunction with their submission that he 
“was the author of the defunct’s death” to support their conclusion 
that he was guilty of the murder. The defence, having gone to some 
lengths to chai'acterise the killing as a childish event, and the accused 
as a child lacking understanding of his a c t i o n s s e e k  to argue that 
the doli capax finding means only that “the pannel being proved to be 
a sagacious and smart boy, must be capable of evil as well as of 
good.” They add that “[t]he jury, from this verdict, could never 
possibly imagine, that the infant’ had any intention to commit 
murder.””’^
The actual finding of capacity of dole then, does not seem to settle 
the matter of guilt. Even though the jury has effectively ovenidden 
the presumption that the character of a child of twelve could not be 
sufficiently hardened and evil to support a verdict of guilty of 
murder, he is not automatically condemned. Instead, even the 
prosecution present arguments from “the doctors” indicating that
Ibid, atp 105 
Ibid, atpp 118-119
10Û incorrect teclmical term for a twelve-year old must be a flirther attempt to 
present the accused in as childish a light as possible.
HMA V Alexander Livingston, supra, note 9, at p  120
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capital pimisliment is not to be automatic for children.”’^  The direct 
link between responsibility and punisliment, which the conception of 
character responsibility, demonstrated in dole, facilitates, still 
operates to tailor the punishment primarily to the offender as a young 
person.
hifants (aged six and under)
This category presents the least difficulty. Very young children are 
not subject to punishment in any circumstances, a position which has, 
apparently, never been challenged.”’^  Hume simply states this, 
whereas Alison justifies it on the basis that such children “are held to 
be incapable of crime.”’”’ The Scottish Law Commission warns 
against inteipreting these words through a modern filter, stating that 
“it is anachronistic to read Alison’s reference to children being 
incapable of crime in terms of the later idea of capacity to form mens 
rea.”” ’ Nonetheless, Alison proceeds to explain his rule by stating 
that “whatever vice exists must be ascribed to improper tuition, or 
bad example, and the child cannot be considered as answerable for a 
violation o f what he [sic] could not understand.”  ^ Whilst heeding 
the warning against anaclrronistic inteipretation then, this explanation 
strongly sets up the linlc between understanding and responsibility
Ibid, atpp 106-109  
Hume i, 35; Alison, i, 666 
Alison, i, 666
Scot Law Com No. 185, supra, note 10, at para 2.3 
Alison, i, 666. Emphasis added
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posited in chapter 2 as key to the establishment of the child’s 
criminal capacity.
It is interesting to take note of the English case of Marsh v Loader”  ^
in 1863. Loader was a builder by trade as was Henry Marsh, father 
of six-year old William, whose actions sparked the proceedings. 
Loader caught William in the act of stealing wood from his premises 
and “gave him into custody”. It appears that Loader must have 
detained William himself in order to talce him to the official 
authorities. A magistrate discharged William, presumably because of 
his nonage. The Marshs then sued Loader for false imprisonment 
and were awarded £20 damages. On appeal, it was conclusively 
detennined that not only does nonage operate to prevent the infliction 
of punishment, it also precludes proseeution.
This indicates that, by 1845, seven operated much as the current age 
of criminal responsibility does to preclude criminal proceedings 
altogether.” '’ It is also interesting that the arguments presented in the 
case draw such a clear distinction between conviction and sentence. 
The direct role which responsibility played in the infliction of 
punisliment for Mackenzie, Hume and Alison is not so clearly 
discernible.’”
In general, then, the work of the Scottish institutional writers implies 
the existence of a criminal justice system which was sensitive to the
''3(1863) 14CBNS535  
M eni nv S  1987 SLT 193
Obviously, there are certain dangers in drawing conclusions from an English 
civil ease.
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interests and comprehension of children as different in key respects 
from their adult counterparts and which sought to accommodate this 
difference by at least adverting to the child-accused’s understanding 
of his/her actions. Because the mental element consisted in dole, 
some of the judgment which the law was required to make in relation 
to an individual child-accused related to his/her tractability- whether 
or not his/her character had hardened into criminality and depravity. 
Despite this, there is still evidence of an overtly developmental 
approach to the child’s criminal responsibility and that issues of 
understanding - primaiily of the distinction between right and wrong 
- formed an important plank of the decision as to the appropriate 
punisliment -  the main purpose of a criminal justice system which 
tended to assume the guilt of the accused and to use the trial to see if 
any exculpatory evidence existed.’”
Unfortunately, this is one area in which Hume has not been regarded 
as the authoritative basis for modern Scots criminal law and practice. 
Reasons for the failure to translate these relatively clear principles of 
children’s criminal responsibility into the emerging doctrine of mens 
rea in cases concerning children will be discussed subsequently. 
Before that, however, it may be instructive to consider the historical 
approach to the child’s criminal capacity in English law as 
represented by the doli incapax presumption.
See Lacey "Responsibility and Modernity,” supra, note 86; Lacey “Responsible 
Subject,” supra, note 86
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The Doli Incapax Presumption
The literal translation of doli incapax is “incapable of dole”. English 
law does not, however, appear to have defined the mental element 
specifically as “dole” in the exact sense in which it is explained by 
Hume in Scots law. Nonetheless, it is clear that, certainly in the mid­
eighteenth century, criminal responsibility was defined in character 
rather than capacity terms, similarly to the then Scottish position.’”  
In any event, the presumption survived well into the period when, in 
both jurisdictions, evei*y offence carried its own specific mental 
attitude or mens rea. It was finally abolished by section 34 of the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The effect of this piece of legislation, 
by a new Labour government anxious to follow thiough on its 
commitment to be “tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime”’”  
was the loss of a benefit to accused children which had, by 1998, 
existed in English law for around a thousand years. Traces of the 
modern doctrine were evident in the law, already mentioned, which
See Lacey “Responsibility and Modernity”, supra, note 86, particularly at pp 
256 -  261; Lacey “Responsible Subject,” supra, note 86, particularly at pp 361 - 
362
Labour party election manifesto, 1997 general election. 
(http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/lab97.html
In this instance, the legislature was only following the path taken by the 
judiciary in 1993 in the case of C (a minor v DPP) [1994] 3 All ER 190 where 
Laws J, in the Queen’s Bench Division, sought single-handedly to abolish the 
presumption. This was thwarted by the House of Lords when the case was 
appealed ([1995] 2 WLR 383), largely on the basis that the Divisional Court’s 
actions came too close to judicial legislation.
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was promulgated by Athelstan in the tenth centuiy saving, from the 
death penalty, children who had not resisted or fled.” ’’
The presumption is of importance because it indicates that there is no 
very obvious reason why a legal system cannot impose a capacity 
requirement, in cases involving children, to ensure that some 
attention is focussed on their understanding of their criminal acts. 
Indeed, the case, discussed earlier in this chapter, of HMA v 
Alexander Livingston,” ’ the twelve-year old who, in 1749, was 
transported for life for having stabbed to death a young acquaintance, 
infers that Scots law itself made some use of this concept. Certain 
other legal systems still employ it.’^^
In this thesis, the particular interest of the seam of English case law 
on the presumption is that it demonstrates the difficulties which arise 
from seeking to target the investigation of capacity in too narrow an 
area. The criminal law prefers questions to which a “yes or no” 
answer can be given. Examination of the operation of the doli 
incapax doctrine suggests, however, that criminal capacity is too 
complex a concept to lend itself to this type of analysis. How, then, 
did the presumption operate?
’3“ See Kenny, supi'a, note 1, a tp  78, n 7. Also, Thomas Crofts The Criminal 
Responsibility o f  Children and Young Persons: A Comparison o f English and 
German Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002) at pp 5 - 8 
’3* supra, note 9
'33 Eg Hong Kong. See The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong Report on 
the Age o f Criminal Responsibility in Hong Kong (May 2000) 
(http://www.info.gov.hlvhkrefonn) particularly at pp 5 -  11
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The explanation of the concept which was received into modern 
English law stemmed from Sir Matthew Hale’s Pleas o f the Crown: 
A Methodical Summary, published in 1678.”  ^ He stated that the 
prosecution had to prove that the child-accused had a “mischievous 
discretion”,” '’ a phrase which, without judicial inteipretation, would 
convey very little to the modern reader. In 1845, the presumption 
was explained in these terms: “between the ages of seven and 
fourteen, no presumption of law arises at all [as to the child’s ability 
to commit crime], and that which is tenned a malicious intent - a 
guilty knowledge that he was doing wrong - must be proved by the 
evidence and cannot be presumed hom the mere commission of the 
act”” '
In the development of the law on the meaning of “mischievous 
discretion”, or “malicious intent”, which terms tend to be used 
interchangeably, the only point which is beyond doubt is that no child 
could be convicted unless there was clear evidence that s/he 
understood that his/her action was wrong. The decided cases strove 
to clarify the quality of the wrongness which had to be established 
yet, paradoxically, in so doing, they tended to confuse the issue.
Cases from the mid-nineteenth century made reference to guilt in a 
manner which is circuitous, given that, ultimately, guilt depended on 
the existence of the mischievous discretion. In R v Elizabeth Owen.
'33 (Abingdon: Professional Books Ltd, 1982 (reprint)) 
'3'* Ibid, at p 630
'3^  R V Sydney Smith, supra, note 60, at p 260
179
where a ten year-old child was charged with stealing coal, the judge 
stated that a child under fourteen “ought not be convicted, unless ... 
[s/he] had a guilty knowledge that [s/he] was doing wrong.”’”  Again 
in R V Manley, a case where the accused had induced a child of nine 
to steal money from the child’s father’s till and give it to him, 
counsel for the prosecution advised the jury that, in relation to the 
child, they would have to determine ’’whether he knew that he was 
doing wrong, or was acting altogether unconsciously of guilt.”’^ '’ 
Even if the term “guilt” is stripped of its coimotations in a criminal 
trial, this basically indicates only that the child must know that s/he 
was doing wrong.
This rather unsophisticated approach is discernible even in more 
modern cases. In B v R.’”  the accused was aged eight and was 
charged with housebreaking and larceny. The test for satisfaction of 
the presumption was stated to be that the child should “know in the 
ordinary sense the difference between good and evil;”’”  in R v B; R 
V a ’”  that s/he should, quite simply “know the difference between 
right and wrong”.” ’ Clearly, this understanding is an important 
plank of the child’s criminal capacity -  perhaps even the basic 
element -  but it is also, in isolation, relatively easily satisfied. Even
'3<^(1830)4C&P236,  a tp 237
'33(1844) 1 Cox 104 
'38(1960) 44C rim A ppR l 
'3^  Ibid, at p 4 
'3*^ [1979] 1 WLR 1185
'3' Ibid, at p 1186. In this case the two accused were aged thirteen and charged 
with blackmail.
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very young childien know that they should not do certain acts 
because adults have so instructed them. Knowledge of the difference 
between right and wrong, then, is not sufficient, in itself, to establish 
that the child’s understanding of his/her act in its context grounds the 
imputation of full criminal responsibility, which is the effect of 
rebuttal of the presumption.
In fact, however, the majority of cases did not apply this bald and 
simple test but a slightly more searching one derived from R v 
Gorrie”  ^ in 1919. This was a case arising from the, possibly 
preventable, death of an eleven-year old boy named James Lane. 
Gorrie, the accused, who was then aged thirteen, stabbed Lane in the 
buttock with a penknife in the course of some horseplay. Lane did 
not mention the wound to anyone and it eventually became septic. 
He died from blood-poisoning and Gorrie was charged with, though 
eventually acquitted of, his manslaughter.
The test which came out of the case was that the prosecution must 
satisfy the jury that “when the boy did this he knew that he was doing 
what was wrong - not merely what was wrong, but what was gravely 
wrong, seriously w r o n g . T h i s  was applied as the relevant test for 
rebuttal of the presumption in subsequent cases” '’ and, in 1995, the
’33(1919) 83 JP 136 
'33 Ibid, at 136.
134 Eg JM (a minor) v Runeckles (1984) 79 Cr App R 255 at p 259; LP.H. v Chief 
Constable of South Wales [1987] Crim. L.R. 42, at p 42; R v Coulburn (1988) 87 
Cr. App. R. 309, at p 314 (in defence submissions on appeal); and A v D.P.P. 
[1992] CrimLR 34 atp 35
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House of Lords held that its meaning was reasonably clear when used 
in direct contrast with “merely naughty or mischievous”.” '
As a test it was not, however, without its detractors. In his attempt, 
in 1994, to abolish the presumption by judicial fiat, Laws J attacked 
as “conceptually obscure” the plirase “seriously wrong” which, in his 
opinion, meant neither “legally wrong” nor “morally wrong”” ’’ so 
that it was impossible to know what it was that the law required the 
prosecution to prove.
In fact, however, both of these, allegedly plainer, alternatives - 
“legally wrong” and “morally wrong” - had been canvassed over the 
course of the doli incapax presumption’s long history without 
bringing conspicuous clarity. Sydney Smith’s case, where a child of 
ten was charged with maliciously setting fire to a hayiick, added a 
nuance to the general nineteenth century requirement of knowledge 
of wrongness in the suggestion that the child must have a “guilty 
knowledge that he was committing a crime” This was, however, 
directly contradicted by the 1992 case of A v D.P.P..”  ^ an appeal 
against the conviction of an eleven-year old for a public order 
offence arising out of tlnowing bricks at a police car, where it was 
stated that “the test was not knowledge of unlawfulness.”” ’’ It might 
be argued that the 147-year gap between these two cases explains this
'3^  C (a minor) v DPP [1995] 2 WLR 383 at p 397 
'3^  C (a minor) v DW,supra, note 119, at p 197 
'33 Supra, note 60. Emphasis added.
'38 Supra, note 134 
'3^6/4, atp 35
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inconsistency but it seems more likely, given the general lack of 
clarity sunounding the test to be applied, that this is simply an 
example of two judges expressing diametrically opposed views 
which camiot be reconciled with each other. The search for a naiTow 
test, which could be easily applied, then, seiwed to generate 
confusion.
With regard to knowledge of wrong in the moral sense -  Laws J’s 
alternative to legal wrongness as the basis of a clear test - similar 
uncertainty and contradiction existed. The case of J.B.H. and J.H. 
(minors) v O’Connell” ” held, unequivocally, that it had to be proved 
that the accused knew that they were doing wrong morally. Three 
years later, and apparently without reference to that case, Robert 
Goff, L.J. stated: “I do not feel able to accept that the criterion in 
cases of this kind is one of morality”.” ’ His position was confirmed 
by his fellow judge, Mann J., who thought it “unnecessary to show 
that the child appreciated that [his/her] action was morally wrong ... 
[but rather] sufficient that [s/he] appreciated that it was seriously 
wrong.”
Again, the test was confused both in teims of this direct contradiction 
concerning its content and consequently as to what it was that the 
prosecution required to prove. For example, can something be 
“wrong” at all without being morally wrong in the sense that it is
'4° [1981] Crim L.R. 632 atp 633
JM (a minor) v Runeckles, supra, note 134, at p 260
142 Ibid, at p 259
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something which should not be done? Or, if it can -  parking in a 
controlled area, for example, may not, prima facie, carry moral 
coimotations — is this something the wrongness of which a child 
could be expected to appreciate? It is even questionable whether 
appreciating that an action was “seriously wrong” conveyed, by 
itself, the quality of understanding necessary to constitute criminal 
capacity. It might be seriously wrong for a group of children to 
ostracise one of their peers to the extent that s/he commits suicide but 
it is unlikely to constitute a criminal offence. Conversely, it would, 
teclmically, constitute the crime of theft to take a pencil from another 
child intending to keep it, but it is hardly “seriously wrong”, histead, 
it is submitted that the test should have been directed towards 
establishing whether the child-accused had some understanding of 
the nature, purpose and effects of criminalisation such that it was just 
to hold him/her to account for breaking this code.
The attempt to set down a test for the rebuttal of the doli incapax 
presumption, then, reveals the difficulty of encapsulating into a 
naiTow test, to which a “yes / no” answer can be provided, an issue as 
complex as the child’s criminal capacity. It demonstrates the benefits 
of a much broader approach as advocated in the previous chapter. 
However narrow or imperfect its approach though, English law did at 
least pay lip service, through the doli incapax presumption, to the 
issue of the child’s understanding of his/her criminal acts, for this 
lengthy period, the value of which was, as ever, particularly
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recognised and lamented only on abolition.” '  Scots law, on the other 
hand, does not seem to have developed any similar principle, or 
similar mechanism for assessing the child’s criminal capacity, even 
to date, with the result that its response to this issue is, at best, 
patchy. It is necessary now to return to the Scottish position in the 
nineteenth century and beyond.
Scotland: The Shift from Dole to Mens Rea
It is the contention of this chapter that the work of Hume and Alison 
indicates that, in their times, Scots criminal law did accord some 
importance, in the general case, to the child’s understanding of 
his/her criminal acts, in terms of determining the appropriate level of 
punishment. Thereafter, this principle of inquiry into understanding, 
as a general precept of the treatment of juvenile offenders, seems to 
have been lost. It is important to consider how this might be 
explained.
First, the mental element itself changed from dole -  the pervasive 
wickedness of character of Mackenzie and Hume - to mens rea, a 
specific mental attitude accompanying a specific criminal act. This 
shift was, in fact, already well under way by 1832 when Alison’s first 
edition was published. His work contains no discussion of dole as a 
free-standing concept and his definitions of individual offences deal
''‘3 See, for example, Nigel Walker “The End of an Old Song?” 1999 NLI 
149(6871), 64; Sue Bandalli “Abolition o f the Presumption of DoU Incapax and the 
Criminalisation of Children” 1998 Howard Journal o f Criminal Justice 37(2), 114
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in pliraseoiogy which is easily accessible to a modern Scots criminal 
lawyer. For example, “[mjnrder ... consists in the act which 
produces death, in consequence either of a deliberate intention to kill, 
or to inflict a minor injury of such kind as indicates an utter 
recklessness as to the life o f the sufferer, whether he live or dieP^^^ 
Or, again, “Reset of Theft is the receiving and keeping of stolen 
goods, Jowwing them to be stolen, with the design o f feloniously 
retaining them from the real owner,”^^  ^ There is no difficulty in 
separating out the actus reus from the mens rea in these examples, 
nor would it be historically incorrect to attempt to do so.
The fact that Alison’s section “of minority and pupillage’’” ” bears 
such a strong resemblance to Hume’s, both in content and in 
underlying philosophy, indicates primarily its, widely recognised, 
derivative quality.”  ^ But it perhaps also reveals the beginnings of 
the failure of the post-Hume law to engage with the issues presented 
by children who offend, outwith the conceptual box within which 
Hume had placed them. Such an engagement was, and would 
continue to be, required, given the shift in the focus of the criminal 
law away from its preoccupation with the punishment of children 
towards the question of their criminal responsibility as the key to the 
earlier question of conviction.
Alison, i, 1. Emphasis added 
*'*3 Alison, i, 328. Emphasis added 
Alison i, 663 
*'*3 See Farmer, Genius, supra, note 12, at p 41
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This shift is infeiTed by John Macdonald’s 1867 Practical Treatise 
on the Criminal Law o f Scotland in which he covers, in the briefest 
possible compass, what is by then referred to as the defence of 
nonage. The principles set down are, again, derived, almost 
verbatim, from Hume and Alison, who are cited as his main sources. 
He states that “[a] child under seven years of age is held in law not to 
be liable to any punishment as a criminal. But children above that 
age may be prosecuted and punished.””  ^ Neither Hume nor Alison 
had demonstrated any interest in the process of prosecution of 
children as in any way distinct from the process of inflicting the 
appropriate punishment -  the primary concern of each of them. 
Nonage then, together with insanity, had the distinction of spanning 
the gap between dole, which could allow an exception for a lack of 
understanding demonstrating a character which had not yet hardened 
into depravity, and mens rea which could be cancelled by the absence 
of that understanding, or rationality, which was required to formulate 
it in the first place. Indeed, it has been suggested in relation to the 
broadly comparable English position, that “eighteenth-century ideas 
about age and sanity represent a thin doctrine of capacity as a 
condition for criminal responsibility.’’” ”
The status of being a child and, almost by definition, lacking in the 
mental, moral and emotional development necessary to pennit the
*'*8 Jolui HA Macdonald Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law o f Scotland 
(Edinburgh: William Paterson, 1867) at p 14
N Lacey “Responsibility and Modernity,” supra, note 86, at p 261
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formulation of criminal capacity, is comprehensive, like dole, even 
though it can be used to establish the absence of a specific mens rea 
for a particular offence. This apparent fit with both the old dole 
regime and the new mens rea situation may, therefore, partially 
explain the lack of urgency in refining Hume’s principles of 
children’s responsibility during the generalised period of transition to 
the mens rea-based system. It does not, however, explain why ever 
less attention was paid to this issue by the major treatise writers, who 
may be regarded as a barometer of criminal legal thinking for their 
times. The third edition of Gordon, published in 2000, states only 
that “[a] person under the age of criminal responsibility cannot 
commit any offence, including an offence of strict responsibility.’’” ” 
In order to find an explanation for the lack of developed principles, it 
is necessary to look elsewhere.
The Child-Saving Philosonhv of the Nineteenth Century 
For children and, most notably, poor, destitute and delinquent 
children, the nineteenth century -  and particularly the latter half, 
especially in England and the United States, was dominated by the 
child-savers” ’ whose efforts, insofar as they concerned the criminal 
law, were directed towards the protection of child-offenders from the 
rigours of the adult criminal justice system. These reformers had
'3° Gordon, supra, note 18, para 8.28
'3' For a full and critical discussion of their role and achievements see Anthony M 
Platt The Child Savers: The Invention o f Delinquency (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1977) [hereinafter Child-Savers}
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little interest in the child’s criminal capacity except insofai’ as lack of 
understanding might serve as a generalised justification for progress 
towards this overarching aim. Instead they viewed children who 
offended more as victims of their unfortunate social circumstances”  ^
and consequently sought to play down issues of responsibility which 
would engender harsh punishment. Their interest was in diversion 
out of the adult system or, if this was not instantly achievable, in the 
provision of disposals which were specifically designed to 
rehabilitate young people, often grouping together the deprived (who 
had not offended) and the depraved (who had).
These, in any event, were the outwardly expressed aims of the child- 
savers but the received view among modem historians is that they 
were, in fact, seeking to exercise ever-greater control over the 
children concerned. Anthony Platt’s “seminal and highly 
influential”” '  work in this area centres on the rise of the juvenile 
court in America in the late nineteenth century. He has noted that 
“[wjhat seemingly began as a movement to humanise the lives of 
adolescents soon developed into a programme of moral 
absolutism”.” '’ In his opinion, “[t]he main aim of the child-savers
'33 Martin J Wiener Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, Law and Policy in 
England 1830— 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) at 286 
'33 M D A Freeman “The Rights of Children When They Do Wrong” 1981 Brit J  
o f Crimin 21(3), 210, at p 214. Freeman is, however, critical of tire way in which 
Platf s work has been perceived as foreclosing the debate on the child-saving 
movement and takes the view that there is simply insufficient evidence to conclude 
that there was “some kind of ruling class conspiracy”.
'3'* Anthony Platt “The Rise of the Child-Saving Movement” in Cluis Jenks The 
Sociology o f Childhood: Essential Readings (Aldershot: Gregg Revivals. 1982) 
(1992) reprint) 151 atp 157
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was to impose sanctions on conduct unbecoming youth and to 
disqualify youth from enjoying adult privileges”.” '  Platt suggests 
that, in fact, the underlying purpose of the child-savers, albeit tacit 
and perhaps not even fully recognised by the reformers themselves, 
was the imposition of a middle-class value system on, predominantly, 
working-class youth, which accorded with the reformers’ own.” ” In 
addition, young peoples’ subordination to adults was reinforced 
through programmes which treated adolescents “as though they were 
naturally dependent, requiring constant and pervasive 
supervision.”” ’^
Deborah Gorham”  ^ has echoed these themes in her examination of 
Victorian England’s response to child prostitution. Her conclusion is 
that the motivation of many of those advocating reforai was the 
desire to ensure that the poorest working-class girls (and those most 
likely to become child prostitutes) had middle- and upper-class 
values instilled in them. Reformers were unable to separate “child 
abuse” from the need to earn a living, and tended to ignore both the 
fact that many young women had exercised a choice to become 
prostitutes and that the, extremely maiked, inequalities between the 
classes meant that the poorest, even if they were “saved” from
'33/W , atp 157
'3^  This principle of “fostering middle class character in the general population as 
an important purpose of the law” has been identified as a more general Victorian 
phenomenon, at least in England, by Wiener, supra, note 152, at p 51 
33 Platt Child-Savers, supra, note 151, at p 4
'38 Deborah Gorham “The ‘Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon’ Re-Examined”: 
Child Prostitution and the Idea of Childhood in La te-Victorian England” 1978 
Victorian Studies 21, 353
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prostitution, had such a limited range of economic options open to 
them that they could never aspire to middle-class girlhoods anyway. 
Thus, philanthropy and control became confused.
The particular concern of this chapter is the impact of the child- 
saving philosophy in Scotland, and its effect on the criminal justice 
system. The philosophy is apparent in the development of industrial 
and reformatory schools from 1832 onwards.”  ^ Andrew Ralston has 
noted that, despite the fact that there was a consolidating Act of 
1866” ” standardising the law on refoiTnatory schools in Scotland and 
England, the impetus to refonn, and its early implementation, were 
different in each jurisdiction.” ’ It is therefore important to 
concentrate on the Scottish situation.
According to Ralston, the initial trigger to the reform movement was 
the Tron Riot of 1812’”^  an organised robbing spree which took place 
during the New Year celebrations that year at the Tron Church in 
Edinburgh. Over 65 boys took part’”'  and their preparation consisted 
in forcing the city watchmen from their posts, one of whom was 
murdered. In the interests of future deterrence, the immediate 
response of the authorities was about as far from the child-savers’ 
philosophy and practice as it was possible to be. Four ringleaders
*3^  Most of the information included here, on these institutions is taken from two 
articles by Andrew G Ralston: (1) “The Development of Reformatory and 
Industrial Schools in Scotland, 1832 -  1872” 1988 Scottish Economic and Social 
History 8, 40 [hereinafter “Development”] and (2)“Tron Riot,” supra, note 76 
The Reformatory Schools Act 1866 (29 & 30 Viet, c 117)
'3' Ralston “Development” at p 40 
"33 Ralston “Tron Riot” at p 41
Or, at least, 68 arrests were made. Ibid, at p 43
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were identified, the involvement of one of whom, Jolm Skelton, was 
established only on highly questionable evidence. His sentence of 
death was commuted to transportation for life. The other tlrree, Hugh 
Macdonald and Neil Sutherland both aged eighteen and Hugh 
Macintosh aged sixteen were all hanged on a gibbet erected specially 
for the purpose opposite the spot where the murder had been carried 
out.” '’
Following the riot and the public executions, a period of soul- 
searching ensued as the underlying causes of the increase in juvenile 
delinquency evidenced so forcefully by the Tron Riot were 
considered. The view taken was that the church had not taken a 
sufficiently active role in moral education but, in the course of its 
attempts to remedy this situation, it was discovered that literacy 
amongst the childien attending its new Sunday Schools was 
extremely low. Accordingly, in April 1813, the Edinburgh Sessional 
(day) School was opened to which each Kirk Session- the governing 
body of each individual Church of Scotland -  in the city was entitled 
to send up to fifteen of its children.’”'  This institution, part of the 
stated puipose of which was to reduce juvenile delinquency, was the 
forerunner of the industrial schools which were developed in eleven 
Scottish towns and cities’”” between 1841 and 1851.
Ibid, at p 44. Hume cites the case of Macdonald and Macintosh as an example 
of “early and irreclaimable depravity”. Hume i, 32, n 3
Î(JÛ
Ibid, at p 45
Aberdeen, Ayr, Dumfries, Dundee, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Greenock, Paisley,
Perth, Stirling and Stranraer. Ralston “Development” at p 41
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The early Scottish industrial school philosophy, first espoused by 
Sheriff William Watson in Aberdeenshire, is fascinating for its 
similarity to that underlying the modem children’s hearings system. 
Watson set up the first industrial school, in Aberdeen, in 1851 and 
the other ten followed in relatively quick succession. All were local 
initiatives and held as a primary aim the prevention of 
delinquency.” ’' To this end, they targeted children who were already 
involved in vagiancy. Nonetheless, in contrast to their English 
counteiparts they did, at least prior to 1854, also take children who 
had already been convicted of offences because, in Watson’s view, 
“they belonged to the same class.””  ^ Children attended twelve hours 
a day and were provided with tlrree meals and with training in 
industrial skills as well as basic literacy. The school in Aberdeen 
taught net-making for the fishing industry, for example. Watson 
insisted that the early industrial schools should be day schools 
because he wished to promote the continued involvement of parents 
in their children’s lives and development. These principles of 
meeting the child’s needs (in the nineteenth century, for something as 
basic as food), of mixing children who had offended with those who 
were only at risk of doing so, because their situations were similar, 
and of involving par ents as much as possible in taking responsibility 
for their children are all still overtly adhered to by the children’s
'^ 3 Ralston “Development,” supra, note 159, at pp 41 and 42 
’^ 8 Ibid, at p 43
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hearings system, which will be considered in more detail in the next 
chapter.
Scotland also had reformatory schools, which were specifically for 
children with a criminal conviction, as early as 1832 in Edinburgh 
and 1838 in Glasgow.” ” These establisliments provided an 
alternative to a sentence of imprisonment in an adult gaol, something 
which was commonplace to Hume’™ and Alison.’”’ Nonetheless, 
children were still sometimes subjected to a short prison sentence 
first,’”” although the local legislation applying to Glasgow sought to 
avoid this.’”'
With the movement to standardise the provision of industrial and 
reformatory schools in England and Scotland certain key features of 
the Scottish system were diluted. Under Dunlop’s Act in 1854, 
magistrates were given the power to commit vagrant children to 
industrial schools, thus weakening the previously accepted principle 
of voluntary attendance. This also changed the way in which such 
institutions were funded. A vagrant child who had been committed 
brought funding with him/her thus discouraging those charities and 
churches which had previously provided financial assistance from
"3UW,atp42 
'3° Hume i, 35 - 36 
'3' Alison i, 665
'33 The Hansard debate on the 1866 Act to consolidate English and Scots law in 
this area contains quite an extensive discussion of what would be the most 
appropriate minimum or maximum period of imprisonment prior to attending the 
reformatory. Wüwsaxé Parliamentary Debates 3S, 184, col 1608 
'33 Act for Repressing Juvenile Delinquency in the City of Glasgow 1841 (4&5 
Viet. Cap xxxvi). See Ralston “Development,” supra, note 159, at pp 43 and 45
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doing so in the future. In addition, the principle that such schools 
should be day schools was eroded, in that, in many cases, it was 
cheaper to provide residential accommodation. Finally, in 1856 an 
Act was passed to amend Dunlop’s Act so that, for the future, no 
school could be certified as both an industrial and a refonnatory 
institution. This was to satisfy the general feeling south of the border 
that children who offended should not be mixed with those who 
merely found themselves in difficult circumstances. ’ ™
It is clear, then, that the child-saving philosophy reached Scotland, 
albeit that it was mediated in a practical and almost piecemeal 
fashion, with the momentum towards the establishment of industrial 
and refoimatory schools being generated on a very localised basis. 
Within this philosophy, and the practice which it spawned then, lies 
another possible reason for the relative failure of Scots law, after 
Alison, to engage with the issue of the child’s criminal capacity. The 
emphasis on prevention of delinquency appears to have been 
relatively successful’”'  so that there were, perhaps, simply less 
juvenile offenders generally for the law to deal with overall. There 
was, therefore, no particular spur to the courts to provide a coherent 
set of principles for an ever-decreasing body of clients.
’3'* The position in relation to mixing convicted and vagrant children reverted 
following the consolidating Reformatory Schools Act 1866 (29 & 30 Viet c 117) 
and Indushial Schools Act 1866 (29 & 30 Viet c 118)
'33 Certainly in the eyes of its protagonists. See Ralston “Development,” supra, 
note 159, at p 50 for the views of the Rev Thomas Gutlnie who was instrumental in 
the opening of the Edinburgh Original Ragged School in 1847, and was a central 
figure in the development o f the industrial schools programme more generally.
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At a more abstract level, child-saving, as an ideology, was very 
pervasive in the nineteenth century and particularly strong in 
England, with activists there making their presence felt in Scotland 
too, especially in the latter half of the century when the relevant 
legislation was consolidated for the two jurisdictions. It is likely, 
therefore, that there was a general feeling that the adult courts were 
an inappropriate forum for child-accused altogether so thaf there 
would have been a disinclination to expend time and energy 
developing legal doctrines for a group of offenders who were no 
longer regarded as overtly criminal but, in many spheres, more as 
victims of circumstances.’”” As will be argued more fully 
subsequently, this does not excuse the courts for their failure to 
engage with child-accused, but it may paitially explain it.
This principle of diversion had, in fact, been given some legislative 
effect as early as 1828 with the passing of an Act’”” to allow child- 
accused to be dealt with by magistrates under summary jurisdiction, 
to obviate the need for them to be subjected to lengthy trials or to 
spend prolonged periods in adult prisons on remand. It was not, 
however, until 1932, that courts specifically for children -  juvenile 
courts - were set up, in temis of the Children and Young Persons
'3*3 The Scottish Law Commission sought to justify its recommendation that “there 
[was, in 2002] no need for a rule on the criminal capacity o f children” partly on the 
basis of the existence of the children’s hearings system as the primary forum for 
dealing with children who offend. Scot Law Com No. 185, supra, note 10, paras 
3.2 to 3.5 
'33 9 Geo IV c 29
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(Scotland) Act of that year. The children’s hearings system,’”^  set up 
in 1971, under the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968’”” continues this 
strong tradition of diversion.
However well the diversionary tactic worked, however, a small 
number of children continue to be prosecuted in Scotland every year. 
It is therefore necessary to conclude this chapter with an examination 
of the modem law, as set down in the reported cases of children who 
offend.
The Modem Law 
Introduction
One of the main arguments put foi-ward in this chapter is that Scots 
criminal law does not engage sufficiently with the issue of the child’s 
criminal capacity. To substantiate this claim, this part of the chapter 
will examine the reported cases, in modem times, where the accused 
is a child in order to highlight the invisibility of this issue in many 
instances. It is necessary, however, first of all, to consider the one 
area where capacity is, at least for the present,’ ”^ regarded as 
relevant.
'38 This will be discussed in detail in chapter 4
'3^  Now generally governed by Part II of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995
'8" The Scottish Law Commission’s proposals, which are discussed in this section,
seek to sever this link with criminal capacity.
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Age of Criminal Responsibility
The only statutory provision which is generally recognised as relating 
directly to the child’s criminal capacity is section 41 of the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 which sets the age of criminal 
responsibility at eight and expresses this as a conclusive presumption 
that no child under that age can be guilty of any offence.’^ ’ In 
Menin v the High Com*t had to detemiine whether a child aged 
under eight could be refened to a children’s hearings on the ground 
that “he [sic] ha[d] committed an o f f e n c e . I n  its interpretation of 
section 41, the High Court was clear that the issue was whether, 
given the irrebuttable nature of the presumption, a child under eight 
was capable of formulating mens rea or dole. Lord Justice Clerk 
Ross stated that the presumption constituted a substantive rule, rather 
than merely a procedural one, and that it had its origins in the law as 
set down by Hume and A l i s o n . T h e  view of the m ajority^w as 
that such a young child would not be able to formulate mens rea 
therefore s/he could not be refened to a children’s hearing on the 
offence ground. This examination of the nature and meaning of 
section 41 is particularly interesting given the Scottish Law
181
182
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, [hereinafter “CP(S)A 1995”] s 41 
Supra, note 114
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 s 32(2)(g) (now Children (Scotland) Act 1995, 
s52(2)(i))
Supra, note 114, at p 197
Lord Dunpark dissented though on the basis that the word “offence” could be 
construed differently where the purpose of the proceedings was to ensure the 
welfare of child in trouble, not that the age of criminal responsibility had no 
comiection with criminal capacity. Ibid, at p 197
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Commission’s recent recommendation that the age of criminal 
responsibility should be restated simply as an age denoting iramimity 
from prosecution and, hence, discomiected from capacity altogether. 
It has been suggested that this proposal would effectively reverse the 
decision in Menin v
The Law Commission proposes that, in a system where the majority 
of juvenile offenders are processed tlirough the, welfare-based, 
children’s hearings system, the age which is of particular significance 
is that at which most children become liable to prosecution in the 
adult courts. Under the Commission’s scheme, that would remain, as 
at present, sixteen. In line with the views of the Kilbrandon 
Commission^ however, it considers that there is still a need to retain 
the power to prosecute children aged under 16, in exceptional 
circumstances. It proposes twelve as the age below which this 
would be im possible^but it specifically recommends that this line- 
drawing exercise at the age of twelve should be completely severed 
from the issue of the child’s capacity. Children aged eleven and 
under would simply be immune from prosecution.
Although this thesis argues for a detailed and individualised 
examination of a child-accused’s criminal capacity, it is still regarded
Elaine Sutherland “The Age of Reason or the Reasons for an Age: The Age of 
Criminal Responsibility” 2001 SET l,atp  2 
CP(S)A 1995, s 42(1)
Report on Children and Young Persons (Scotland) (1964) Cmnd 2306, paras 
124 and 125
Scot Law Com No. 185, supra, note 10, paras 2 .10 -2 .13  
Ibid, paras 3.15, 3.16, 3.19 and 3.20 
Ibid, para 3.6
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as important that there should be an age of criminal responsibility 
and, in contrast to the Law Commission’s stance, that that age 
should, at least notionally, be seen as expressing a general view about 
children’s capacity/^^ The justification for having an age of criminal 
responsibility is political -  to ensure that very young children are 
never prosecuted, no matter the circumstances of the offence or the 
prevailing political climate in which it is committed. This is broadly 
in line with the Law Commission’s proposal to debar children aged 
under twelve from prosecution, which accords with the view of a 
number of the Commission’s consultées that having no minimum age 
might expose the very young to the adult c o u r t s . F o r  example, the 
wave of opprobrium generated by the murder of James Bulger 
suggests that there would have been a political will to prosecute 
Robert Thompson and Jon Venables no matter what their age at the 
time of the crime. It is submitted that very young children should 
be protected from political points-scoring exercises of this nature. 
There are, however, two reasons for departing from the Law 
Commission’s recommendation that the age below which prosecution 
is impossible should be divorced from c a p a c i t y . T h e  first of these
192
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Ibid, paras 3.4 and 3.5 
Ibid, para 3.4
This is demonstrated by the press reports cited in chapter 1 concerned with 
attempts to raise the age of criminal responsibility in Scotland and Eire which 
expressed outrage that the proposed increases would have exempted “the Bulger 
killers” from prosecution.
The Draft Crbninal Code for Scotland also takes the view that “children under 
12 years of age are too young to be held guilty of a criminal offence”: Commentary 
to section 15 (Children) at p 41
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is stigma. Immunity from prosecution, by definition, prevents 
children from appearing in court but it does not provide any 
justification for so doing. Accordingly, it merely serves to heighten 
the perception of children “getting away with murder”. If the age of 
criminal responsibility is notionally linked to capacity, this identifies 
children as a group whose development is, in ceidain respects key to 
the criminal process, lacking, and who are, therefore, entitled to some 
protection from prosecution which is not appropriate for their adult 
counterparts.
Secondly, immunity from prosecution expires once the relevant age 
is attained. This raises the spectre of a child who committed a crime 
as a toddler becoming liable to prosecution years later. The need for 
this safeguard is demonstrated by the case of a child who was 
charged, by the district attorney in Cincinatti, Ohio, with a murder 
allegedly committed when she was aged three. At the age of twelve, 
the child, who was in foster care, started to display disturbed 
behaviour and to suffer from nightmares. She eventually told her 
foster parent that she had killed her baby cousin, when she was aged 
three herself, by drowning him in a bucket of water. It appears 
that the DA eventually dropped the charge but the case illustrates the 
possibility that prosecution, even of those who were very young at 
the time of the offence, might take place later, if the age of criminal
“Can 3-Year-Old Child Commit Murder?” Montreal Gazette 9 March 1994 pp 
A1 and A12
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responsibility did not operate to prevent this. This is undesirable 
most notably because of the difficulty of assessing his/her 
understandings of the crime and of criminality generally, at the time 
when the offence was committed given that it is likely that, by the 
time of the trial, s/he will have a more mature understanding of such 
matters simply by virtue of having aged.*^  ^ As the Law Commission 
has noted, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
which requires prosecution “within a reasonable time” would, almost 
certainly, ensure that this did not happen, but the possibility, 
undesirable in itself, remains.
Support for the view that the age of criminal responsibility should be 
linked to capacity is to be found in international law. Both the 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of 
Juvenile Justice (1985) (“Beijing Rules) and the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (“CRC”) include 
provisions which indicate that this is required. The CRC is a multi­
lateral treaty^ *^^  which has been signed and ratified by the UK and is
It is, of comse, arguable that this is an acceptable way to proceed if the view is 
taken that the primary justification for protecting children from prosecution is their 
inability properly to defend themselves. The position adopted here is however, that 
the child’s understanding of his/lier actions, in a number of respects, whilst s/he is 
committing them is an element integral to the establisliment of Iris/her criminal 
responsibility. Without this the maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, 
which requires the actus reus and the mens rea to occur simultaneously, and which 
is fundamental in Scots criminal law, is not satisfied.
Scot Law Com No 185, supra, note 10, para 3.18
These issues are discussed more fully subsequently in relation to the case of  
HMA V P 2001 SLT 924
Currently the USA and Somalia are the only countries which are not signatories. 
Jolm P Grant and Elaine E Sutherland “Scots Law and International Conventions”
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therefore binding in international law, although it does not have 
direct effect in British law. The Beijing Rules, which predate the 
Convention, have been described as “soft law”.^ ^^  Although not 
binding in international law, the British goveminent is a signatory to 
them and they therefore constitute one of its international 
o b l i g a t i o n s , o f  importance in issues comiected with the 
administration of juvenile justice. The UN invites, but does not 
require, states to adopt the Rules.
Rule 4(1) of the Beijing Rules states:
“In those legal systems recognising the concept of the age of criminal 
responsibility for juveniles, the beginning of that age shall not be 
fixed at too low an age level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, 
mental and intellectual maturity”
The official commentary on the provision expands on this by
explaining that
“The minimum age of criminal responsibility differs 
widely owing to history and culture. The modem 
approach would be to consider whether a child can live 
up to the moral and psychological components of 
criminal responsibility; that is, whether a child, by 
virtue of her or his individual discernment and 
understanding, can be held responsible for essentially 
antisocial behaviour. If the age of criminal 
responsibility is fixed too low or if there is no lower age 
limit at all, the notion of responsibility would become 
meaningless.”
in Alison Cleland and Elaine E Sutherland (eds) Children's Rights in Scotland 
(Edinburgh: W Green, 2001) 29, at para 3.28 
Penal Reform International website: 
httD://www.penalrefonn.org/english/vuln iutinsiuve.litm 
Sutherland, supra, note 186, at p 3 
Scot Law Com No. 185, supra, note 10, para 2.21
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The Law Commission’s opinion on this provision is that “ [a]t first 
sight the concept of age of criminal capacity used in Article 4(1) is 
that of criminal capacity but it is clear from the commentary that the 
provision is concerned rather with an appropriate age for being 
prosecuted in the criminal justice system.” ®^"^ It is not, however, 
altogether clear how this conclusion is reached. The purpose of the 
age of criminal responsibility is, of course, to determine, in the 
broadest possible teims “an appropriate age for being prosecuted in 
the criminal justice system” but it is submitted that this Rule seems 
clearly to indicate that that determination should be predicated on 
principles of criminal capacity, defined loosely as the child’s 
understanding of his/her criminal actions which allows him/her to 
take responsibility for them.
The CRC provides that “States Parties shall seek to promote the 
establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and institutions 
specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused of, or 
recognized as having infringed the penal law, and, in particular ... 
[t]he establisliment of a minimum age below which children shall be 
presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law.” °^^
Ibid, para 2.22 
Art 40(3)(a)
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The Law Commission makes two main points concerning this 
provision.^^^ The first is that its requirement that states “seek to 
promote” these matters is weak. Signatory states will satisfy its 
tenns merely by moving towards the establisliment of such laws. 
Secondly, the Commission considers that, if Article 40(3) is read in 
the context of the rest of the provisions in the CRC on children who 
offend, which are seeking to ensure diversion out of the adult courts 
wherever possible, then that Article’s formulation of the age of 
criminal responsibility should be read simply as the age at which 
children become liable to prosecution in the adult courts. It is 
submitted that this is a veiy strained reading of an Article which 
expressly and in as many words links up the minimum age for 
prosecution with the concept of capacity. Elaine Sutherland argues 
that the Commission’s reading of Article 40(3)(a) would mean that it 
was effectively treated as if it were pro non scripto?^^
These provisions, in both the Beijing Rules and the CRC then, on a 
straightforward reading lend support to the view that the age of 
criminal responsibility should be linked to the child’s criminal 
capacity. The question of the appropriate age itself is discussed in 
chapter 5
Scot Law Com No. 185, supra, note 10, paras 2.27 to 2.30 
Sutherland, supra, note 186, atp 3
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Scottish Domestic Case Law 
(a) Age of Little Consequence
The age of criminal responsibility deals with capacity very broadly, 
as applicable to all children in the same way. This thesis is, however, 
primarily concerned with capacity on an individualised basis. It is 
therefore necessary to examine how the issue has been characterised 
in individual cases of children who commit serious crimes in modern 
times. It should be noted at the outset that very few children are 
prosecuted, the vast majority of juvenile offenders being referred to 
the children’s hearings system.Accordingly,  there is a paucity of 
reported cases in this area generally, Wowever some analysis of those 
which are reported is both possible and useful. Even prior to the 
question of capacity, it is noteworthy that the accused’s age, and 
his/her con espending status as a child, are often, in themselves, 
disregarded or downplayed to the extent that case reports accord 
them only a passing reference.
For example, in McDermott v HMA^^  ^the accused was convicted of 
murder at the age of fifteen. Despite the seriousness of the crime, his 
youth is mentioned only twice: once to explain why his conviction
The Scottish Law Commission inteipreted the statistics on children who offend 
for 1997, 1998 and 1999 to mean that 99% were referred to the children’s hearings 
system and only 0.5% to die courts: Scot Law Com No. 185, supra, note 10, at para 
3.10. The figures for retenais to the hearings system and prosecution do not 
exactly match, causing the 0.5% discrepancy.
2000 SLT 366
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was for “detention for life”^^  ^ in terms of s 206(2) of the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995)^" (only adults are imprisoned) and 
the second time as paid of a reminder to the jury that he had allegedly 
confessed to the crime in the absence of his solicitor/^ ^  Similarly, in 
W V where the accused had been convicted of rape and
appealed, the fact that he was aged fifteen at the time is left out of the 
headnote completely and only covered in the indictment itself, and, in 
passing, in Lord Ross’s opi n i on . ^The  case tmmed on whether the 
trial judge’s charge to the jury was sufficiently clear concerning what 
constituted rape where the complainer (who, in this case, was also 
aged fifteen) was intoxicated.^From a methodological point of 
view, this failure to attach importance to age has the consequence 
that indexing or digesting of cases on an annual basis often fails to 
identify the accused as a child, making finding such cases difficult in 
itself.
Canacitv in Cases Dealing Specifically with Mens Rea
Even where mens rea itself is the key issue in a case, and where it
might, therefore, be considered paiticularly important that the child’s
In fact convicted murderers aged under eighteen are sentenced to “detention 
without limit of time”.
McDermott v HMA, supra, note 209, at p 368 
atp 370 
1995 SLT 685 
Ibid, at p 685 and p 686
See also Mathieson v HMA 1981 SCCR 196 where it is noted, in passing that 
“Mathieson ... is now sixteen”. It is unclear what age he was when he committed 
the offence, nor does this appear to have been of any further relevance in the case.
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capacity be taken into account, this tendency to gloss over the 
accused’s status as a child is still discernible. This is clear from the 
cases of W V and C v HMA^^  ^ in each of which the accused
was a fourteen-year old boy. In W, the accused was convicted of 
culpable and reckless injury for throwing a bottle out of a fifteenth 
floor window and seriously injuring a passer-by. In Ç, the conviction 
was for two counts of indecent assault committed against an eleven- 
year old girl, the second count having been reduced from a charge of 
rape.
In W, the court discussed, to the extent that the case has become part 
of the accepted Scottish canon of recklessness,^ the (high) degree of 
culpability and recklessness required to constitute this crime. There 
is no hint that the requisite degree might vary to accommodate the 
accused’s status as a child or that, even if he had, objectively, acted 
recklessly, he might not have understood his actions and their 
consequences in the same way, or to the same extent as an adult. For 
example, his conduct had “near fatal consequences to a member of 
the p u b l i c , y e t  there is no discussion of the nature of his 
understanding of the likelihood that his action might kill someone. 
That such issues might at least be considered is not as idealistic as it 
at first appears. Seventeen years after W, in HMA v S, Lord Cap Ian 
stated his view that “[cjertainly children can act recklessly (and it
1982 SLT 420 
1987 SCCR 104
See Gordon, supra, note 18, at paras 7-58, n 4 and 7-61 n 44 and 49 
W V HMA, supra, note 213, at p 420
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may be that they are even more prone to do so than adults) but their 
capacity to appreciate the dangers they are creating may not always 
be sufficient to attach criminality to their conduct.
In C, the accused claimed that he had believed that the complainer 
had consented to the indecency and, therefore, that he lacked the 
mens rea of evil intent for a conviction of assault. It was conceded 
on his behalf, however, that a girl aged eleven or under was incapable 
in law of consenting to acts of indecency. Because his error was as 
to a matter which, if proved, could not have afforded him a defence 
anyway, it was irrelevant. Again, the case is sufficiently important 
legally to be cited by Gordon in his discussion both of error^^’ and of 
consent in a s s a u l t . T h e  complainer’s age is accorded importance 
because of its significance in the general law. By contrast, the 
accused’s age is treated as largely irrelevant, only discernible at all in 
the trial judge’s rather patronising comments about “[sjupposed 
heroes of the playground.”^^  ^ The assessment of capacity is 
particularly important in a case of this nature where, in law, there is, 
effectively no defence.
In both of these cases, then, C and W, in determining responsibility 
in terms of whether or not to convict, the criminal law simply treats 
the child-accused as if he were an adult. Capacity is, presumably, if
HMA V S (unreported) (5 October 1999) (High Court) (examination of the facts) 
See http://www.scotcourts.ROv.uk/opinions/845A 99.html) at p 7 of 10 (on internet 
copy)
Gordon, supra, note 18, at para 9.08 
Ibid, at para 29.39 
C V HMA, supra, note 217, at p 106
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it is considered at all, regarded as an implicit element of mens rea?^^ 
Here, then, the “contra-factualism”, - treating young accused as if 
they were mature - identified, in the juvenile justice system by Ido 
Weijers^^  ^and commented upon by Antony D uff is writ large. The 
law treats these accused “'as i f  [they were] fully responsible” 
when, in fact, their inlierent immaturity may well mean that they are 
not. Examining capacity specifically would allow a more accurate 
assessment of their individual responsibility and obviate the need for 
reliance on the fiction of maturity.
A note of caution may be necessary here. There may be number of 
reasons for the absence of any discussion of capacity in cases 
concerning children as offenders. First, case reports are selective in 
the points which they consider, sometimes illuminating only one 
legal issue out of a number discussed. Equally, the majority are 
appeals, with the consequence that information presented to the trial 
court as evidence is unlikely to be discussed again. Capacity may 
slip thi'ough the reporters’ net on either or both of these bases. 
Secondly, reference can be made to the Scottish Law Commission’s 
view that the fact that the vast majority of juvenile offenders are
In sentencing Ç, youth was taken into account in mitigation. Sentence was 
defened for a year with the promise that, if  the judge received a “satisfactory 
report” and the accused behavefd] [him jselfthat would “be an end of the matter.” 
Ibid, at p 106. The sentence in W is not recorded in the case report.
Ido Weijers “The Moral Perspective: A Pedagogical Perspective on Juvenile 
Justice” in Weijers & Duff (eds), supra, note 2, 135 atp 141
Antony Duff “Punishing the Young” in Weijers & Duff (eds), ibid, 115 at pp 
116-7
Ibid, at p 116
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referred to the welfare-based children’s hearings system obviates the 
need for a sophisticated approach to capacity for those who are 
prosecuted. In fact, however, it is contended that because so few 
children are dealt with in this way, the importance of securing their 
fair treatment, in a system which does not set out to be child-centred, 
is heightened. Additionally, the small number of child-accused 
means that the employment of mechanisms for the thorough testing 
of their capacity should not overstretch the criminal justice system.
Unpreparedness for Children
Certain cases illustrate the unpreparedness of the Scottish criminal 
courts for dealing with children. In F v the accused, aged
fourteen and described as a “one-boy crime wave”^^  ^ pled guilty on 
indictment to nine charges of theft by housebreaking all committed in 
Shetland. There is no doubt, from his note to the appeal court, that 
the sheriff gave the case anxious consideration. He paid lip service 
to capacity, though without investigating it. His note states that 
“[t]he appellant ... was for all his extreme youth the leader and 
plaimer of the pair. He is not mentally immature. He knew or ought 
to have known that what he was doing was wrong.” The sheriff 
sought a disposal which took into account “[ajdolescent nature” 
whilst weighing up both the accused’s development and the public
1994 SCCR 711 
^^Ubid, atp 712
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interest.^^^ In order to achieve this, however, he detained the accused 
“without limit of time”, the equivalent of a sentence of life 
imprisonment for an adult and carrying the same connotations of 
seriousness (of offence) and dangerousness (of offender).
Ironically, the sheriffs primary aim -  to ensure the greatest 
flexibility so that the accused could be released as soon as he had 
been appropriately rehabilitated -  would have been realised by the 
imposition of a determinate sentence of detention, the law allowing 
the release of a juvenile offender at any time during the sentence, on 
the recommendation of the Parole Board.^^* It appears then, that 
neither the sheriff, his colleagues whom he consulted, nor either the 
crown or the defence had to hand the information required to make 
an informed decision on sentencing a child, nor did they apprise 
themselves of it. The consequences for this accused, given that the 
sentence of detention without limit of time requires release on life 
licence, could have been severe. Of course, as in many cases, the 
errors here were corrected on appeal and it is arguable that it was 
unreasonable to expect the sheriff in Lerwick to be fully cognisant of 
the law in every case over which he might preside. Nonetheless, he 
had specifically sought to deal with the child-accused in an age- 
appropriate fashion and his failure to access the relevant information
"'U W , atp 711 
atp 715
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suggests that the system as a whole is not particularly well prepared 
for the prosecution and sentencing of the young.
In HMA V the accused aged twelve at the time of the offence 
and thirteen at the time of the court proceedings was originally 
charged with murder. He had set fire to a pool of petrol situated a 
short distance from his friend, the deceased, who was lying on a path 
and who, to the accused’s knowledge had petrol on his clothes. 
Petrol vapour ignited and the deceased suffered severe bums from 
which he later died. In order that the court could hear" evidence on 
the child-accused’s (delayed) development, a plea in bar of trial on 
the ground of insanity was entered on his behalf. Although, 
ultimately, this mechanism served the child-accused well, because it 
allowed infoimation on his capacity to be fed into the p r o c e s s , t h e  
fact that the only means by which this could be achieved engendered 
a finding of “insanity”^^ '^  is indicative of a system which can cope 
only clumsily with the young. It was necessary for expert witnesses 
to present evidence that the accused suffered from a mental
(plea in bar of trial on ground of insanity) (unreported) (9 July 1999) (High 
Court) see http://www.scotcourts.rov.uLopinions/845 99 .litnil ; (examination of 
the facts -  supra, note 220)
Cf B V HMA 2003 SLT 662 where the accused aged fourteen at the time of the 
offence (rape) had an IQ of 74 (S’s IQ was 76). No plea in bar was led and, 
therefore, the only aspect of the accused’s understanding which was discnssed was 
his ability to understand the caution administered by the police.
It should be noted however, that, in recognition of the, often inappropriate, 
stigma attaching to the term insanity, the Scottish Law Commission has proposed 
that the plea should be renamed “disability in bar of trial.” Scottish Law 
Commission Discussion Paper on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility (Scot 
Law Com No 122) (Edinburgh: TSO, 2003) paras 4.8 -  4.12
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impairment^^^ which would be recognised by the Mental Health 
Acts.^^^
The procedure in a plea of insanity in bar of trial is contained in 
sections 54 to 57 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 
which are primarily designed to deal with offenders suffering from 
mental illness or disorder. If it had been determined, at the 
examination of the facts, that S had committed the offence then, 
because he was originally charged with murder, the mandatory 
disposal at that time would have been incarceration in the state 
mental hospital with the imposition of the equivalent of a restriction 
order on release.^^^ This would clearly have been inappropriate 
given that S’s mental impairment, which justified the plea in law, 
was a developmental delay. In other words, S had, in certain 
important areas - primarily verbal and abstract-reasoning abilities - 
failed to develop as fast as his peers and the deficit was, in his case, 
significant. All children, however, are, to some extent lacking in 
development -  that being an integral part of the status of being a 
child. The legal system is failing children if it can only engage at all 
with the question of their development -  or lack of it - in 
circumstances where this is “abnonnally” slow. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, development and capacity are intrinsically bound 
up with each other.
HMA V S (plea in bar) supra, note 232, at p 7 of 9 (on internet copy)
Ibid, at p 3 of 9 (on internet eopy)
CP(S)A 1995, s 57(3). This subsection has now been amended to remove the 
mandatory disposal for murder: Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, s 2
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The Effect of the Human Rights Act 1998
HMA V is one of the first cases involving a child to be decided 
after section 57(2) of the Scotland Act 1998 came into force on 20^ '’ 
May 1999. This section prevents members of the Scottish Executive 
from acting in a way which is incompatible with any Convention 
right or with European Coimnunity law. Accordingly, it specifically 
requires the Lord Advocate (as a member of the Scottish Executive) 
to adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights, even prior 
to the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 on 2"^  
October 2000. It is submitted that these two legislative provisions - 
or, in other words, the incorporation of the European Convention into 
domestic Scots law -  have gone some way to improving the situation 
of children accused of serious crimes in Scotland. The inteipretation 
of the Convention in such cases, all of which have so far been 
concerned, directly or indirectly, with Article 6, is infomied by the 
European Court’s decision in the Bulger case.
Article 6 is concerned with the right to a fair trial. In T v UK; V v 
UK?^^  the European Court, following an earlier case,^ "^ ® took the 
view that, read as a whole, this Article required an accused person’s 
effective and active participation in his own trial. Where the accused
Supra, notes 220 (examination of the facts) and 232 (plea in bar)
(2000) 30EHRR121
Stanford v UK The Times 8 March 1994. Here the applicant’s argument was 
that he was unable to hear some of the evidence and it was held that this did not 
preclude his participation given the role played by his legal representatives.
215
is a child, “it is essential that [s/he] is dealt with in a manner which 
takes full account of his [sic] age, level of maturity and intellectual 
and emotional capacities, and that steps are taken to promote his [sic] 
ability to understand and participate in the proceedings.” "^^^
This points to the need to assess a child’s functioning under the heads 
identified here of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities 
in order that s/he can be dealt with in the appropriate marmer. The 
court specifically held that the child’s active participation in the trial 
will not be achieved merely by his/her presence and legal 
representation throughout. It is this finding which was applied by the 
High Court in HMA v S in deteiinining whether S could have a fair 
trial, given his intellectual impairment. It is interesting to examine 
the construction of capacity in S’s case.
HMA V S was determined by a single judge in the High Court 
(because the charge was murder), sitting without a jury to deal with, 
what is, essentially, a procedural matter. Its relative insignificance 
within the doctrine of precedent is, however, displaced in this thesis 
by its subject matter -  the level of understanding, in particular areas, 
of a child accused of a serious crime. The court was called upon to 
decide whether S was insane in bar of trial in terms of the test set 
down in HMA v Wilson "^^  ^ - ie “whether he [was] fit to instruct a
T V UK; V V UK, supra, note 239, at para 86 
1942 SLT 194
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defence and fit to follow the p r o c e e d i n g s . T h e  evidence led was, 
accordingly, geared towards answering these questions -  and Lord 
Caplan specifically took into account in making his ruling the need 
for S’s active participation in his trial.^ "^ "^  The evidence required to 
answer these questions also however covers a number of the pre­
conditions to a legitimate trial and the capacity points identified in 
the previous chapter.
The ability to follow the proceedings and the requirement of effective 
participation are both intrinsically bound up with the question of 
understanding of legal language and concepts theorised previously as 
a precondition. Accordingly, S’s verbal and abstract reasoning skills 
were subjected to close scmtiny both because these were the areas in 
which his deficit was the greatest^ "^  ^ and because they were the most 
crucial to imderstanding and participating in a criminal trial. A clear 
picture emerged of his (dis)ability in these respects,^"*  ^the difficulties 
which this presented for the conduct of the trial and the steps which 
might be taken to ameliorate, if not to resolve the problems. For 
example, his difficulties with language were such that he would 
understand the trial better if it could be translated from verbal into
Ibid, atp 195 (per Lord Wark)
HMA V S, supra, note 232, at p 7 of 9 (on internet copy)
In general, in these areas, he hinctioned at the level o f a child aged just over 
eight years, despite his clironological age of twelve at the time o f the offence and 
thirteen at the time of tr ial. See ibid, at pp 2, 3, 5 and 7 of 9 (on internet copy)
Despite its technical nature, Lord Caplan was able to present a clear summary of 
this evidence, expressed in terms which were helpfiil horn the legal perspective. 
See ibid, atp 7 of 9 (on internet copy)
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visual i m a g e s . H e  could not follow sentences of more than ten 
words in length^ "^  ^ therefore participants in the trial should limit 
themselves to such short sentences containing no more than two 
c o n c e p t s . H i s  understanding, certainly of key points, possibly of 
all points, would require to be checked, on a sentence by sentence 
basis, by a trained interpreter because it would be insufficient simply 
to ask him if he had understood.^^® It was likely that this checking 
would require to take place outwith the presence of the jury and it 
was unclear whether the evidence would require to be reheard if it 
was determined that S had not, in fact understood it.^ ^^  As in T v 
UK; V V S was beginning to suffer from post-traumatic stress
disorder^^^ and the court proceedings would significantly increase his 
anxiety, making it even more difficult for him to follow.^ "^^  It was 
therefore recommended that the trial be conducted in a small room 
with not more than four people present at any one time,^^  ^ that low 
vocal tones should be used at all times and that wigs and gowns 
should be removed.
Ibid, at pp 4 and 5 of 9 (on internet copy). No opinion was expressed as to how 
this might be accomplished.
Ibid, at pp 3 and 5 (on internet copy)
Ibid, at p 5 (on internet copy)
Ibid, at pp 4 and 5 (on internet copy)
Ibid,at p 8 (on internet copy)
Supra, note 239 at pp 180 -  181 paras 89 and 90
HMA V S (plea in bar) supra, note 232, at p 4 (on internet copy)
Ibid, at p 2 (on internet copy)
The judge’s calculation was that the absolute minimum number of personnel 
who could be present at a Scottish jury tiial was, in fact, 25.
HMA V S (plea in bar) supra, note 232, at p 5 (on internet copy)
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Given this evidence, it is unsiuprising that Lord Caplan sustained the 
plea in bar of trial on the basis of “unequivocal and satisfactory 
expert evidence from defence witnesses that the accused would not 
be able to follow the proceedings were he to go to t r i a l . T h e  
evidence is also interesting in its own right because Lord Caplan 
reached his conclusion on the basis of an inference that S had “an 
effective age of a child of little more than eight years, if not 
younger.”^^  ^ This inference was drawn because several of the expert 
witnesses placed S’s skills in specific respects at about the level of a 
child of eight. Given the difficulties with a criminal trial to which 
these findings indicated that S would be subject, the setting of the age 
of criminal responsibility in Scotland at eight must be seriously 
questioned. This is point which will be considered in chapter 5.
The case also demonstrates that there is no difficulty about obtaining 
and leading evidence which would enable a court to reach 
conclusions about a child-accused’s understandings both in terms of 
preconditions to a legitimate trial and capacity points. Expert 
witnesses in the case also opined, for example, that S was capable, 
with appropriate explanation, of understanding that a charge of 
murder involves an attribution of blame, that he could understand the 
difference between guilty and not guilty and that his lack of 
understanding was of a different order from that of an adult of low
Ibid, at p 8 (on internet copy) 
Ibid, at p 7 (on internet copy)
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i n t e l l e c t . There was also a close examination of his understanding 
of causation in the specific circumstances of this case, in tenns of the 
flammable properties of petrol and petrol vapour and how this related 
to his state of mind with regard to the harm caused to his friend, the 
deceased.^^^
While the case demonstrates the Scottish courts’ ability to deal with 
issues of capacity, as a precedent, it still only stands for the fact that 
such issues are relevant where an accused who is a child brings a plea 
in bar of trial on the gi’ound of insanity. Capacity, then, has not, by 
virtue of this case, become a major concern of the Scottish criminal 
justice system. More encouragingly, however, recent cases on the 
question of unreasonable delay in terms of Article 6(1) of the 
European Convention have demonstrated a generally child-centred 
approach which touches on the need to determine capacity, albeit 
only obliquely.
Article 6(1) requires “a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” It 
is accepted generally by the Crown Office that cases involving 
children, whether as witnesses, complainer or accused should be 
expedited.^'’^  hr HMA v Lord Reed set down a rationale for this 
rule where the child is the accused. In so doing, he attached
Ibid, at p 2 (on internet copy)
Ibid, at p 8 (on internet copy); (examination of the facts) supra, note 220, at pp 
3, 5, 7 and 8 (on internet copy)
HMA V P, supra, note 199, a t  p  927, p a r a  9 
Ibid
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significance to the status of child per se, in a way which has 
resonance for all cases involving child-accused. He also drew on the 
CRC and the Beijing Rules, according to them an importance in their 
own right in Scots law^^  ^ which had previously been absent.^ "^^  The 
High Court’s implicit acceptance of the framework which these 
treaties create for cases involving children is particularly welcome 
given their lack of binding status in Scots law which was discussed 
above. In fact, the requirement to have regard to the CRC and the 
Beijing Rules, in cases involving child-accused, was subsequently 
endorsed by the Privy Council in a Scottish appeal on a devolution 
issue.^^  ^ Overall then. Lord Reed’s judgment re-focussed attention 
on the child as a child and as the bearer of rights in international law, 
additional to those accorded to everyone, child or adult, by the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
HMA V P involved two child-accused charged with rape, allegedly 
committed when they were aged thirteen. They were charged in 
March 1999 but, for various reasons, their trial was not due to start 
until February 2001. Lord Reed examined the reasonableness of this 
delay in a child-centred fashion.^^^ He noted that a child of thirteen 
might be very different from a child of fifteen “both in terms of
Ibid, p 927, paras 7 and 11
In Cook V HMA 2001 SLT (Sh Ct) 53 for example, which also concerned delay 
under Article 6, where the accused was aged fifteen at the time of the offence, the 
sheriff was dismissive o f the CRC and stated that the Children (Scotland) Act, 
which is, in part, based on the CRC, was “of no relevance to a criminal 
prosecution.” (at p 55)
Dyer v Watson; K v HMA 2002 SLT 229 at p 243 
HMA V P, supra, note 199, at p 928
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physical development and in terms of maturity and understanding,” 
thereby giving a very different impression to a jury than if the trial 
had taken place expeditiously. He indicated, encouragingly in 
capacity terms, that it might be much more difficult to assess the 
child’s understanding, in this case of sexual matters and 
relationships, at the time of the offence, if the trial was delayed for 
two y e a r s . H e  also recognised that the experience of the passage 
of time is relative to age and that a two-year period during childhood 
may have a very different significance than the comparable period for 
an adult.^^^
HMA V P is not concerned with capacity in its own right, but it does 
demonstrate an awareness that understanding is linked to 
development and that it is the child’s understanding of the crime at 
the time o f its commission which is and ought to be the concern of the 
criminal law. Its weighting towards the child of the balance between 
the accused’s status as a child on the one hand, and his/her status as 
the alleged perpetrator of a serious offence on the other^ *^  ^may help 
to redress the previous situation in cases such as W v HMA^^  ^and C
A similar point is recognised in the official commentary to Rule 20 of the 
Beijing Rules. (Avoidance o f Unnecessary Delay). It states: “[a]s time passes, the 
juvenile will find it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to relate the procedure 
and disposition to the offence, both intellectually and psychologically.”
In a subsequent appeal, the whole of Lord Reed’s statement on these points was 
quoted and adopted by the Lligh Court. Kane v HMA 2001 SCCR 621
See Claire McDiarmid “Children Who Murder: What is Her Majesty’s 
Pleasur e?” 2000 Crim L R 547 for a discussion of this tension. See also Rule 17 of 
the Beijing Rules and the official commentary thereon.
Supra, note 216
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V where youth was ignored. At the very least, there is now
no doubt that, because of the characteristics of youth including 
developmental progression, children’s cases must be expedited if 
they are not to fall foul of Article 6(1).^^^
Capacitv Under the Convention and in International Law 
These cases also give new authority, within the Scottish criminal law 
framework, to the Beijing Rules and the CRC. This is a step forward 
even from the treatment of the Bulger case in the European Court 
where the use made of the CRC has been described as “an aid to 
construction”^^  ^ of the European Convention. The main provisions 
of the relevant international instruments on the child’s criminal 
capacity have already been examined -  Aiiicle 6 of the European 
Convention requires that the child-accused understands the 
proceedings sufficiently to participate in them actively and 
effectively; Article 40(3)(a) of the CRC and Rule 4(1) of the Beijing 
Rules require that the age of criminal responsibility be linked to 
capacity. Both the Scottish courts’ recent treatment of delay under 
Article 6 and the decision in T v UK; V v indicate that the
Supra, note 217
Haston and Ors v HMA (um'cported)
(see http://ww\v.scotcourts.nov.ul<7opinions/xc898 03.htmll held that “[t]he 
approach in the case of a child of eight or nine years old would not be the same as 
in the case of child who was nearly sixteen. There had to be a sliding scale.” At 
para 11
See Grant and Sutherland, supra, note 200, at p 48 
Supra, note 239
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European Convention, which does not, in general ,engage with the 
rights of children as distinct from those of adults^ *^’ can be interpreted 
and applied to take account of the special characteristics of children. 
Both the CRC and the Beijing Rules include provisions which, while 
not relevant to an assessment of the child’s capacity as such, do 
indicate the need actively to promote children’s understanding of the 
criminal proceedings. Article 40 of the CRC is reminiscent of Article 
6 of the European Convention suggesting that it could be construed 
similarly so as to require active participation.
In a similar vein, Rule 14(2) of the Beijing Rules states: “[t]he 
proceedings^^^ shall be conducive to the best interests of the juvenile 
and shall be conducted in an atmosphere of understanding, which 
shall allow the juvenile to participate therein and to express herself or 
himself freely.” This provision is particularly clear as to the need to 
promote the child’s understanding within the proceedings.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the treatment of the child’s criminal 
capacity in Scots criminal law from the seventeenth century to date,
Though certain Articles do make specific reference to children. Article 6(1), for 
example, modifies the obligation on states to dispense justice publicly so tliat the 
press and public can be excluded “where the interests o f juveniles so require.” For 
a complete list see Grant and Sutherland, supra, note 200, at p 38
Article 1 secures rights and freedoms to “everyone” (ie including children) 
within the jurisdiction of a High Contracting Party
The Beijing Rules are expressed very broadly so that they can be applied in all 
countries which adhere to them, whatever their specific system. “Proceedings” 
therefore refers to any proceedings which deal with a criminal offence committed 
by a child. In Scotland this includes both the children’s hearings system and the 
adult courts,
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drawing on comparative material where appropriate. A picture 
emerges of a law which, because of the prevalence of capital 
punishment in an earlier period, at that time engaged quite 
extensively with the justification for saving children and young 
people from the gallows. This is giounded in issues of understanding 
which, although relating only to the narrow areas of the distinction 
between right and wrong and the ability to participate actively in the 
trial, nonetheless resemble certain aspects of criminal capacity as the 
term would be understood today.
From the beginning of the nineteenth century however, the law 
begins to take less and less interest in child-accused as such partly, 
perhaps, because of the success of programmes to divert those at risk 
of offending into industrial schools, which may have resulted in 
fewer children being prosecuted, in the first place. The child-saving 
philosophy, part of which was that the court was not the most 
appropriate forum for dealing with children may also have been 
significant here.
This lack of engagement with child-accused as children, paidicularly 
in relation to capacity, has continued into the modem law, although 
there are more promising indicators in relation to cases decided under 
the Human Rights Act 1998. The tension between the child as 
dependent and in need of protection and the child as perpetrator of 
crime underlies much of this analysis. It will be examined 
specifically in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4 
Reconciling Welfare and Justice
Introduction
This chapter discusses specifically one of the major underlying 
themes of the whole thesis: the tension between the child as 
vulnerable and in need of protection and the child as independent 
actor  ^ and the even greater paradox presented by a child who 
commits a serious crime. This returns the debate specifically to some 
of the issues raised in chapter 1 arising from the distinctions drawn 
between the “traditional” and the “childhood studies” constructions 
of childhood and between original sin and original innocence. The 
traditional construction of childhood is criticised for representing 
children primarily as “becomings” on the road to adulthood rather 
than (young) persons in their own right. The childhood studies 
construction concentrates on the child’s own, individual reality and 
eschews the attempt to theorise childhood as a universalisable 
experience. This thesis seeks to treat children holistically, 
realistically and individually and, in so doing, to recognise both their 
interactivity, as young members of society, with adults and other 
children and their need to be protected, to the extent which each of
* Erik Erikson’s theory of child development, discussed in chapter 2, suggests that 
even very young children (those in his second phase of development, aged between 
1 and 3 on average) experience conflict caused by a developing sense of autonomy 
drawing them out from the state of dependence which they have previously 
enjoyed and which still pertains in their lives in many respects.
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them, as an individual, requires, in their participation in the criminal 
justice system,^
Children are neither wholly vulnerable nor fully independent and 
responsible yet the discussion of the modem law in chapter 3 
suggests that it is sometimes easier for the criminal law to approach 
them as if they were as responsible as adults.^ In order to treat 
children fairly however, the law, both civil and criminal, ought to be 
able to accommodate the child’s vulnerability and his/her agency 
simultaneously. This chapter is particularly concerned with this 
challenge and with the way in which the law responds to it.
It is impossible to discuss these issues properly, especially in the 
Scottish legal context, without bringing in a philosophical approach 
to the legal treatment of children which has been touched upon on 
several occasions in the earlier chapters but not, until now laid bare, 
explained and analysed. That is the concept of welfare. Welfare is 
fundamental to Scots law’s engagement with children in general, 
including those who commit crime. It is often regarded as 
paternalism in practice and, for this reason, perceived as an 
appropriate response to the “vulnerable” child in need of care and 
protection, but not so obviously to the serious child-offender.
The argument to be presented here is that this perspective is too 
narrow in that welfare, certainly as practised by the Scottish
 ^As will be discussed later in this chapter, in Scotland this encompasses both the 
courts and the children’s hearings system.
 ^ See, particularly, the discussion on “Capacity in Cases Dealing Specifically with 
Mens Rea” in chapter 3
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children’s hearings system, is not opposed to criminal justice. 
Rather, it encompasses certain of its key components -  specifically 
capacity and responsibility - albeit that its approach and methodology 
may not conform to those commonly accepted in the criminal legal 
sphere.
Overall, then, the chapter seeks to effect a reconciliation of “welfare” 
with “justice”'^  examining, along the way, the need for, and the 
advantages of such a reconciliation and looking at models taken from 
other areas of law and legal practice where similar reconciliations 
have been successful.
In order to make this argument, it is necessary, first of all, to provide 
an overview of the role of welfare and the way in which it is 
practised in the Scottish legal system together with an exposition of 
the concept of “justice” in this context.
The Role of the Children’s Hearing
A thesis concerned primarily with children who offend in Scotland 
would be seriously lacking if it failed to give welfare its place. 
Indeed, Scotland, as a jurisdiction, has been described as “one of the 
few bastions of a welfare-based youth justice system thi'oughout the
Justice will be explained more fully subsequently but, for present puiposes, can 
be taken to represent the approach of the (adult) criminal courts to issues such as 
“due process” rights and “just deserts” but translated into the juvenile justice 
context.
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world.”  ^ This statement, of course, relates primarily to the children’s 
hearings system, yet this thesis has, hitherto, been almost entirely 
concerned with the prosecution of children in the (adult) courts. It is 
important, therefore, to clarify the role of the hearings system in 
relation to children who offend.^ A child may be refen'ed to a 
children’s hearing on the ground that s/he “has committed an 
offence”.^  This ground for referral is not qualified in any way so that 
all crimes, even the most serious can, in theory, be dealt with thi'ough 
the hearings system, including crimes within the privative 
jurisdiction of the High Court.^ Accordingly, the hearings system is 
an integi'al part of the Scottish criminal justice system, making it all 
the more important that its response to juvenile offending should be 
effective and defensible.
The Statutory Foundations of Welfare
It is widely recognised that welfare underlies the system’s ethos 
philosophically but it is necessary also to be clear concerning the
 ^ John Muiicie and Gordon Hughes “Modes of Youth Governance; Political 
Rationalities, Criminalization and Resistance” in John Muncie, Gordon Hughes and 
Eugene McLaughlin (eds) Youth Justice: Critical Readings (London: Sage, 2002) 1 
atp 8
 ^ The wiiter has been a member of the children’s panel for the city of Glasgow 
since 1996, a position which informs some of the analysis of the hearings system in 
this chapter.
 ^Children (Scotland) Act 1995, [hereinafter “C(S)A 1995] s 52(2)(i)
® See, for example Walker v C 2003 SLT 293 concerning rape. In practice, the 
reporter to the children’s panel and the procurator fiscal have a concurrent 
jurisdiction over crimes committed by children. The presumption is tliat most 
crimes will be dealt with tlnough the hearings system however, for more serious 
offences, the reporter and the fiscal will discuss the position to decide which is the 
more appropriate foinm.
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firm statutory foundations on which this ethos rests. It is an 
overarching principle of the system that “the welfare of [the] child 
throughout his [sic] childhood shall be [the] paramount 
consideration”  ^ in decisions taken by children’s hea r ings . Th i s  is 
qualified only “for the purpose of protecting members of the public 
from serious harm (whether or not physical harm.)”^^ Despite the 
strength of the statutory wording, it might still be possible to be 
dismissive of the hearings system as ‘just a welfare institution.’^^  
Welfare is, however, so entrenched in the Scottish legal approach to 
children that “[ejvery court in dealing with a child who is brought 
before it as an offender [is required to] have regard to the welfare of 
the child and ... in a proper case [to] take steps for removing him 
[sic] from undesirable siuTOundings.”^^
The provisions on welfare relating both to the courts and to the 
hearings system are bolstered by the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (“CRC”) which provides, in Article 3(1) that “in all actions 
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social
"C(S)A 1995, s 16(1)
Emphasis added. Tliis requirement applies only to decisions made by children’s 
hearings or courts under Part II o f the Act. Welfare is therefore the key element in 
decisions taken by children’s hearings on children who are referred to them for 
offending behaviour -  as, indeed, on any other ground. There is also a crossover 
between the criminal courts and the children’s hearings through the power 
confeiTed on the courts to remit cases of children who offend to a children’s 
hearing for disposal. Alternatively the court can apply to the children’s hearirrg for 
advice as to sentence. (Crimirral Procedure (Scotland) Act, [hereinafter “CP(S)A 
1995] s 49)
” C(S)A 1995 s 16(5).
As a corrcept, welfare has been much criticised, particularly outwith Scotland, as 
will be discussed subsequently.
CP(S)A 1995 s 50(6). Emphasis added. The modern reported cases canvassed in 
chapter 3 make little or no reference to this provision and it is, therefore, very 
difficult to assess its impact, or even the irrterpretation placed on it.
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welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration.” '^^  This Article makes no distinction between civil and 
criminal proceedings therefore both sets of courts are placed under 
the same obligation to respect the child’s best interests. As noted in 
chapter 3, the cases of HMA v and K_y_HMA^ *^  accept that the 
CRC is applicable to Scottish children chai’ged with offences and 
therefore has to be considered by courts dealing with them.
Legally, all of these statutory requirements create a duty on decision­
making bodies breach of which would, at the very least, ground an 
appeal. They assume even greater importance philosophically and 
practically however, in that they serve to prioritise “welfare” or “best 
interests” but to leave the content of those terms relatively 
uncircumscribed. The meaning ascribed to welfare, and the way in 
which it is practised therefore become key to the decision-making 
process. These issues will now be considered, as the foundation for 
an examination of the appropriate legal response to child-offenders as 
both children and criminals.
The Theorv and Practice of Welfare in the Children’s Hearings 
Svstem
Emphasis added
2001 SLT 924 at pp 927 - 928
(otherwise known as Dyer v Watson) 2002 SLT 229 at p 243
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In short compass, the welfare concept holds that offending by 
juveniles is a product of unmet needs in their lives. If these needs 
can be isolated and satisfied then the offending is likely to cease or, 
at least, to be diminished. Children whose unmet needs are signalled 
by the commission of an offence are placed in exactly the same 
category as those who are in need of care and protection from the 
state. Accordingly, welfare-based systems are often characterised as 
“mixing the deprived and the depraved”'  ^or as dominated by “needs 
not deeds”. Because welfare theory treats every child as an 
individual, with, consequently, an individualised set of needs, it 
confers a high level of discretion on decision-makers in detennining 
how best to meet those needs. Punishment, as such, plays no overt 
part whatsoever in welfare decision-making. For those who regard 
punishment as an essential element of the state’s response to crime, 
this is a deficiency. This may be one reason for the development of a 
further theoretical approach to juvenile justice alongside welfare 
which is often juxtaposed with it, both in theory and in practice. It is 
known, not very helpfully as will be seen, as “justice”.
See, eg Kathleen Murray “Residential Provision” in FM Martin and Kathleen 
Murray (eds) Children’s Hearings (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1976) at p 
140
See, for example Janice McGhee, Lorraine Waterhouse and Bill Whyte 
“Children’s Hearings and Children in Trouble” in Muncie, Hughes and 
McLaughlin (eds) supra, note 5, 228 at pp 228 and 234 -5
See, for example, Antony Duff “Punishing the Young” in Ido Weijers and 
Antony Duff (eds) Punishing Juveniles: Principle and Critique (Oxford: Hart, 
2002)115
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One of the main contentions of this chapter is that the distance 
between welfare and justice, as philosophical approaches to juvenile 
justice, is not as gi-eat as is sometimes suggested. In order to be clear 
about the generally accepted content of each approach, however, it is 
necessary to examine justice, first of all, separately from welfare, 
before proceeding to make the argument in favour of their actual 
proximity.
The “justice” approach concentrates almost exclusively on the 
criminal act itself and bases the action which it takes in respect of the 
child-offender on the severity of the crime. Other factors which 
might be taken into consideration in determining the appropriate 
disposal include any previous offences which the child has 
committed and the penalty imposed for these. The “due process” 
rights of the individual child are respected. The purpose of juvenile 
justice programmes predicated on this theory is tlii'eefold: to protect 
society from the offender; to indicate its intolerance of behaviour of 
that kind; and to deter the peipetrator from committing further 
criminal acts. It is likely that there will also be a rehabilitative 
element but, by contrast with welfare, it does not play the most 
prominent role. In teims of underlying philosophy, then, systems 
predicated on the justice modef° are markedly similar to adult courts,
For a full explanation o f the system and procedure in English youth courts, for 
example, see Richard Ward Young Offenders: Law, Practice and Procedure 
(Bristol: Jordans, 2001), particularly ch 1
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although it is still likely that both the procedure^ ^ and the disposals 
available will be tailored for children/^
This is a fair summary of the justice concept as it is often used in 
child law to signify all matters which cannot be brought under the 
umbrella of welfare. From the criminal law perspective, however, 
this broad exposition runs together and blurs the boundaries of two 
issues which are usually treated as distinct and belonging to two 
different areas of the criminal legal sphere. First, the right to a fair 
trial,^  ^ or the accused’s “due process” rights, fonn part of the law of 
evidence and ought to apply to the child-accused in the same way, for 
the same purpose and to the same extent as to adult accused. This 
belongs to justice rather than welfare because, as will be discussed 
subsequently, informal procedures are usually regarded as one of the 
hallmarks of welfare.
Second, the concentration on the offence as the main referent 
determining the system’s response to the offender -  the “just deserts” 
element -  is part of criminal justice as opposed to substantive 
criminal law. It is “not-welfare” because punishment has no place in 
welfare systems. Because issues like criminal capacity and criminal
For example the Magistrates Coiuts (Children and Young Persons) Rules 1992 
(SI 1992/2071) (L. 17), which governs the procedure hi youth courts, includes a 
number of provisions for explaining various aspects of the proceedings to the child- 
accused and his/her parents.
Under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 69 for example, a court may impose 
an action plan on a young offender which requires him/her to undertake, under 
supeiwision, certain acts, and to account, where necessary for his/her whereabouts 
over a tlnee-month period,.
Ensln ined in Article 6 o f the European Convention on Human Rights
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responsibility are usually regarded as intrinsic to the criminal trial, 
and necessary for the imposition of a sentence, they would also 
normally be treated as part of justice.
One outcome of the tendency in law, which will be discussed in more 
detail later in this chapter, to treat children as either vulnerable or 
autonomous, is that welfare and justice are often viewed as in 
opposition to each other. Indeed, as Bill Whyte has noted, with 
reference to the ever-changing face of government policy on juvenile 
justice, “[t]he debate tends to be classified, rather simplistically and 
unhelpfully, as justice versus welfare.” "^^ In faet, most juvenile 
justice systems^^ draw on aspects of both theories and, certainly, it 
would be impossible properly to understand the way in which the 
children’s hearings system practises welfare without an appreciation 
of the role and purpose of justice as well.
What, then, can be said of the practice of welfare within the 
children’s hearings system?^^ The trigger to a children’s hearing is 
the establishment of grounds for referral and, in the context of this 
thesis, this will mean that the child “has committed an offence.”^^
Bill Whyte “Rediscovering Juvenile Delinquency” in Andrew Lockyer and 
Frederick H Stone Juvenile Justice in Scotland: Twenty-Five Years o f  the Welfare 
Approach (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998) 199 atp 199. Emphasis added
Where that tenu is used to delineate systems (such as the children’s hearings 
system) set up specifically to deal with children, usually outwith the (adult) court 
shncture
This summary concentrates exclusively on the offence ground for referral 
(C(S)A 1995, s 52(2)(i)). S 52 lists a further eleven grounds for referral, some of 
which constitute “status offences” (eg truancy under s 52(2)(h)) but which are 
generally grouped together as “care and protection” grounds in contradistinction to 
the offence ground.
C(S)A 1995, s 52(2)(i)
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Where the factual basis for this is in dispute -  i.e., where the child or 
a parent denies the of fence ,or  where the child’s understanding is in 
i s sue , the  matter is referred to the sheriff court for proof.^® Thus, it 
is a fundamental principle from the outset, that fact-finding forms no 
part of a children’s h e a r i n g . B y  relieving the hearing of 
responsibility for such an adversarial element of the proceedings, this 
cleavage between establishing the facts and deciding their 
consequences arguably accentuates, from the beginning, the 
hearings’ orientation towards welfare. The hearing is concerned only 
with the child’s needs and how best to meet these through the 
disposals available to it, in order to move the child on from the 
offence.
Once the grounds have been established so that the hearing can 
proceed, the form of process whieh the hearing employs assumes 
importance. The decision which the children’s panel members take 
is a product of the discussion at the hearing informed by the written 
information passed to them in advance.^^ Welfare-based systems 
lend themselves to informal discussion. Rules of evidence, such as 
hearing witnesses on oath and cross-examination would militate
C(S)A 1995, s 65(7)
C(S)A 1995, s 65(9)
This also protects the “due process” rights of a child accused of a criminal
offence. The offence ground uniquely requires to be proved to the criminal
standard (beyond reasonable doubt) (C(S)A 1995, s 68(3)(b).
McGhee, Waterhouse and Whyte, supra, note 18, at p 230 
Since the case of McMichael v UK (1995) 20 EHRR 205, parents have been 
furnished with the same papers as panel members in advance of the hearing, to 
facilitate equality of arms. This is now being extended to older children, unless a 
report-writer indicates that his/her report contains information which it would be 
detrimental for tlie child to read.
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against the free exchange of information. Decision-making is a 
response to the information presented and children’s hearings are 
both obliged and empowered to look to the broadest range of material 
available. A hearing must consider a social background report, 
prepared by the social work department expressing its estimation of 
the child’s needs, the report from any residential establishment in 
which the ehild is living, “any other relevant document” and, most 
broadly, “any other relevant information a v a i l a b l e . T h e  case of O 
V Rae "^^ endorsed the hearings’ use of the widest variety of 
information available to it.
The discursive (or dialogical)^^ nature of the process is also 
emphasised legislatively in the obligation on panel members to 
discuss the case with, not only, the child, but also the parents, the 
safeguarder^^ and any representatives^^ who are present at the 
hearing.^^ In the midst of all these participants however, the 
discussion which the hearing will seek to hold involving each of
Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Rules 1996 (SI 1996/3261) [hereinafter “CH(S)R 
1996”] mle 20(3). These requirements are reiterated more briefly in C(S)A 1995 s 
69(1).
34 1993 SLT 570
This is the term used by Neil MacCormick, in his Kilbrandon lecture, to describe 
the process at a children’s hearing. See Neil MacCormick “A Special Conception 
of Juvenile Justice: Kilbrandon’s Legacy” Fifth Kilbrandon Child Care Lecture, T‘ 
November 2001.
See http://www.scotland.a:ov.uk/!ibrarv5/edrication/ch30-00.asp 
The safeguarder’s role is explained subsequently.
The CH(S)R 1996 (SI 1996/3261) r 11(1) provides that “[a]rry child whose case 
comes before a children's hearing and any relevant person who atteirds that 
children's hearing may each be accompanied by one person for the pmpose of 
assisting the child, or as the case may be, the relevant person at the hearing.” 
CH(S)R 1996 (SI 1996/3261) r 20(3)(c)
See Claire McDiarmid “Perspectives on the Children’s Hearings System” in Jane 
Scoular (ed) Family Dynamics: Contemporary Issues in Family Law (Edinburgh: 
Butterworths, 2001) 29 at p 30
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them, and the, potentially extensive, mass of written infoimation 
which the hearing considers, the child remains the pre-eminent 
player^^ and the process is above all, child-centred."^^
Panel members seek to ensure the child’s understanding of all stages 
of a hearing and also to elicit and weigh his/her views. To a greater 
or lesser extent, these aspects of the procedure are legislative 
requirements"^* yet it is the way in which they are implemented, and 
the degree of importance which panel members accord to them, 
which give the hearing its welfare focus. A recent research project 
carried out on behalf of the Scottish Office by Christine Hallett 
noted, against its own empirical finding that children said little in 
hearings,"*  ^ that “the fact that panel members made considerable 
efforts to engage families, that parents and children and young people 
were able to contribute significantly to some hearings and that the 
contributions of families, even when they were small, could be 
crucial suggests that for some families participation was a reality.”"*^ 
Even beyond the point being made here concerning participation, this
See Scottish Child Law Centi’e Children and Young People’s Voices: The Law, 
Legal Services, Systems and Processes in Scotland (Edinbui'gh: HMSO, 1999) at p 
50
The chairman [sic] is required to explain the grounds for referral to the child and 
any relevant person (C(S)A 1995, s 65(4)); s/he must also inform them of the 
substance o f any reports (except where this would be dehimental to the child) 
(CH(S)R 1996 mle 20(4)); finally, s/he must inform them of the decision made, the 
reasons for that decision, their right of appeal and their right to call for a review of 
any supervision requirement (CH(S)R 1996 mle 20(5)). The duty to give the child 
an opportunity to express his/her views and to have regard to these is found in the 
C(S)A 1995, s 16(2) and the CH(S)R 1996 rr 15 and 20(3)(d).
Cluistine Llallett and Cathy Murray with Janet Jamieson and Billy Veitch The 
Evaluation o f Children’s Hearings in Scotland, Volume 1, Deciding in Children’s 
Interests (Edinburgh: The Scottish Office Central Research Unit, 1998) at pp 47 - 
48
Ibid, atpp 120-21
238
indicates the importance attached by panel members to this 
facilitative aspect of their role.
Equally, all discussion should, at some level, be oriented towards 
establishing and then meeting the child’s needs. Hallett e t a l 
specifically commented on the extent to which welfare “talk” 
characterised the hearings which their study observed."*"*
Welfare is a broad and flexible concept which relies in large measure 
on the wide discretion accorded to decision-makers. Within the 
children’s hearings system that discretion is, on the face of it, 
delimited by the very few decisions actually available to a hearing -  
it can either discharge the grounds for referral"*  ^ or impose a 
supeiwision requirement."*  ^ Such a requirement may, however 
“require the child ... to comply with any condition contained in the 
requirement”."*^ This short phrase confers extremely wide-ranging 
powers on childi'en’s panel members. They can impose any 
obligation whatsoever on the child, assuming that it is broadly in 
compliance with the overarching principle of the paramountcy of 
his/her welfare throughout his/her childhood."*^
As will be discussed subsequently, certain checks are imposed on the 
hearings’ use of its broad discretion. Nonetheless, traditionally, the 
view has been accepted that welfare attaches little importance to the
Ihid, at pp 52 -  54. The study found that welfare talk characterised some 
hearings more than others but that it featured in all hearings to some extent.
C(S)A 1995, s 69(l)(b) and (12)
Ibid, s 70(1)
Ibid, 1995, s 70(3)(b)
^^Ibid, 1995,8 16(1).
239
child’s “due process” rights, because these are regarded as 
unnecessary where the whole purpose is to achieve a beneficial 
outcome for him/her."*  ^ Because of the high level of discretion 
accorded to the decision-maker in a welfare process, however, there 
is always a risk that the outcome for the child is not, in fact, as 
benevolent as the theory demands. At the extreme, it might herald 
“[b]eatings becom[ing] justified as a means of promoting a 
therapeutic attitude change”.^ ** Even where the disposal selected is, 
“objectively”,^ * in the child’s best interests, it is certainly not clear 
that the child him/herself and his/her family will recognise it in this 
way.^  ^ Any decision to commit a child who has offended to 
residential accommodation when s/he would prefer to remain at 
home, for example, is likely to be experienced as punitive.^^
The opportunity conferred by welfare to act in this way then, as the 
iron hand in the velvet glove is, rightly, one of the most critiqued 
aspects of the philosophy. It lay behind the decision in the famous 
American case of In Re Gault,^ "* where Gerald Gault, aged fifteen.
See Jean Trépanier “Juvenile Courts After 100 Years; Past and Present 
Orientations” 1999 European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 7, 303 at p 
313
Sanford J. Fox “The Scottish Panels: An American Viewpoint on Children’s 
Right to Punishment” 1975 Journal o f the Law Society o f Scotland 20, 78 at p 79
All that this can mean in the context of welfare is that there are clear 
justifications for the course of action taken which are likely to impact positively on 
the child’s life and that implementing this course is more likely to have a positive 
impact than maintaining the status quo.
See, Peter D. Scott, “Juvenile Courts: The Juvenile’s Point of View” 1959 
British Journal o f Delinquency 9(3), 200; and Allison Morris and Henii Giller, 
“The Juvenile Court - The Client’s Perspective” 1977 Ci'im L R 198 
”  See Martin and Murray, supra, note 17, atp 131 
'^ 3^87 U.S. 1 (1967)
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was committed to the Arizona State hidustrial School “for the period 
of his minority (that is, until 21) unless sooner discharged by due 
process of law”^^  on the basis of having made one obscene telephone 
call to a neighbour. It was, in fact, never fomially established that 
Gerald had uttered any of the obscene statements alleged to have 
been made during the call, and the maximum penalty for an adult 
convicted of the same offence would have been a fine of $5 to $50 or 
up to two months’ imprisonment.^^
In giving the judgement of the American Supreme Court, Mr Justice 
Portas remarked that “the condition of being a boy does not justify a 
kangaroo court.”^^  The case lists in detail the many procedural 
requirements and constitutional guarantees which had been 
disapplied to Gerald by virtue of his status both as a child and as a 
“juvenile delinquent”.^  ^ The Supreme Court asserted that children 
had an entitlement to the protection of the Constitution. The case 
itself is often regarded as the catalyst by which the American system 
distanced itself from welfare and moved back towards a justice-based 
model.
"UW , atpp 7 - 8  
Ibid, at p 9 
Ibid, at p 28
He had one previous conviction for having been in. the company of a boy who 
stole a purse from a woman’s handbag. See ibid, at p 4
See Allison Morris “Legal Representation and Justice” in Allison Morris and 
Hemi Giller (eds) Providing Criminal Justice for Children (London; Edward 
Arnold, 1983) 125 at pp 132 -  134. It has been suggested that this overstates the 
position and that the “movement away [from welfare] ... was prompted, at least in 
part, by a desire for more punitive responses to juvenile offending.” Elaine E 
Sutherland “The Child in Conflict with the Law” in Alison Cleland and Elaine E
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The children’s panel undoubtedly has the power, which is latent in all 
welfare systems, to abuse its discretion by acting punitively, provided 
this is cloaked in best interests temhnology. This tendency, if it 
exists at all, may be more apparent in the process at a children’s 
hearing than in actual imposed disposals. For example, it is not 
unusual for panel members to “threaten” children refeiTed for 
tmancy^° that they will have to go and live in a residential school if 
they fail to improve their attendance in mainstream education.^* In 
relation to the offence ground, Hallett et al commented specifically 
on the way in which the discussion at children’s hearings moved 
backwards and foiwards between overtly welfarist considerations and 
issues such as the seriousness of the offence, protection of the public 
and t a r i f f s . T h i s  may suggest, then, that, whilst it is clear that 
children’s hearings operate within a strongly welfarist framework, 
the role which they actually play is broader than this and captures 
certain aspects of the “just deserts” model of justice, although only, 
apparently, in the process at the hearing itself and not in the disposal 
imposed.
It is important to take issue, at this point, with a further criticism 
sometimes levelled against welfare systems generally and the 
children’s hearings in particular. The critique of “net-widening”
Sutherland (eds) Children’s Rights in Scotland (Edinburgh: W Green, 2001) at p 
287
C(S)A, s 52(2)(h)
See Hallett et al, supra, note 42, at pp 53 and 56 
Ibid, at pp 52 - 54
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arises from the principle that, in a welfare system, those who have 
offended should be treated identically to those who are in need of 
care and protection. It has been suggested that one of the main 
results of this is simply to bring a gr eater number of children into 
contact with the “criminal” process than is desirable. The “net” of 
potential juvenile justice clients is thus “widened”. This in turn is 
said to mean that children who go on to commit offences 
subsequently, having first entered the system as, for example, truants 
or neglect cases may receive more serious or punitive disposals from 
the system because they already have a “record” with it. They 
receive a disposal from further “up” the “tariff’ than would be the 
case if the “crime” constituted their first contact with the system, 
hi fact, welfare systems are seeking to respond to the child’s best 
interests at the moment of intervention. Whilst previous work 
undertaken with the child may be an important element of the 
disposal imposed, it is not determinative of the matter. Equally, as 
already indicated, “punisliment” per se has no place whatsoever in 
the system. Disposals, then, are never imposed with the aim of 
“more punisliment than the time before” and there is the same 
possibility of a child being authorised for admission to secure 
accommodation*"  ^on his/her first attendance at a children’s hearing as 
after years of involvement with the system. Welfare systems seek to
C(S)A 1995, s 70(9} and (10). This is the most restiictive disposal available to a 
children’s hearing.
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respond anew to the child’s unique set of needs with every 
appearance.
Net-widening and up-tariffing may be by-products of a welfare 
system then, but only where the outcomes are viewed in isolation 
from the process. Citing these as criticisms, fails to take account of 
the justification which a welfare system offers for its decisions. 
Despite its clear welfare orientation, justice principles, on the “due 
process” model play a role in the children’s hearings system.*""* It is 
important to accord to these the significance which they deserve 
because they may promote the child’s best interests, as mentioned 
above, by limiting the scope for abuse of discretion. The statutory 
obligations alluded to above - to explain to, and inform the child and 
the relevant persons of, certain aspects of the proceedings - give 
shape to the hearing. For example, the discussion in a hearing 
commences with the chaiiperson’s explanation of the purpose of the 
hearing;*"  ^ the end is marked by a statement of each panel member’s 
decision and the reasons for it.^ *" In addition, the family has the right 
to appeal the decision to the sheriff court*"^  and/or to call for a review 
of any supervision requirement imposed, any time after three months
See, eg Joan Rose “Procedure in Children’s Hearings” 1994 SLT (News) 137 
where she discusses the distinction between “the relative informality of the setting 
of hearings and the procedur es which must be followed.” (at p 137)
Required by the CH(S)R 1996 (SI 1996/3261) r 20(2)
CH(S)R 1996 (SI 1996/3261) r 20(5) imposes an obligation on the chairman to 
communicate this information to the child and any relevant persons, as well as 
informing them of their rights of appeal.
C (S)A s51(l)
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from the date of the hearing which put it in place.^^ If not reviewed 
sooner, a supervision requirement can continue in force for no longer 
than one year.^^ These provisions act as checks on the hearings’ 
discretion and may promote confidence in the system as well as 
serving their more obvious purpose of protecting children against 
arbitrary and unfair decision-making. It remains true that “[t]he 
challenge of the children’s hearings system is to demonstrate how far 
an honest and uninliibited discussion of intensely personal issues can 
be earned on without disregard for the essential principles of the 
administration of justice.” *^*
There is little doubt, then, that the children’s hearing is an explicitly 
welfarist institution, albeit that its practice is tempered by certain 
aspects of justice theory. While it lays stress on the child’s views -  
indeed the Children’s Hearings Rules make several suggestions as to 
mechanisms by which these might be obtained^* -  its decision­
making is still driven by the assessment made by adults of the child’s 
best interests. The most compelling criticism of welfare, which the 
foregoing discussion does little to dispel, is its tendency to detract 
from the child’s agency in this way. It is submitted, however, that 
the discursive nature of the process and the importance which ought
C(S)A s 73(6)
C(S)A s 73(2)
™ Martin and Murray (eds), supra, note 17, at p 78
The child may present his/her views in writing or on audio or video tape or 
tlu'ough an interpreter. (CH(S)R 1996 (SI 1996/3261) r 15(4)(b)
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to be attributed to the child’s contribution, even if it is very minor, 
may alleviate it, at least to some extent.
The most damaging criticism of welfare arises from the public 
perception of crimes such as the Bulger case, canvassed fully in 
Chapter 1. Because such crimes are regarded as heinous, a system 
which responds to them by assessing and meeting the child- 
perpetrator’s needs, rather than by, metaphorically, locking him/her 
up and throwing away the key, is marked out as “soft” on crime. 
This, in turn, generates a groundswell of, often wholly uninformed, 
opinion that welfare simply does not work. It is in circumstances like 
this that justice, on the “just deserts” model, sometimes ceases to be 
solely a philosophical approach and is mobilised instead to frirther 
the political end of securing punitive outcomes for child-offenders. 
In jurisdictions where welfare’s place, as the primary approach to 
juvenile offending, has been eroded justice, has stepped into its place. 
As a basis for policy decision-making, knee-jerk reactions, both to 
individual crimes and to the welfare philosophy, are clearly not very 
satisfactory. They may, however, begin to provide an explanation for 
the extremes of favour and disfavour to which welfare has been 
subject since the mid-twentieth century.
See Trépanier, supra, note 49 passim, particularly at pp 305, 309, 311, 317, 319 
and 321
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The Changing Fortunes of Welfare
It is clear from chapter 3 that welfare principles have been of 
significance in relation to the law’s interaction with children, 
certainly since the nineteenth century yet, politically, welfare’s 
popularity has ebbed and flowed. In the 1960s, welfare theory 
seemed to be particularly buoyant. Two examples serve to illustrate 
this. In his seminal discussion of Punishment and Responsibility, 
HLA Hart devotes a chapter to the “elimination of responsibility” 
laying stress on Barbara Wootton’s view*'^  that the offender’s act 
should be looked upon “merely as a symptom of the need for either 
punislnnent or treatment.” ''"* Although the work is directed primarily 
towards England and Wales, this suggests, more generally, that 
welfare theory had such an embedded place in criminological 
discourse at that time that it was viewed as generalisable to adults as 
well.
In Scotland, with specific reference to children, the report of the 
Kilbrandon Comraittee^^ in 1964 led to the enactment of the 
legislative framework for the children’s hearings system in 1968 and 
its implementation in 1971. Kilbrandon noted that “the object must
Set down in Barbara Wootton Social Science and Social Pathology (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1963)
HLA Hart Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy o f Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) at p 178. Alan Brudner, in fact, classifies Hart as 
a welfarist by contrast with those who regard the criminal law as ordered by the 
principle of “desert”. See Alan Brudner “Agency and Welfare in the Penal Law” in 
Stephen Shute, Jolm Gardner and Jeremy Horder (eds) Action and Value in 
Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 21 at p 26 
Report on Children and Young Person SCOTLAND Cmiid 2306, 1964
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be to effect, so far as this can be achieved by public action, the 
reduction, and ideally the elimination, of delinquency. ... [T]he 
appropriate treatment measures in any individual case can be decided 
only on an informed assessment of the individual child’s actual 
needs.”^^  It would be difficult to find a clearer statement of faith in 
the efficacy of “pure” welfare.^^
In recent years, certainly in jurisdictions other than Scotland, the 
space occupied by welfare as the primary mechanism for tackling 
offending by children has, however, been greatly diminished.^^ In 
England, the youth court, a more justice-based institution than the 
children’s hearing, deals with children who offend.^^ In America, 
waiver procedure is often invoked, based on the seriousness of the 
offence rather than the offender him/herself, so that an older child 
can be tried as an adult.^^
These developments suggest that there is a discernible trend in youth 
justice away from welfare towards establishing criminal liability and 
responding to it in increasingly punitive ways. Even in Scotland 
where, despite some tinkering at the margins,^^ the welfare
Ibid, at para 12
It is an indication of the importance attached to this report generally that it was 
republished in 1995 (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1995) (to coincide with the passing of the 
C(S)A 1995)
See Josine Junger-Tas “The Juvenile Justice System: Past and Present Trends in 
Western Society” in Weijers and Duff (eds) supra, note 19, 23
See Ward, supra, note 20
Philip H Witt “Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court: The Case of HH” 2003 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 9, 361
For example, the Scottish Executive has proposed that children’s hearings be 
empowered to order electronic monitoring, or “tagging” of child offenders in 
certain circumstances. Anti-Social Behaviour (Scotland) Bill, clause 103
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foundations of the system remain solid, the political climate suggests 
some antagonism towards it, certainly if press coverage is any 
indicator. For example, the Scottish Executive was recently reported 
to be anxious about appearing “soft” on youth crime.^^ On a similar 
theme, a Daily Record readers’ forum on “neds” advocated inter alia, 
birching, boot camps and scrapping children’s panels.
This trend espouses an overtly punitive and just deseits-based 
approach to children who offend including a concentration on 
ensuring that they take responsibility for their criminal acts. This is 
derived, at least to an extent, from “justice” -  the philosophical 
approach to child-offenders which requires that children be found 
criminally responsible for their acts, in proceedings which are fair 
because they accord to them their “due process” rights, as a prelude 
to the imposition of a “just” punishment. Criminal responsibility, in 
a traditional sense, then, is of relevance to the justice model. 
Equally, this chapter will argue that children’s hearings have an 
interest in the child’s responsibility for his/her criminal act, which 
does not necessarily equate to the traditional conception. Both of 
these approaches can be contrasted with “responsibilization” to 
which the chapter will now tmm its attention.
“Jim’s Guilty Youth Crime Secret” Daily Record 3 October 2002 at pp 1 -  2. 
The article is critical of a campaign of spin launched by the Scottish Executive in 
the face of expected criticism from Audit Scotland about its handling of youth 
crime. The briefing note for ministers warned, inter alia, that the Matrix 
(diversion) Project might be seen as soft on crime.
“Sling 'Em in Boot Camp” Daily Record 6 September 2003, pp 26, 27, 32 and
33
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Responsibilization
The “justice” approach, and children’s hearings, are both concerned 
with the child taking responsibility for his/her criminal acts, in the 
individual case. Responsibilization, on the other hand, is a tenn 
describing a particular trend within criminal justice. The move 
towards increasing children’s liability for their criminal acts, 
documented above, often through the use of punitive measures, is 
almost certainly underlain by this trend which was first identified by 
David G a r l a n d . I t  arises from the recognition by the state that it is 
no longer able, by itself, to control crime, using only the traditional 
methods of policing, the courts and prison, histead, it is necessary to 
involve a number of other organisations, down to the level of the 
individual, and to impose, or simply impress, upon them, their 
“responsibility” for crime prevention. Neighbourhood Watch 
schemes, for example, play a role in the responsibilization strategy as 
an example of gioups of private individuals coming together to take 
particular responsibility for crime prevention, and the reporting of 
suspicious activity, within a given area or community. Garland 
describes responsibilization as “a new fonn of ‘goveming-at-a- 
distance’.”^^
See David Gadand The Culture o f  Control: Crime and Social Order in 
Contemporaiy Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at pp 124 - 127 
Ibid, at p 127
250
With regard to children who offend more generally, there is no doubt 
that the response of the criminal justice system is driven by the 
political ideology of the government of the time. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that “young people” are so central to the embodiment of 
that ideology in practice that “[tjhey remain the touchstone through 
which crime and punishment can be imagined and re-imagined.”^^  
This may explain why govenunent policies in relation to them 
change so frequently. On this basis, it is, therefore, unsurprising that 
the responsibilization strategy should have been extended to them.
At the general level envisaged by Garland, the government effected 
responsibilization thi'ough the enactment, for England and Wales, in 
1998, of a very broad provision stating that, “in addition to any other 
duty to which they are subject, it shall be the duty of all persons and 
bodies carrying out functions in relation to the youth justice system 
to have regard to [the principal] aim [of the youth justice system 
which is] to prevent offending by children and young persons.”^^  
This was tied down in a number of more specific provisions such as 
the need for the establishment of youth offending t e a m s . A t  a 
stroke then, everyone involved in the field was “responsibilized” 
such that no scope remained for the argument that an individual 
agency “caiTying out [presumably any] function in relation to youth 
justice” was not also responsible for crime prevention.
Muncie and Hughes, supra, note 5, at p 13 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 37 (1) and (2) 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 39
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From this, it appears that Garland’s account of responsibilization 
simply documents an extant phenomenon -  that of the government 
divesting itself, or at least sharing, as far as possible, its duty to 
maintain order in society. It is, however, the way in which 
responsibilization directly affects children who offend as individuals 
which is of particular interest in the context of this chapter. John 
Muncie and Gordon Hughes note that the second plank on which the 
responsibilization strategy is built, in addition to the generalised 
sharing of the role of crime prevention and detection, is that 
“individuals should be held responsible for their actions.
In relation to the young, they argue that New Labour have attempted 
to link this to the more aspirational elements of the restorative justice 
movement^® such as “reconciling conflicting interests and ... healing 
rifts.”^^  The claim has been made for “Victim-Offender Mediation”, 
for example, that it “serves an educative, rehabilitative, and 
ultimately preventive function for the juvenile offender while giving 
victims a much needed voice in the criminal process .Effect ively 
then responsibilization is presented, positively, by govenunent as 
providing children who offend with choices -  for example, to behave
Muncie and Hughes, supra, note 5, at p 3
The Scottish Executive has specifically addressed the issue of tlie use of 
restorative justice in children’s hearings but only in relation to the breach of an 
anti-social behaviour order. See its consultation document Putting Our 
Communities First: A Strategy for Tackling Anti-Social Behaviour, section 2 
(http://www.scotland.gov.uk/con.sultations/social/pocf-QO.aspj 
Muncie and Hughes, supra, note 5, atp 4
Nancy Lucas “Restitution, Rehabilitation, Prevention and Transformation: 
Victim-Offender Mediation for First-Time Non-Violent Youthful Offenders” 2001 
Hofstra Law Review 29, 1365, at p 1370
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in a non-criminal fashion in the future or to make reparation to the 
victim in some way. To this extent, then, it is in keeping with the 
aim espoused by this thesis as a whole of seeking to ensure that 
children take such responsibility for their criminal acts as they can. 
Barry Vaughan has argued that this ought, in fact, to be the overall 
effect of the “responsibilizing” provisions of the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998.^^
Muncie and Hughes, however, express concern about the punitive 
ends which it will, in fact, achieve, and may be covertly pursuing, 
particularly where a child-criminal re-offends. '^^ hi their view it 
“appears most interested in ensuring that offenders face up to the 
consequences of their actions”^^  and they note specifically that these 
strategies for bringing (full) responsibility for criminal activity home 
to the perpetrator “also extend[...] to ten-year-olds.”^^  At this level, 
then, there may be a fit between responsibilization and the “just 
deserts” model of justice simply because both arrive at a similar 
outcome. Justice as a philosophical approach is not, however, a 
specific tenet of responsibilization.
Barry Vaughan “The Government of Youth: Disorder and Dependence” 2000 
Social and Legal Studies 9(3), 347
This sentiment is echoed by Loraine Gelsthorpe and Allison Morris who are 
similarly pessimistic about the prospects for restorative justice within an overall 
youth justice agenda which is largely coercive and which includes noticeably 
punitive elements such as detention and üaining orders. See Loraine Gelsthorpe 
and Allison Morris “Restorative Youth Justice: The Last Vestiges of Welfare?” in 
Muncie, Hughes and McLaughlin (eds), supra, note 5, 238 at pp 246 - 250 
Muncie and Hughes, supra, note 5, at p 4
Ibid, at p 4. The age o f criminal responsibility in England and Wales is 10 by 
virtue o f the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 50, as amended by the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1963, s 16(1)
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Effectively, responsibilization ultimately makes it possible to impose 
liability on children for their criminal acts in an unquestioning and 
absolute fashion particularly in the situation where, having been 
presented with the options which restorative justice makes possible, 
the alternatives which they select lead them into criminal behaviour. 
“[I]f their choices lead to offending they must take the full 
consequences.”^^  In other words, if it is established in fact that the 
child earned out the criminal behaviour, with the appropriate mental 
attitude, s/he must take the full responsibility. This thesis as a whole 
challenges such an absolute ascription of responsibility, absent any 
investigation into the child-offender’s actual understandings of the 
complexities of his/her apparent criminality and its consequences. 
The concern of this chapter is however, specifically with the way in 
which welfare, as a philosophy might be able to move beyond this 
all-or-nothing approach and to accommodate the child offender’s 
actual level of responsibility.
The Tension Inherent in the Child
To this point, then, in its examination of welfare theory and 
responsibilization theory, this chapter has presented, albeit implicitly, 
two different, and largely opposed, images of the child. The child in 
welfare theory is primarily vulnerable and in need of protection; the 
“responsibilized” child is fully accountable for his/her actions
Muncie and Hughes, supra, note 5, atp 11
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because s/he was the agent who occasioned them and their 
consequences. As noted in the introduction to this chapter and in 
chapter 1, a conesponding tension between defencelessness and 
independence is iniierent in the status of being a child. If the law, in 
general, is to treat children justly, it must accommodate them as they 
are, taking account of this paradox. The areas of children’s rights 
and legal representation of children place this issue in particularly 
sharp focus and seiwe to demonstrate the difficulty which arises 
where the law seeks to respond to one of these characteristics 
exclusively. This chapter will therefore consider these issues next. 
This discussion will show that a reconciliation of the child’s need for 
protection with his/her impetus to independent action is possible in 
the legal sphere which reconciliation will, in turn, serve as a model in 
the attempt to draw together welfare and justice.
Children’s Rights
Turning first then, in this context, to children’s rights, the tension 
between vulnerability and agency is apparent from the two distinct 
meanings of the term “right”, when the rights in question are ascribed 
to children.^^ On the one hand, the constmction of the child as 
powerless has given rise to a category of rights which might be
For a full discussion of the various meanings attributable to the term “right” with 
particular reference to children see C A Wringe Children’s Rights: A Philosophical 
Study (London: Routledge and Regan Paul, 1981)
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described as protective or paternalistic.^^ The history of children’s 
rights in international law, certainly until the promulgation of the 
CRC in 1989, has been very much orientated towards protection in 
this sense -  indeed this was the philosophy underlying the three 
Declaiations on the Rights of the Child passed, in 1924 by the 
League of Nations and in 1948 and 1959 by the UN.^°° Rights 
conferred expressly on children are more likely than those conferred 
on everyone, or on adults only, to fall into this category.
Without endorsing the perspective, Sheila McLean has 
conceptualised such rights as arising expressly from the construction 
of the child, which was critiqued in chapter 1, as a “becoming” rather 
than a “being”. She states, “because children are not fully rational or 
autonomous human beings, what they need is not a description or 
history of rights but rather only one right and that is the right to be 
adequately cared for and to receive adequate guidance and advice.” ®^’ 
In essence, this one, primary right is not clearly a right for children at 
all but more a recognition of obligations placed on others -  for 
example parents and the state -  to ensure the child’s well-being and 
healthy growth and development.
See Ruth Adler “Taking Children’s Rights Seriously: Some Reflections on the 
Juvenile Justice System” in KaÜileen Murray and J Eric Wilkinson (eds) Children’s 
Rights in a Scottish Context (London: National Children’s Bineau, 1987) 19. At pp 
20 -  23 Adler provides a typology of rights which includes “parentalist” and 
“protectionist” children’s rights.
See Kathleen Marshall “The History and Philosophy of Children’s Rights in 
Scotland” in Cleland and Sutherland (eds), supra, note 59, 11 at pp 24 - 25
Sheila A M McLean “Children’s Rights in Health Care” in Murray and 
Wilkinson, supra, note 99, 40 at p 43
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This protective meaning and piupose for a right can be juxtaposed 
with the other type of right sometimes confeiTed on children. In this 
context, such a right is taken to delineate an area of personal freedom 
within which the right-holder can operate without interference either 
from other individuals or from the s t a t e / I n  this sense, then, a right 
is essentially permissive. Freedom of express ion, f reedom of 
r e l ig ionand ,  indeed, rights in property are all examples of rights of 
this nature. This better describes a right as the term is generally 
understood, without specific reference to children. The idea that 
children as human beings should have “human” r i g h t s i s  relatively 
new and has been described as “little short of revolutionary. 
Nonetheless, the confennent of such a right on a child emphasises 
his/her autonomy and makes the assumption that s/he will be able to 
exercise it, whether alone or with assistance, thus assuming a level of 
competence and capability.
The CRC itself still accords protection to the child. Article 32, for 
example, “recognise[s] the right of the child to be protected fiom
See Wringe, supra, note 98, at pp 46 - 56 
Enshrined for children in Article 13 of the CRC
CRC, Article 14
See J Eric Wilkinson and Kathleen Munay “Rights in Relation to Children” in 
Murray and Wilkinson (eds) supra, note 99, 40, at p 43
MDA Freeman “The Rights of Children When They Do Wrong” 1981 Brit J  of 
Crirnin 21(3), 210 at p 212
These ideas were taken to the extreme in the 1970s by adherents of the child 
liberation movement. They argued that children were seriously disadvantaged in 
society and, in order to redress their power deficit, they needed not only the same 
rights as adults but also some additional ones. See Richard Farson Birthrights 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978); and Jolm Holt Escape from Childhood (Boston: 
Holt Associates, 1974). Holt, for example, proposed that children should have the 
right to control their own learning, by which he meant that they should choose 
whether or not to attend school.
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economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to 
be hazardous.” Aiticle 33 protects children from the illicit use of 
drugs. In addition however, the CRC “assures to the child who is 
capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those 
views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child 
being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of 
the child.”’^  ^ Kathleen Marshall has noted the way in which this 
right to participation draws together the two rather more polarised 
types of children’s rights identified a b o v e . B y  allowing the child 
“the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative 
proceedings affecting [him/her], either directly, or tluough a 
representative or an appropriate body”^^® it expressly acknowledges 
his/her agency. Simultaneously, it retains a focus on protecting 
him/her by tempering the right with consideration of his/her age and 
maturity. Thus, “it ... retains the character of a welfare provision, 
and leaves room for the exercise of individual discretion ..
The CRC then deals with the tension between the child as agent and 
the child as vulnerable by providing rights appropriate to both 
perspectives. Article 12, however, demonstrates that the gap between 
the two perspectives can be spanned, in the legal arena. The child is
CRC, Article 12(1)
Indeed, the Travaux Préparatoires expressly recognise that “the child should be 
considered from a dual perspective: as an object of protection and as a possessor of 
rights.” See Sharon Detiick (ed) The United Nations Convention on the Rights o f  
the Child: A Guide to the Travaux Préparatoires (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1992) at p 625 
""CRC, Article 12(2)
’ ' ' Marshall, supra, note 100, at p 25
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given the opportunity to participate but in a protected environment 
where his/her lack of development and the difficulties to which this 
may give rise for him/her are recognised and accommodated. The 
Convention also gives specific recognition to his/her evolving 
capacities in Article 5.^ ^^
Representation of Children
Another area where the tension between the child’s vulnerability and 
his/her agency is problematic is the representation of children, 
primarily by lawyers but also by others who advocate for them. The 
difficulty arises in clarifying the actual purpose which the 
representative is being asked to pursue within the relevant legal 
process. On the one hand, it may seem straightforward that a 
solicitor, acting for a child, is that child’s “agent”, as the term is 
understood in the law of agency. Accordingly, the child-client gives 
instructions as to his/her wishes and the solicitor either puts these 
into practice or else formulates an argument that they should prevail 
over the other interests represented in the proceedings. This is the 
role perfoimed, unreflectively, by legal representatives for their adult 
clients and, as such, it clearly recognises the autonomy of a child- 
client.
The Article is concerned with the role played by parents or guardians in 
assisting the child to exercise his/her rights under the CRC and requires them to 
provide “appropriate direction and guidance” in a manner consistent with the 
child’s evolving capacities.
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On the other hand, the representative may, on the basis solely of the 
client’s status as a child, instead perceive his/her role as presenting to 
the court or tribunal a summary of his/her own evaluation of the 
child-client’s best interests. This is largely the way in which 
safeguarders in the children’s hearings system interpret their role. 
Safeguarders may, but do not require to, be legally qualified and are 
appointed “to safeguard the interests of the child in the 
proceedings.”*^  ^ This statutory statement of their role tends towards 
the paternalistic and recent research suggests that safeguarders 
themselves take the view that their role is to advise the hearing as to 
what is in the child’s best interests.**"* The child’s views clearly have 
some significance in detennining the content of these interests but it 
is the child’s needs, as assessed, patemalistically, by the safeguarder, 
which drive the recommendations ultimately made.
There is not yet any research of a similar nature into the role played 
by solicitors who are appointed to represent children at hearings 
under the Children’s Healings (Legal Representation) (Scotland) 
Rules 2001.**  ^ In S v Miller/*^ it was decided that a children’s 
hearing detemiines the child’s rights in civil proceedings in term of 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This
C(S)A 1995,s41(l)(a)
Aime Griffiths and Randy Kandell “Reconceiving Justice? Children and 
Empowerment in the Legal Process” in Simon Halliday and Peter Schmidt (eds) 
Human Rights Brought Home: Socio-Legal Studies o f Human Rights in the 
National Context (Hart) (forthcoming),
SSI 2001/478 
""2001 SLT531
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necessitated the provision of legal representation for the child in 
certain limited circumstances/*^ The role of the legal representative 
is defined, more ambiguously than the safeguarder’s as being to 
“allow the child to effectively participate at the hearing.”* *^ While 
this suggests facilitation of an active role for the child and therefore 
tends towards allowing ehildren their autonomy, it is not encouraging 
that the decision as to whether a child should have a lawyer under the 
new scheme is entirely in the hands of the children’s panel itself**^ 
There is no statutory mechanism by which a child can compel, or 
even r e q u e s t , t h e  appointment of a solicitor, nor can s/he refuse the 
services of a solicitor appointed by the children’s panel for 
him/her.*^*
Generally on this point, Griffiths and Kandell have noted that “[a] 
glowing number of studies are pointing to the fact that where 
children are involved lawyers who represent them have difficulty in 
acting purely as their advocate and that they operate instead on the 
basis of a mixed welfare and rights perspective.”*^  ^ This does not
Broadly, where the issues involved are so complex that the child requires some 
assistance in understanding them, where the child’s interests are in conflict with 
his/her parents’ or in any case where secure accommodation is proposed since this 
would deprive tire child o f his/her liberty. See Joe Thomson Family Law in 
Scotland (Edinburgh: Butter worths, 2002) atp 321 for a more detailed discussion.
Children’s Hearings (Legal Representation) Scotland Rules 2001 (SSI 
2001/478), r3(l)(a)
"^/W,r3
It is submitted that, if  a child made such a request to children’s hearing, they 
would have to take it seriously in terms of their general obligation to have regard to 
the child’s views (C(S)A 1995, s 16(2)) but this is very far from a right in this 
respect.
Griffiths and Kandell, supra, note 114
Ibid
261
change the fact, however, that “there is a tension in representing both 
views and interests, which has been observed and criticised by 
several commentators, who conclude in favour of a clearer 
delineation of representation/advocacy.”*^  ^ The advantage of this 
would be that the decision as to whether to advocate for the child’s 
views or his/her best interests would be less arbitrary. The individual 
representative would, presumably, no longer be able to make this call 
independently of the court or tribunal, the child-client and the other 
interests represented in the case.
Sharper delineation of these roles would, however, still support a 
dichotomous construction of the child-client. The agent whose remit 
was to represent his/her views would, necessarily perceive the client 
as an autonomous agent; the representative charged with presenting 
the child’s best interests might touch upon the same child’s views but 
would regard him/her primarily as in need of protection. This 
renders more difficult the attempt to view the child-client holistically 
and realistically.
As with children’s rights, however, efforts have been made to bring 
together these divergent conceptions of the purpose of legal 
representation of children. Alison Cleland has sought to reconcile 
them in such a way that the child him/herself can benefit from both. 
She has developed the concept of “protected empowerment” in teims
Kathleen Marshall, L Kay M Tisdall and Alison Cleland 'Voice o f the Child' 
Under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995: Having Due Regard to Children's Views 
In All Matters That Affect Them (Edinburgh: Scottish Executive Central Research 
Unit, 2002) V e i l ,  p 54, para 7.7.1
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of which the overarching requirement that all decision-makers should 
hold the child’s best interests as the paramount consideration in their 
deliberations is tempered by the need for the child’s views to be 
heard and given due weight.*^ "* hi other words “[cjhildren are given 
their place in the decision-making forum, but adjustments are made 
to promote their welfare.”* I n  this way, paternalism is not 
renounced entirely, where it is acknowledged that the child still 
requires protection and guidance but his/her agency is simultaneously 
and expressly recognised especially in circumstances where s/he is 
seeking to present him/herself as an actor -  for example where s/he 
has requested the right to participate in proceedings such as his/her 
parents’ divorce action.
The Paradox of the Child-Criminal
In relation both to children’s rights and to legal representation then, it 
is clearly possible to make provisions which reconcile the child’s 
independence with his/her vulnerability -  even if this is a rather 
artificial, bipartite division of attributes. *^  ^ hideed, since children 
naturally display characteristics of need for care alongside autonomy, 
the law fails them if it cannot deal with both simultaneously. This, 
then, provides some hope that it should be possible to find a
Alison Cleland “Childien’s Voices” in Scoular (ed), supra, note 39, 7 
particularly at pp 11 - 15 
Ibid, atp 27
Children will, o f course, display innumerable other characteristics alongside 
these two, which are primary in the legal context.
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mechanism for drawing together welfare and justice so that a similar 
reconciliation can be effected. Before examining the mechanism by 
which this might be achieved however, it is necessary to consider two 
objections to the whole enteiprise.
First, proponents of restorative justice would argue that, ultimately, 
the aims pursued by welfare and justice are so divergent that there 
can be no crossover between them. Lode Walgrave, for example, has 
stated that, “it is in fact a mission impossible, to try to combine the 
humane goal of responding to the needs of juveniles and their 
families with the societal need for just and fair trials. The constraints 
of formal procedural rules hinder the possibilities for flexibility and 
rich human dialogue which the therapeutic ambitions require.”* 
This is because restorative justice seeks to create a new space for 
itself, freed from the constraints of either welfare or justice “to 
provide the conditions for reasonable reparation or compensation for 
the harm caused by the offence.”*^  ^ Since this is not an aim which 
either welfare or justice has pursued overtly in the past, there is little 
benefit to the restorative justice movement in expending time on the 
attempt to reconcile the two philosophies. On the other hand, it has 
already been noted that the Scottish legal system mixes elements of 
welfare and justice (certainly on the “due process” model) therefore
Lode Walgrave “Not Pimishing Children But Committing Them to Restore” in 
Weijers and Duff (eds) supra, note 19, at pp 99 - 100 
'^®/6M,atp 102
264
the characterisation of the attempt at reconciliation as a “mission 
impossible” is too pessimistic.
The second potential objection is that a further element is present 
here, which is not necessarily present in relation to children’s rights 
and legal representation: the “welfare versus justice” debate applies 
only to juveniles who have offended. It might, therefore, be argued 
that, because the child-offender exercised a choice to carry out the 
criminal act, it is not incumbent on the law to find a means of 
incorporating his/her need for protection alongside its response to the 
hann which s/he has caused. In other words, where the child has 
committed an offence, the inherent wrongfulness, where the 
behaviour is an exercise of freewill, might be regarded as absolving 
the law of any duty to respond to the tension inherent in the child as a 
child and as an offender. Again, this appears to be an attempt to 
ignore the “child” in the child-offender.
This is not an unusual response. Children who commit serious 
crimes often engender such an extreme and adverse public response 
that they lose their status as children in the public perception. There 
is a parallel here with the similar paradox presented by the “teenage 
pregnancy” as this has been constructed by Anne Murcott. She states 
“teenage pregnancy ... is a contradiction in terms. ... Child and 
adult are mutually exclusively conceptualised. It is impossible 
simultaneously to be child and adult. ... Teenage pregnancy offends 
a morality which can identify children only by separating them from
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adults. ... A girl’s pregnancy ... raises doubts about her status as a 
child.”'^’
There is a direct comparison here with the concept of the “adult 
crime” which was touched upon in chapter 1. The notion underlying 
this, and Murcott’s conception of “teenage pregnancy,” is that certain 
acts, or areas of life, are reserved for adults. Where an individual, 
who is otherwise categorised as a child, strays into these, s/he thereby 
places him/herself outwith the protection generally afforded by 
childhood and must accept the (adult) consequences of this act. 
Violent crime and teenage pregnancy both, in some sense, transgiess 
the restrictive morality circumscribing the behaviour of children and 
part of the “punishment” is the forfeiture of the status of “child”.
The political and societal response to the Bulger case, for example, 
suggests that there is a difficulty in perceiving a child who has 
committed such an act as vulnerable in any degree. Instead s/he is 
characterised not only as autonomous in an extreme sense which 
would require him/her to be held fully accountable for his/her actions 
but also, beyond that, as a latter-day monster whose actions deseiwe a 
strongly and overtly punitive approach, incorporating incapacitation 
(through detention) in order to protect the public.
The view adopted in this chapter is that, if the law can find a means 
by which to reconcile welfare with justice, this enables it to present a
Anne Murcott “The Social Construction of Teenage Pregnancy: A Problem in 
the Ideologies of Childhood and Reproduction” 1980 Sociology o f Health and 
Illness 2, 1 at p 7
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more holistic and true image of the serious child-offender as both a 
criminal and a child so that a way of responding simultaneously to 
these characteristics emerges. Overall, there is a need for welfare 
and justice to be in harmony with each other, since each provides an 
element which is necessary for the fair and humane treatment of the 
child-accused. There is evidence from a recent empirical study that it 
is only possible to separate the child who offends from the child in 
need of care and protection by arbitrary line-drawing. The “most 
significant finding” of a study of youth offending in Glasgow, based 
on refeiTals to the reporter, was “the extent to which persistent 
offenders had already been formally identified as children in need of 
care and protection.”*^**
Reconciling Welfare and Justice
One of the consequences of the general tendency to characterise the 
debate as welfare set against justice, rather than as two 
complementary philosophies is that welfare and justice are conceived 
as mutually exclusive, or as completely dichotomised fi'om each 
other. In fact, however, as was discussed earlier in this chapter, this 
rigid bifurcation serves to obscure the way in which the two 
philosophies complement each other, certainly within the Scottish 
legal system. It is clear from the earlier discussion that, in both the
Iain Gault Study on Youth Offending in Glasgow (Stirling; Scottish Children’s 
Reporter Administration, 2003) atp 16
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courts and the hearings, the Scottish system mixes aspects of welfare 
and justice. The hearings are not “pure” welfare institutions'^* any 
more than the courts can deal with children regardless of their 
welfare. *^ ^
The notion of welfare as in opposition to justice, then, does not
accurately represent the factual situation. A further difficulty which
this dichotomous terminology creates is the idea that, if welfare and
justice are mutually exclusive, then welfare cannot occupy the same
territory as justice. But, because justice is so called -  and welfare is,
by definition “not justice” -  the impression is generated that welfare
is not just. Thus, setting up welfai'e and justice as polar opposites
leads to a perception that the outcomes delivered by welfare-
orientated institutions lack the quality of justice -  understood as
fairness. Neil MacCormick has termed this “[t]he ‘Welfare versus
Justice’ Fallacy.”* In fact, there is no reason to think that welfare
decisions are not “just” in this sense. MacCormick states:
“I want to offer a frontal assault on an implicit 
‘persuasive definition’. This persuasive definition is 
accomplished precisely in the juxtaposition of the two 
rival models or ideal types under the terminology of 
welfare for the one and justice for the other. It is 
important to note carefully what a sleight of hand there 
is involved. It is achieved by arrogating the teim 
‘justice’ to one of the two models for treatment of 
children in trouble. In saying that the justice model
Because of the elements of justice, on the “due process” model, which are 
inbuilt.
Under the CP(S)A 1995, s 50(6)
MacCormick, supra, note 35,at p 11
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dispenses justice and the welfare model dispenses 
welfare we sell the pass at once.”*^"*
In this passage, he lays bare one of the ways in which the concept of
welfare is subtly downgiuded by its implicit labelling as “not
justice”. Later in his lecture, he challenges the exclusivity of the
space occupied by “justice”. He argues that it is, in fact, more just
for children, who, in general tenns, lack certain of the advantages of
adulthood such as power, status, wealth and maturity of judgment,
that decisions made in relation to them should take into account their
needs. He states;
“Our system is not a welfare system that works better 
than a justice system. It is a better system because it 
matches a better conception of justice than in this 
context the so-called ‘justice model’ would do. We do 
better justice to children than we used to do and than we 
would do if we were to go down the road of further 
assimilating the children’s system to the criminal law 
and the criminal process as this ... applies to adults. ... 
[Njever accept that our system ... diverges from what 
could properly be called a justice model. ... Say, 
rather, that we have here a model of justice that tells us 
why to treat children differently from adults.”*
MacCormick, then, argues that the children’s hearings system -  an 
overtly welfarist foriun - is infused by justice, as that teim is 
commonly used, to mean fairness, or as he himself would have it, as 
“the first virtue of political institutions.”'^  ^ Although he does not 
specifically address the tenets of justice theory as outlined above, he
atp 7 
Ibid, atp 11 
Ibid, at p 7
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suggests that there is no necessary opposition between the two 
concepts. In the same way that, as discussed above, procedures 
usually ascribed to justice, (on the “due process” model) such as 
rights of appeal and review, actually complement the provision of 
welfare then, it may be that the practice of welfare actually 
incorporates, without necessarily acknowledging this, other “justice” 
elements. In this way, considerations which have always been placed 
on the ‘justice’ side of the welfare/justice divide -  in particular, 
capacity and responsibility -  may actually already have a role in 
welfare decision-making. Thus, it is not so much a reconciliation of 
welfare with justice which will be discussed here, but rather the 
drawing out of a position which has always existed, albeit implicitly.
The Concept of Responsibility in a Children’s Hearing 
Criminal responsibility in the court system is a still snapshot set 
against the moving picture which constitutes the offender’s life.*"*^  It 
arises where it is proved that the accused committed the actus reus of 
the criminal offence with the necessary mens rea and is, therefore, 
specifically linked to the moment in time when the offence took 
place. Only if reason to question the extent of the accused’s capacity 
exists, as in the case of a child or a mentally disordered person, 
would any wider issues be canvassed and even these are specifically
This metaphor was used by Margaret Ross in relation to the law on adoption. 
See “Adoption in the 2T‘ Century; Still Image Against a Moving Picture?” in 
Scoular (ed) supra, note 39, 105
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related to understanding of, and the ability to rationalise, the criminal 
act itself. Criminal responsibility also constitutes the link between 
the crime itself and the sanction. Once it has been established, the 
state is authorised to impose punislunent. The existence of this 
serious consequence, which may consist in deprivation of liberty, 
arguably justifies the narrowness of the concept and the need to 
ensure that it is established only where a rigorous procedure which 
protects the rights of the accused has been followed.
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that there have been calls, particularly 
from feminists, for more contextualised decision-making in the 
criminal law albeit that these have been made primarily in relation to 
provocation'^** rather than criminal responsibility.'^** It is not 
obvious, however, that the argument in favour of examining the 
criminal act in the context of the offender’s life as a whole is only of 
relevance to cases where the accused has suffered an excusable loss 
of self-control. If contextualised decision-making is fairer, because it 
allows other issues than simply the offence itself to be taken into 
account, why should it not be fairer in relation to other aspects of the 
criminal law and process as well?
The law on provocation, which, if successful as a defence, reduces a charge of 
murder to culpable homicide requires a sudden loss of self-control following 
immediately upon either an act of violence against the accused or his/her discovery 
of sexual infidelity by a partner. Feminists argue that women who have been 
subjected to sustained domestic abuse over a long period are more likely to suffer a 
“slow burn” effect so that the repeated acts of violence against them have a 
cumulative effect and their own use of deadly force does not arise out of a specific 
incident.
See Donald Nicolson and Rohit Sanghvi “Battered Women and Provocation; 
The Implications of R v Ahluwalia" [1993] Crim LR 728
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It is clear from the discussion earlier in this chapter that the 
children’s hearings system has no concern whatsoever with the issue 
of punishment and that its style of decision-making is almost 
completely contextualised. Its criteria for relevancy/"*** in relation to 
the material presented to it, both written and oral, are drawn very 
widely and, in reaching its conclusion as to disposal of the case, it is 
as likely to accord importance, for example, to the fact that the child 
enjoys football as to his/her acceptance of the offence ground for 
referral.'"*' The criminal cornts’ narrow construction of criminal 
responsibility then, would, on the face of it, appear to have no role in 
a children’s hearing. Constructing criminal responsibility exclusively 
on that model consigns it very clearly to the justice side of the 
welfare / justice divide.
This chapter, however, seeks to argue that welfare and justice are not, 
in fact, as dichotomised as the traditional debate suggests, hi 
particular, it is misleading to accept that justice is concerned 
exclusively with the offence, whereas welfare pays no heed to it once 
it has served its puipose of triggering the process. It is, however, 
important to note that welfare is not necessarily concerned with the 
offence even if the child has been referred under s 52(2)(i) of the 
Children (Scotland) Act. Kenneth Nonie has stated that “[i]t is the
Kenneth Nome defines this as “whether the matter is relevant to tire question of 
what couise should be taken in the child’s best interests”. Kenneth McK Norrie 
Children (Scotland) Act 1995 (Edinburgh: W Green / Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) atp 
140
See McDiarmid, supra, note 39, at pp 34 - 36
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strength of the [children’s hearings] system that the existence of a 
ground of referral merely raises the question of whether compulsory 
measures are necessary ... but does not detenuine their nature; it is 
both questions which must be considered by the children’s 
hearing.” "^^^
Nonetheless, in summarising those aspects of the discussion which 
were most commonly present in the sixty children’s hearings which 
they observed, Hallett et al noted that “[o]ne main topic of the 
children’s and young person’s contribution [at the hearing] was the 
explanation of the offence, the circumstances surrounding it and the 
young person’s ... part in this.”’"^  ^ This was against an overall 
finding that children tended not to say very much in h e a r i n g s a n d  
suggests first, that the offence was of gi'eater relevance to the 
hearings’ deliberations and decision than simply as a justification for 
bringing the case in the first place and, second that children 
themselves regarded utilising the opportunity presented to explain 
their criminal activity as important. On this basis, the offence itself is 
of significance in welfare decision-making, at least as practised by 
the children’s hearings. This in turn supports the view that welfare 
and justice are not as polarised as is sometimes thought.
What, then, of the concepts of criminal capacity and criminal 
responsibility as specific aspects of the offence which are also
Norrie, supra, at p 140
Hallett et al, supra, note 42, at p 50
Ibid, at pp 46 - 48
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usually branded as “justice” considerations along with the offence 
itself? It should be clear horn the detailed discussion of the theory 
and practice of welfare in the hearings system earlier in this chapter 
that the process itself -  the discussion within the hearing mediated by 
panel members but involving all participants -  is as key, in many 
respects, as the disposal itself. It is therefore necessary to look at 
these concepts in both contexts: the discussion and the decision.
Capacity and Resnonsibilitv in a Children’s Hearing 
The discussion surrounding the offence which Hallett et al identify as 
a common feature of hearings brought under section 52(2)(i) clearly 
occupies tenitory which is covered by the rationality capacity point 
identified in chapter 2. It indicates that the child is seeking to 
provide a rational explanation of the crime, and his/her involvement 
in it and it will demonstrate practically the child’s ability to do this. 
The nature of the discussion is also likely to touch upon some of the 
other capacity points. In the court setting, the evidence presented on 
the points is purely descriptive. It gives an indication of the child’s 
existing understanding of the issues covered such as the 
wrongfulness of the act, its criminality and its consequences. The 
panel members may attempt to apply the points, or some of them, in 
a rather more nonnative sense — that the child should understand that 
the act was wrongful, or criminal, or carried wider consequences.
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This can be viewed as an attempt to assist the child to build his/her 
capacity.
It might be argued that all that is suggested here is that the child 
should take a more mature attitude to his/her wrongdoings and panel 
members indulge in moralising or preaching which merely 
emphasises the child’s lack of status. It is submitted, however, that 
there is a concept of criminal responsibility (in a broad sense of 
taking responsibility for a criminal act) at play here. While it 
eschews the crude link with punishment generally made in the 
criminal courts, it is still concerned with the child’s criminal capacity 
as that has been theorised in chapter 2. It is, however, as, if not more, 
concerned with facilitating the taking of responsibility in the future, 
to avoid criminal behaviour, as with the completed criminal act 
which camiot be undone. Responsibility in this sense is also 
important to the actual outcome of the hearing -  the disposal decided 
upon by panel members.
The hearing’s decision cannot seek to punish the child for the crime. 
It is likely that the hearing will regard it as in the child’s best 
interests, both objectively and subjectively, that s/he should stop 
offending. It will therefore seek to impose a condition which 
facilitates this, for example requiring the child to attend an 
Intermediate Treatment programmespeci f ical ly designed to
Such programmes are intended to be “intennediate between supervision in the 
home and committal to care”. Geoff Aplin “Intermediate Treatment” in Martin and
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address offending behaviour in both a backward-looking (towards the 
offence itself) and a forward-looking fashion. Issues like the 
wrongfulness of criminal action, the harm which it causes and the 
need to control impulses towards it, all of which may be covered in 
such a programme, are certainly aspects of criminal capacity and may 
serve to move the child towards the assumption of criminal 
responsibility in the naiTow, traditional sense. The hearings’ concept 
of responsibility may be broader than “criminal responsibility” but it 
is no less valid. The purpose which it serves, of bringing the child to 
an awareness of his/her criminality, with all of its coiuiotations, fills 
in some of the gaps, in relation to understanding and prevention of 
criminal behaviour in the fliture, which are left by the courts’ practice 
of equating the commission of the crime with criminal responsibility 
and imposing punisiiment on that basis
Conclusions
Overall, this chapter has sought to argue for a holistic and realistic 
view of the child-offender which accommodates his/her status as 
both a child and a criminal simultaneously. It has considered, in 
detail, the theory and practice of welfare, both because of its 
centrality to the Scottish legal system’s interaction with child-
Murray (eds) supra, note 17, 177 at p 178. See also Anthony Bottoms, Phillip 
Brown, Brenda McWilliams, William McWilliams, and Michael Nellis, in 
collaboration with John Pratt Intermediate Treatment and Juvenile Justice: Key 
Findings and Implications from a National Survey o f Intermediate Treatment 
Policy and Practice (London: HMSO, 1990)
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criminals and because of the image which it is often seen as 
presenting, of the child as primarily, or indeed only, in need of 
protection. This was contrasted with the view of the child implicit in 
the government’s perspective on responsibilization, as an 
independent agent who can and should take (often full) responsibility 
for the criminal act and its consequences. Having noted the 
reconciliation between the construction of the child as vulnerable and 
the construction of the child as independent agent achieved in 
children’s rights and in legal representation, the chapter concludes 
that a similar reconciliation is possible between welfare and justice in 
relation to children who offend. In fact, it would appear that, as 
practised by the children’s hearings system, welfare has, all along, 
taken on board sufficient elements of the justice approach to provide 
an effective response to the child as offender as well as the child as 
child. In the current, punitive, political climate, this is encouraging 
for the continued durability of the children’s hearings system.
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Chapter 5
Procedural Framework and Conclusions
Introduction
The central theme around which this thesis has been built is the 
response of the Scottish legal system to children who commit serious 
crimes, both as it is currently in the courts and the children’s hearings 
system and as it could be, specifically where children are prosecuted. 
The aim of the innovations which have been suggested, particularly 
to the establishment of the mental element where the accused is a 
child, is to ensure the fairest treatment possible of the child-accused. 
The issue of fair treatment has been theorised to encompass two key 
elements, around which the main discussion in the thesis has centred. 
These are: first, the need to engage thoroughly with the child’s 
criminal capacity, conceived as his/her understanding of the criminal 
act in context, and its consequences; and second, the tension inherent 
in the status of child between autonomy and dependence which 
becomes even more pronounced and less tractable when the child 
commits a criminal offence. In the latter case, the status of “child- 
criminal” is almost a contradiction in terms, so difficult is it for the 
legal system to accommodate an individual who is, simultaneously, a 
child and an offender. This point was examined in detail in chapter 
4.
In the popular consciousness, in Scotland as much as in England, the 
murder of James Bulger is still regarded as the main example of a
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serious crime committed by children. The trial judge’s description of 
the event as an “act of unparalleled evil and barbarity” stigmatised 
Robert Thompson and Jon Venables legally in the same way as the 
media coverage had done socially. Other than the rebuttal of the doli 
incapax presumption, however, which, as was discussed in chapter 3, 
only considers the understanding of the distinction between right and 
wrong in a very narrow sense, there was no engagement with T and 
V’s actual understandings of their act and its consequences. The 
importance of a close examination of the mental element where the 
accused is a child, which this thesis has set out in chapter 2, and 
advocated throughout, is that it provides a mechanism for informing 
the court of the child’s true level of comprehension, in relation to 
his/her criminal act, and of other aspects of his/her functioning, such 
as the general ability to control and determine conduct. From this, 
the court can build a picture of the child’s actual level of criminal 
responsibility and make more rational decisions on “guilt” and 
“sentence”.
Developmental psychology may be censured by sociological work on 
the childhood studies model for its monolithic structure, which 
overlooks the individualism and the lived reality of children’s lives 
but, as exemplified in chapter 2, it holds data which is necessary to 
making such determinations in individual cases. The law may 
sometimes have difficulty with the discourses utilised in other
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disciplines^ but developmental psychology can still provide 
information on which to base a legal decision.
There is a need to routinise the procedure for dealing with children 
who offend in the courts to move away from the presentation of such 
cases as abenunt and, again, to ensure fairer treatment by levelling 
the playing field so that all children who offend are processed in the 
same way -  a way which focuses attention on their understandings. 
In so doing, it may also be possible to improve upon certain of the 
existing elements of the system.
These points are specifically addressed in this chapter, together with 
a number of others which have been raised, expressly or implicitly, in 
the discussion in chapters 1 to 4 but which have not, so fai*, received 
due consideration. In form, the chapter is, therefore, procedural. In 
effect, however, it is an appeal for fairness towards, parity between 
and a compassionate approach to, children who commit serious 
crimes.
The Age of Criminal Responsibility
The provision of an age of criminal responsibility is a demonstration 
of Scots law’s acceptance of the difference between the commission 
of criminal acts by young children and by their adult counteiparts. It 
is, in fact, the only fonnal provision currently made by the Scottish
' For example, there are difficulties in translating psychiatric evidence into 
information which the courts can understand and apply in insanity cases. See 
Derek Chiswick “Medicine and the Law -  Use and Abuse of Psychiatric 
Testimony” 1985 5M7 290(6473), 975
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legal system in relation to the capacity of children. Chapter 3 
explained its operation, arguing that its retention is necessary to 
avoid the spectre of very young children being prosecuted to serve 
political ends and that the age ought to be linked the capacity. This 
chapter will look at the age which should be set, bearing in mind, 
given the individualism of child-offenders, that this can only ever be 
decided arbitrarily.
The basic premise of the Scottish Law Commission’s Report on Age 
o f Criminal Responsibility is that, in a system where the vast majority 
of child-offenders are referred to the children’s hearings system, the 
age which is of importance is the age at which the child is 
automatically subject to the adult system. In the Commission’s view, 
that is, and should remain, sixteen. Cunently, the relevant statute 
does not formally state the position in these words but it is clear that 
prosecution of an individual aged under sixteen is to be viewed as an 
unusual com'se.^ Equally, only a “child” can be referred to a 
children’s hearing and the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 states that 
“child means ... a child who has not attained the age of 16 years.
In its Discussion Paper which preceded the Report, the Commission 
tentatively suggested that it might not be appropriate to have any
 ^ Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 [hereinafter “CP(S)A 1995”], s 42(1) 
which only allows prosecution of a child aged under 16 on the instnictions of the 
Lord Advocate and then only in the sheriff court or the High Court.
 ^ Children Scotland Act 1995 [hereinafter “C(S)A 1995”] s 93(2)(b)(i). Sixteen- 
and seventeen-year olds come within the definition of “child” if they are already on 
a supervision requirement as do individuals aheady on a similar requirement made 
in England and Wales or Northern Ireland; C(S)A 1995 s 93(2)(b)(ii) and (ill)
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other relevant age apart from sixteen, and sought views on dus/ In 
effect, therefore, it was canvassing opinion on the proposition that the 
age of criminal responsibility, as such, should either be regarded as 
having been abolished or else as having been recast as sixteen for the 
reason given above.
In the end, the Commission was persuaded “by the views of the 
majority of its consultées ... that there should be a rule that a child 
below a certain age cannot be prosecuted” ... on the basis that “a rule 
of this nature expresses important values about the ways in which 
society should deal with young children who offend [and] that the 
criminal process is not a suitable mechanism for dealing with such 
children.”  ^ It refused, however, to call any such lower age for 
prosecution an age of criminal responsibility.
In the end, the Commission proposed that the relevant lower age 
should be twelve, a view which is endorsed by this thesis and, 
indeed, in the Draft Criminal Code for Scotland^
Whvl2?
Twelve can only be an arbitrary choice but, nonetheless, the Law 
Commission’s arguments in its favour are impeccable. The tliree
Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on Age o f Criminal Responsibility 
(Discussion Paper No 115) (Edinburgh: TSO, 2001) at paras 3.13 to 3.16 
 ^ Scottish Law Commission Report on Age of Criminal Responsibility (Scot Law 
Com No 185) (Edinburgh: TSO, 2002) at para 3.15 
S  15
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reasons which the Commission gives for selecting 12^  are: (1) that 
this is the age proposed by the majority of its consultées; (2) that it 
meets the requirements of the European Convention on Human 
Rights as interpreted particularly by T v UK; V v UK:^  and (3) that it 
accords well with similar assumptions made by the civil law 
concerning children’s capacity. A brief expansion on points (2) and 
(3) is necessary to explain in more detail why the view is also taken 
here that 12 would be an acceptable age.
Human Rights Angle
It is clear from the discussion of the precondition of understanding in 
chapter 2 that the child-accused must have sufficient command of the 
trial process, including its nature and purpose and the language used, 
actively to participate in the trial. It is worth reiterating that the age 
of criminal responsibility in Scotland is eight. The evidence led in 
the case of HMA v however, implicitly attacks eight as being too 
young. According to the expert testimony, despite his chronological 
age of thirteen, S functioned, in certain key respects, more as a child 
of just over e i g h t o r  a child of nine or ten.^  ^ The view was 
expressed that, in order to be able to follow discussion, he would 
require dialogue to be “adjusted to levels normally understood by a
 ^ These are listed in Scottish Law Commission Report No 185, supra, note 5, at 
para 3.16
 ^(2000) 30 EHRR 121
 ^(plea in bar of trial) (unreported) (High Court) (9 July 1999)
See http://www.scotcourls.gov.ulc/onmions/845 99.htm 
See ibid the evidence of Dr Isobel Campbell and Dr Norman Clark 
' ’ Ibid, evidence of Dr Dorothy Taylor (at p 3 of internet copy)
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nine year old c h i l d . O n  the basis, partly, of this evidence, which 
supported the view that S would have considerable difficulty in 
following the trial process, the decision was taken that S was insane 
in bar of trial. At the very least then, this suggests that the 
likelihood of a child of eight being able to follow trial proceedings is 
minimal. This, in turn, implies that there is a need to raise the age of 
criminal responsibility, probably to at least eleven, if a child of nine 
or ten is also likely to struggle with the language and concepts 
involved
111 T V UK; V V the European Court of Human Rights refused
to hold “that the trial on criminal charges of a child, even one as 
young as eleven, as such violates the fair trial guarantee under Article 
6(1).”^^  It did however, take the view that the actual treatment 
accorded to Robert Thompson and Jon Venables, taking account of 
their age (11) and immaturity, the public scmtiny to which the case 
was subject, and their disturbed emotional states, had prevented them 
from participating actively in the trial and was therefore a breach of 
Article 6(1).*  ^ Because the age of eleven was a relevant 
consideration in this decision, even if it was not decisive, it would be
Ibid, evidence of Miss Jenny Munro (chartered clinical psychologist)
This infers that S was unable to instruct counsel or to follow the proceedings at 
the trial since these elements are necessary to satisfy the test for the plea in bar set 
down HMA v Wilson 1942 SLT 194 at p 195 
supra, note 8
Ibid, at p 179 para 86. Emphasis added.
Ibid, at p 181 paras 90 and 91
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unwise, in changing the age of criminal responsibility, to set it any 
lower than twelve.
In terms of the views expressed in both HMA v S and T v UK: V v 
UK then, twelve seems to be an acceptable age legally, albeit that it 
is also the youngest age which would satisfy the concerns relative to 
understanding raised in these cases.
Comparison with the Civil Law Position
There are a number of statutory provisions in the civil law which 
recognise the age of twelve as a pivotal point in a child’s life in terms 
of capacity where this is, broadly, conceived as having sufficient 
maturity to take key decisions. The Law Commission lists several of 
theseincluding the need, in the standard case, for a child of twelve 
or over to consent to his/her own freeing for adoption^ ^  and the 
presumption that a child of that age is sufficiently mature to instruct a 
solicitor on his/her own behalf in civil proceedings.^^ In addition, 
section 6 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 requires that parents 
seek the views of their children in making any major decision 
relating to their parental responsibilities and rights^® with a 
presumption that a child aged twelve or over “is of sufficient age and
Law Commission Report No 185, supra, note 5, para 3.16(3)
Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 ss 12(8) and 18(8) as substituted by Age of Legal 
Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s 2(3)
Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, ss 2(4A) and (4B) as inserted by 
C(S)A 1995 sch 4, para 53 
Listed in C(S)A 1995, ss 1 and 2
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maturity to form a view.”^^  Children of that age are also specifically 
imbued with the capacity to make a will/^
The disparity between the age of twelve, as the first age at which it is 
to be presumed that the child has the maturity to take decisions of 
this nature, and the age of eight as the first age at which the child is 
to be regarded as capable of taking (full) criminal responsibility is 
very stark. This is particularly the case when the various elements of 
criminal capacity teased out in chapter 2 as capacity points are taken 
into account. Whilst consenting to adoption, for example, may be 
one of the most important decisions a child ever takes, the 
assumption of criminal responsibility allows the state to impose 
sanctions including detention. Both are highly significant events; 
both require a mature understanding.
By comparison with the civil law then, the cunent criminal law on 
the age of criminal responsibility appears actively unfair to very 
young children, in making an assumption about their maturity and 
understandings which is not tested in the individual case but which 
may have seriously detrimental consequences. This is particularly so 
given that provisions such as that relating to adoption also allow for 
the situation “where the court is satisfied that the child is incapable of
Some commentators take the view that this provision is unenforceable given that 
it provides no sanction for a failure on the part of the parent to consult with the 
child. See Kenneth Norrie Children (Scotland) Act 1995 (Edinburgh; W Green / 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1998) at pp 19 -  20. Others are more favourably impressed 
regarding it as “do[ing] an admirable job” of “mjanying together the various 
shands in the [CRC]”. Elaine E Sutherland Child and Family Law (Edinburgh; T 
&T Clark, 1999) atp 89 
Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s 2(2)
286
giving his [sic] consent”. I n  that circumstance, the consent may be 
dispensed with. Even where the age is set at twelve in the civil law, 
then, there is a recognition that not all twelve-year olds will have the 
necessary maturity. It is submitted that these are good arguments for 
levelling the playing field in the treatment of the child’s capacity 
between the civil and the criminal law. Given the volume of civil 
statutory provisions recognising twelve as the appropriate age at 
which to presume maturity for decision-making puiposes, it seems 
acceptable that the age of criminal responsibility should also be 
twelve.
Criminal Procedure
This thesis has argued, by reference to developmental psychology, 
that it is necessary, in the interests of fairness and rational decision­
making, to place the child-accused’s understandings of his/her 
criminal act, and related matters, in issue in a criminal trial and, 
indeed, prior to that. Such a proposal is, however, of no value unless 
it is supported by the appropriate procedural framework. Cun*ently, 
Scottish criminal procedure is seriously lacking in this respect, hi the 
discussion, in chapter 3, of the general unpreparedness of the Scottish 
courts for cases involving child-accused, it was noted that the only 
mechanism by which the child-accused in HMA v S could bring his
Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978, s 12(8) as substituted by the Age of Legal 
Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s 2(3)
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developmental delay to the court’s attention was by a plea of insanity 
in bar of trial. This demonstrates the absence of dedicated 
procedures for children.
One justification for the failure to make specific provision for child- 
accused is that there are very few of them. The vast majority of 
children are refened to the children’s hearings system. '^  ^ This is, 
however, a weak argument. By comparison, insanity is also rarely 
pled. As Derek Chiswick has noted “[mjentally disordered offenders 
in Scotland fonn a tiny proportion of the populations passing through 
the criminal justice and mental health s y s t e m s . D e s p i t e  this, 
recognised procedures exist to deal with insanity both as a special 
defence,^^ (indicating that the accused lacked capacity at the time of 
the crime), and as a plea in bar of trial.^  ^ Insanity is the most 
comparable situation to that of child-accused in that both involve a 
lack of rationality in relation to, and/or understanding of, the nature 
of the criminal offence. The plea in bar of trial bears at least a 
passing resemblance to the preconditions for children. The special 
defence of insanity serves a similar function to the capacity points,
The Scottish Law Commission reports tliat “the number of childr en under sixteen 
prosecuted in tire criminal courts was 189 in 1997, 179 in 1998 and 105 in 1999.” 
Scottish Law Conmrission Report No 185, supra, note 5, para 3.10. The number of 
cliildren aged under thirteen, which is included in these overall figures, was 
particularly low (fourteen in 1997, nine in 1998 and five in 1999: note 60 in para 
3.10)
Derek Chiswick “Mental Disorder and Criminal Justice” in Peter Duff and Neil 
Hutton (eds). Criminal Justice in Scotland, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) 262 at p 
262
In which case, the accused's decision to plead insanity must be notified to the 
Crown in advance: CP(S)A 1995, s 78
CP(S)A 1995, ss 5 4 - 5 7 .
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albeit that insanity is determined on an all-or-nothing basis whereas 
the capacity points admit of degr ees of understanding.
The fact that there are recognised mles and procedures to deal with 
insanity, despite its rarity, indicates that the paucity of prosecutions 
of children is not a good enough reason to fail also to have dedicated 
processes for them in place. It is therefore necessary to identify the 
changes to criminal procedure which are necessary.
Accommodating the Mental Element
The main issue is the need to accommodate the mental element as 
conceived in relation to child-accused in chapter 2. A three-fold 
classification was proposed. First, the three preconditions 
identified^^ form a threshold for subjection to the trial process. 
Assuming that they are satisfied, the court then proceeds to examine 
the child’s criminal capacity, by investigating the appropriate 
capacity points^^ and, finally, mens rea has to be proved, as an 
essential, very narrow and primarily factual element of the Crown 
case. There is an overlap between the community membership 
preconditions, of empathy and knowledge of criminality, and the 
capacity points of distinction between right and wrong and
These are preconditions (1) o f understanding; (2) of empathy and (3) of 
knowledge of criminality. The last two are grouped together under the heading of 
“community membership”.
Six of these were identified but this was not intended to be exhaustive. They 
were: (1) the volitional element; (2) distinction between right and wrong; (3) 
causation; (4) understanding o f criminality and criminal consequences; (5) 
rationality; and (6) mens rea-related capacity points.
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understanding of criminality and criminal consequences. There is 
also an overlap between the mens rea-related capacity point and mens 
rea itself. Also, there would be little point in proving the mens rea 
separately from the actus reus therefore these must also be 
considered together. How is all of this to be achieved procedurally? 
First, and most simply, proof of the mens rea and the actus reus are 
cun*ently, and would remain, the main points at issue in the trial diet 
since its primary objective is to ascertain whether it is proved beyond 
reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offence. The 
preconditions and the capacity points are the real innovations and 
require further thought.
The puipose of a preliminary diet^  ^ is to settle any matter which 
would be better resolved before the actual trial takes place.^  ^ The 
preconditions detennine whether there can be a trial at all, a point 
which, by definition, must be settled in advance. It therefore appears 
uncontroversial that a preliminary diet is required in this respect.^^ 
The capacity points are more problematic. On the one hand, there is 
an argument in favour of canying out the investigation into the
In proceedings on indictment in tlie sheriff court, a “first diet” is held. (CP(S)A 
1995 s 71(9)). This serves the same function as a preliminary diet (CP(S)A 1995 s 
71(2)). This chapter will, however, make reference only to “preliminary diets” 
which take place where the proceedings are in the High Court (CP(S)A 1995, s 
72(1). See Renton & Brown at para 17-01 
Implied in CP(S)A 1995, s 72(1 )(d)
S 72 of the CP(S)A 1995 sets down the circumstances in which such a diet is 
currently appropriate. It would therefore require to be amended to make it clear 
that, where the accused is a child, such a diet must be held to ascertain whether s/he 
can be tried at all. A new subsection (2B) could be added stating “Where the 
accused is a child the court shall order that there shall be a diet before the tiral diet 
for the puipose of ascertaining whether the child is able to be tried.”
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child’s criminal capacity in the same, or in a separate, preliminary 
diet because, again, if the child is found to have no criminal capacity 
whatsoever, the trial will not proceed.^^ Also, the overlap mentioned 
above (between the community membership preconditions and the 
distinction between right and wrong and understanding of criminality 
and criminal consequences capacity points) suggests that it would be 
appropriate to allow all the evidence in respect of these matters to be 
led at once. There is a precedent, in the case of insanity in bar of trial 
for having two diets other than the trial diet but the second of these -  
the examination of the facts, is expressly intended to take the place of 
the trial.^ "^  In relation to children, there is no benefit to the accused, 
the court or the witnesses in separating the preliminary hearing on the 
preconditions from any such hearing on capacity.
On the other hand however, the likelihood is that, if the child meets 
the threshold for trial set by the preconditions, s/he will have some 
criminal capacity. There is, therefore, little point in consigning this 
issue to a preliminary hearing on the basis of a very distant 
possibility that it might prevent the trial going ahead. Also, and more 
importantly, criminal responsibility, which is based on the extent of 
the child’s capacity, is integral to the trial process. Indeed, in a 
sense, the raison d ’être of the trial is to determine whether or not the
If the child meets the preconditions, this is unlikely. 
^''CP(S)A 1995 s 55(6)
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accused has this, in any degree/^ It is therefore inappropriate to 
sever the ascertainment of the level of capacity (and, hence, 
responsibility) from the trial itself.
If insanity is taken as a model, the plea in bar of trial (comparable to 
the preconditions) is usually dealt with in a separate, preliminary 
hearing.^*" Insanity as a special defence (comparable to the capacity 
points) on the other hand, is usually considered in the trial itself, with 
the jury being required to make a finding as to whether the accused is 
insane .Overa l l ,  then, the preconditions should be referred to a 
preliminary hearing and the capacity points should be examined in 
the trial itself. This should also obviate any difficulty arising from 
the overlap between the mens rea capacity point and mens rea itself, 
because evidence on both will now be led during the trial.
With regard to the overlap between two of the preconditions and two 
of the capacity points, “[t]he proceedings at a preliminary diet are 
proceedings at the trial for the purposes of taking a record under 
section 93 of the [(CP(S)] 1995 Act.”^^  Accordingly, all evidence 
given in relation to the preconditions will be available to the trial
As explained in chapter 2, for a child, criminal responsibility requires proof 
beyond reasonable doubt of the actus reus and the mens rea, as well as a degree of 
criminal capacity.
See Michèle Burman and Clare Connelly Mentally Disordered Offenders and 
Criminal Proceedings: The Operation of Party VI o f the Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 1995 (Edinbuigh: Scottish Office Central Research Unit, 1999) at 
pp 15 -  17 where it is indicated that, in all of the cases identified in their study 
(except one which was deserted pro loco et tempore), tlie plea in bar of trial on the 
ground of insanity was considered in a separate hearing from the trial.
See, eg, HMA v Kidd 1960 SLT 82 which was reported solely on the charge to 
the jury where the accused had pled insanity,
Renton & Brown at para 17-23
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court, if there is a need to make reference to it in relation to the 
relevant capacity points.
Nature of Evidence
HMA V S indicates that expert testimony can be helpful in 
determining the child’s capacity and, given the reliance placed on 
developmental psychology in relation to both the preconditions and 
the capacity points, it is likely to be necessary. A word of caution is, 
however, required here. Cun-ently, where the accused pleads insanity 
in bar of trial, expert evidence, in the form of testimony from two 
medical practitioners, is required.^^ The Scottish Law Commission 
has recommended that this requirement be repealed on the basis that 
it is too restrictive and fails to take account of the actual evidence 
which is most helpful in deciding if the accused meets the test of 
insanity."^ ® This often comes from psychologists. By analogy, and 
given that the list of capacity points set down in chapter 2 may not be 
exhaustive, it is too restrictive to provide for expert evidence from 
any specified category of professional. It ought to be equally 
valuable, in fact, to hear evidence on some of the preconditions and 
capacity points from those who interact with the child-accused on a 
day-to-day basis such as teachers, particularly on issues with an
CP(S)A 1995 s 54(1)
Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on Insanity and Diminished 
Responsibility (Scot Law Com No 122) (Edinburgh: TSO, 2003) at p 51, paras 4.25 
and 4.26
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intellectual basis such as understanding of causation."^  ^ In this regard, 
however, it is useful to consider the practice which arose around the 
doli incapax presumption.
The Example of Doli Incapax
The doli incapax doctrine was set up as a rebuttable presumption -  
the court presumed that the child was incapable of evil and the 
prosecution was required to lead evidence to rebut this view."^  ^ There 
were a number of difficulties with this. First and foremost, it set up, 
as the norm, the child as an individual who lacked understanding. 
This allowed the presumption to be rebutted if the prosecution led 
evidence that the child-accused was of “normal mental capacity.”^^  
As chapter 2 has argued, children develop at different rates. The 
notion of ''normal mental capacity” is therefore relatively 
meaningless. Equally, the idea that evidence that the child-accused 
was a “normal” child should be sufficient to establish his/her 
understanding of the serious wrongfulness of his/her act does not 
accord with the need actually to investigate this in every case, which
With regard to tlie doli incapax presumption, it was accepted by the House of  
Lords in C (a minor) v DPP [1995] 2 WLR 383 at p 402 that evidence from 
teachers and parents as well as psychiatrists could be led by the prosecution to 
rebut the presumption
JBH & JH (minors) v O’Connell 1981 Grim LR 632 at p 633. This was an 
absolute requirement but, on occasion, it was ignored by the prosecution, leading to 
difficulties at the appeal stage. See R v Coulburn (1988) 87 Cr App R 309 
JBH and JH (minors) v O’Connell supra, note 42, at p 633. In JM (a minor) v 
Runeckles (1984) 79 Cr App R 255, the fact that, from the accused’s handwriting 
and the statement she gave to the police with respect to the crime, the magistrates 
had deduced that she was of normal intelligence for her age, was upheld in the 
course of the appeal as proper evidence from which to draw a conclusion that the 
presumption had been rebutted.
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has been advocated in this thesis. Using the “nomial child” as a 
standard, then, was unfair to child-accused because it introduced a 
normative element into the assessment of their understandings. The 
implication was that, if a child did not, in reality, understand the 
wrongfulness of his/her act then, as a “normal child” of a particular 
age, s/he ou gh t to have done, and s/he could be convicted on that 
basis.
Another issue which came to be meaningful, again somewhat 
dubiously, was whether or not the child came from a “good” or a 
“bad” home. The point seems first to have been raised in B v a 
housebreaking carried out by two boys seeking work for Scout “Bob- 
A-Job” Week, hi the judgment, it was stated:
“[hjere is a child who has had apparently every opportunity in life, 
coming from a respectable family and properly brought up, who, one 
would think, would know in the ordinary sense the difference 
between good and evil and what he should do and he should not
This led to a general acceptance of evidence of this nature to rebut 
the presumption despite the questionable assumption underlying it 
that there is a recognisable standard of a “good home” and that this 
contributed to the child’s understanding of the serious wrongfulness
(1960) 44 Crim App R 1 
Ibid, at p 3
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of his/her act/^ In fact, it is preferable if the investigation into 
capacity remains descriptive, hi other words, instead of the court 
hearing evidence on what the child ought to have known or 
understood, it only considers evidence as to what s/he did actually 
understand on the point at issue. The evidence led may be wide- 
ranging, and personal knowledge of the child should be accorded 
value alongside expert testimony but, overall, no aspect of the child’s 
understanding should be assumed.
All argument was put forward, during the period in which the doli 
incapax presumption was used, that the onus of proof should be 
moved to the defence so that it was presumed that the child-accused 
did know that his/her action was seriously wrong, unless evidence to 
the contrary was led."^  ^ This is helpful in that the child-accused is no 
longer presumed to be “abnormal” but the view is taken here that 
having a presumption at all unnecessarily distorts the nature of the 
inquiiy into the child’s understanding which the capacity points 
require. It makes it necessary to assume either that the child had 
understanding, or that s/he did not, and for evidence to be led only by 
the side on which the onus of rebutting the presumption rests. This 
does not sufficiently recognise the individualism, in terms of 
understanding, of the child-accused. In fact, it is submitted that this 
is one aiea where it might be appropriate to adopt a more inquisitorial
See the judgment of Laws J in C (a minor) v DPP [1994] 3 All ER 190 at p 198 
taking issue with what he characterises as discrimination against childi'en from 
“good homes”.
See, for example, the commentary on A v DPP [1992] Crim LR 34 at p 35
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style of procedure with the aim of establishing the truth, rather than 
the traditional adversarial idea of judging between two opposing 
arguments/^ The court’s role in relation to the preconditions and the 
capacity points is to seek to get to the truth of the child’s 
understandings, informed by his/her developmental abilities and 
maturity. It is not to adjudicate on whether the prosecution or the 
defence has put foiward the better ar gument. It is already sufficiently 
difficult for an expert witness to be asked to translate the discourse of 
his/her area of expertise into concepts which the criminal law can 
apply"^  ^ without the additional burden of the awareness of 
representing either the prosecution or the defence.
Taking the onus of proof away from the prosecution upsets one of the 
fundamental principles of the criminal justice system -  that it is not 
for the accused to prove his/her innocence.^® If the whole issue is 
transferred into the inquisitorial context, however, this criticism loses 
some of its cogency. The question of the style of judging which best 
promotes the aims of fairness, parity and compassion to the child-
For example, in France, certain judges (juges d ’instruction) are specifically 
charged with investigating matters so that the court which actually adjudicates on 
the case can be properly informed as to the facts. Children’s judges (Juges des 
enfants) fall into the other category -  i.e. judges who actually take decisions in 
individual cases -  but they have powers to instruct other bodies to investigate the 
child’s situation (eg the social services department, psychological and psychiatric 
examinations) before reaching a decision in a case. See Alain Grevot Voyage en 
Protection de L ’Enfance: Une Comparaison Européene (Vaucresson: Ministère de 
la Justice, 2001) at pp 63 - 64 
See, for example, Chiswick, supra, note 1
It has been noted, in relation to English law that ‘“one golden thread’ running 
tlrrough English criminal law is that the prosecution bears the burden of proving 
guilt.” Andrew Ashwoiih “Is the Criminal Law A Lost Cause?” 2000 LQR 225 at 
p 228, quoting Viscount Sankey LC in Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462
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accused, without losing sight of the public interest in justice being 
seen to be done, is also of relevance in relation to the formality of the 
proceedings, which will now be considered.
Fonnality
Certain action can be taken to reduce the formality, and the sense of 
intimidation which it may engender in a child-accused, on all 
occasions on which s/he appears in court. Wigs and gowns can be 
removed so that court persomiel are dressed normally. The child may 
be permitted to sit with his/her counsel at the table, rather than being 
required to stand in the dock.
Beyond that, however, there is little doubt that, in relation to an issue 
as important as the establishment of criminal liability, the procedure 
utilised should be as robust, in terms of fairness to the child-accused 
and respect for his/her rights, as possible. This applies in relation to 
all three aspects of the mental element and to the actus reus. In order 
to ensure that this is achieved, rigour in the gathering of evidence in 
the first place, and in its presentation to the court, is mandated.
The only real question arising here then is whether there is any scope 
to render such proceedings more child-centred without losing the 
procedural rigour. It is submitted that it might be possible to anange 
this either in relation to the child’s representation or in relation to the 
judicial role. The child will require a legal representative but s/he 
might also benefit fi'om a non-legally qualified interpreter or
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advocate^’ whose skills would lie in communicating with children 
but who would also have a sufficient knowledge of the criminal 
process to advise the child concerning it.^  ^ Such an individual could 
act as a conduit through which the child could obtain information 
about aspects of the proceedings which were incomprehensible to 
him/her and could feed relevant points back. A proposal of this 
nature would obviously create some difficulties, for example, with 
halting the fonnal proceedings to allow such side discussions to take 
place but, overall, the benefits to the child and to the court in 
satisfying itself that the child’s active participation was facilitated 
might outweigh the disadvantage.
Another possible means of infusing fonnal trial proceedings with 
child-centred practice, which could be used in conjunction with an 
inteipreter for the child, might be to have such cases heard by 
specially trained children’s judges or else to require the judge to sit 
with a member or members of the children’s panel.^^ Either proposal 
should ensure that the decision-maker did not lose sight of the status
The CRC recognises that assistance beyond that provided by a lawyer may be 
necessary to a child charged with a criminal offence. Art 40(2)(b)(ii) states, 
“[ejvery child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law has at least 
the following guarantees: ... to have legal or other appropriate assistance in the 
preparation and presentation of his or her defence.” (Emphasis added)
On the need for such a service generally, not only in the court setting, see 
Rosemary Gallagher / The Scottish Child Law Centre Children and Young 
People’s Voices: The Law, Legal Services, Systems and Processes in Scotland 
(Edinburgh: TSO, 1999) atp 35 
In France, for example, these measures are combined, at least in relation to minor 
offences committed by children, which are tried by a children’s judge (juge des 
enfants) assisted by two lay judges. For more serious offences three judges sit with 
nine jurors. See Brice Dickson Introduction to French Law (London: Pitman 
Publishing, 1994) at p 23
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of the accused as a child and, by extension, that efforts were made to 
draw the child in to the proceedings. At base, however, any 
imiovation to promote greater child-centredness would have to yield 
to protecting the child’s position procedurally, if the two came into 
conflict.
Finding of Partial Criminal Responsibilitv
Finally, before moving on to consider children’s hearings, it is
necessary to look briefly at the effect of a finding that the child has
some, but only some criminal responsibility. On this point, Peter
Cane has noted generally, in relation to adults also, that
“[djegrees of capacity to avoid incurring responsibility 
can be expressed as degrees of fault by penalising less 
harshly those of lesser capacity. The principle that 
punishment should be relative to individual fault is one 
source of misgivings about mandatory sentencing. This 
is not to say that the sentencing process is finely tuned 
to individual differences of capacity. Differences 
between the capacities of individuals may be difficult to 
observe and measure. The most courts can do is to give 
effect to the principle in a rough and ready way.” '^^
This statement highlights the fairness of the attempt to quantify 
capacity but, at the same time, the practical difficulties which any 
such exercise will encounter. It is, nonetheless, tme that one of the 
purposes of trying to assess the level of criminal capacity in 
individual cases is so that the sentence can be matched to the level of 
responsibility which the child was actually capable of taking for
Peter Cane Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart, 2002) at p 77
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his/her actions. If capacity has been fully investigated, the 
sentencing court will be well informed about the child’s 
responsibility and will be able both to take and to justify decisions on 
the basis of that infoimation. For example, the child whose 
understanding of the more remote consequences of hitting another 
with an implement (internal injury; disablement; death) is limited, 
will receive, with justification, a lesser sentence than the child who 
understands that these outcomes are possible but who attacks in the 
hope of causing one or more of them. More individualised, rational 
and defensible sentencing practice is perceived as one of the main 
benefits of the investigation into capacity.
To facilitate better sentencing, the court must also become more 
precise, and, as a consequence, less forensic, in the language which it 
uses to describe the acts which it has found the child to have 
committed. “Guilt” can no longer be used as an absolute term.^  ^
Before the child can be convicted, the Crown must prove the actus 
reus and mens rea beyond reasonable doubt. Following that 
determination, the child is still only criminally responsible for those 
aspects of the crime and its surrounding circumstances which s/he did 
understand. On the other hand, once the actus reus and the mens rea
Presumably in an attempt to avoid tlie consequences of criminal conviction for 
child-offenders, the CP(S)A 1995 s 165 already provides that, in summary 
proceedings, the words “conviction” and “sentence” are not to be used where the 
accused is a child but, instead, the court should refer to a “person found guilty of an 
offence”; a “finding of guilt” and an “order made upon such a finding”.
301
have been properly established, then even very little understanding 
will impute a degree of responsibility.
This, in turn, raises the issue of sentence. This is not a primary 
concern of this thesis which seeks, overall, to elucidate the prior issue 
of responsibility. Nonetheless, it remains important and there is no 
reason to think that the obligation on the court to have regard to the 
child-offender’s welfare^*  ^ is any less relevant at this stage in the 
process than at any other. The court currently has a wide aiTay of 
sentencing options for both adults and children ranging from 
admonisliment to, for children, detention without limit of time.^  ^ At 
sentencing, it is important that the court should weigh the child’s 
understanding, which it will have gone to some length to ascertain, as 
strongly as the offence itself. It is desirable that, if a custodial 
sentence is deemed necessary, it should also recognise a principle 
which has been used in relation to sentencing children in the English 
courts of “not impos[ing] a sentence which, the far end of it, would to 
young men [sic] like this seem completely out of sight.”^^
The current law on insanity removes the insane accused altogether 
from criminal sentencing (because s/he lacks the capacity to be 
“guilty” of a criminal offence) and provides, instead, for five possible 
disposals tailored to individuals with mental disorder whose actions
CP(S)A 1995 s 50(6)
See K V HMA 1993 SLT 237. The power to detain children convicted on 
indictment generally is found in the CP(S)A 1995, s 208 
R V Storey and Others (1984) 6 Cr App R (S) 104 at p 107. See also R v Roberts 
[1989] Crirn LR 521 and R v Simmons (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 801, at p 803
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demonstrate that there is need for the state to exercise control over 
them/^ Whilst children and the insane are not perceived as 
comparable in this respect, because the likelihood is that children will 
be able to take a measure of responsibility, this still raises the 
question of whether the court requires similar special powers when 
dealing with child-offenders. The absolute discharge^^ probably 
serves the same function as the power to “make no order” in insanity 
proceedings. In deciding if an absolute discharge is appropriate, the 
court might bear in mind the “age-crime curve” which demonstrates 
that, in the majority of cases, offending “reduc[es] to a relatively 
small percentage by age t w e n t y . T h i s  appears to be regardless of 
the interventions effected in the child offenders’ lives, whether these 
are punitive or therapeutic.
The court will, of course retain its power to refer a child who “pleads 
guilty to, or is found guilty of, an offence” to the hearings system.^^ 
Where it is considering imposing a probation order, the court would 
do well to bear this alternative in mind. Supervision requirements ai e 
administered by social workers specialising in children and families;
In summary these are: (1) detention in a (mental) hospital; (2) an order restricting 
liberty on release from such a hospital (similar to a life licence for released life 
prisoners); (3) an order placing the person’s personal welfare under the 
guardianship of the local authority or of a person approved by the local authority; 
(4) a supeiwision and treatment order; and (5) no order. CP(S)A 1995, s 57(2).
CP(S)A 1995, s 246. In summary proceedings, the coint does not even require to 
proceed to conviction before discharging the accused absolutely. In solemn 
proceedings, the absolute discharge is “instead of sentencing”.
Bill Whyte “Rediscovering Juvenile Delinquency” in Andrew Lockyer and 
Frederick H Stone Juvenile Justice in Scotland: Twenty-Five Years o f the Welfare 
Approach (Edinbiugh: T&T Clark, 1998) 199 atp 200 
^^CP(S)A 1995, s 49(1)
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probation orders by those on the criminal justice side. The latter are 
intended to be punitive; the former to be helpful. The court should 
weigh up the relative merits of each disposal. Of course, the 
children’s hearing to which the case is remitted retains the right to 
discharge the referraf^ if it takes the view that it would be better for 
the child that no order should be made,^ "^  and the court must also take 
that possibility into account.
Finally, on this point, children who plead guilty to, or are convicted 
of murder, cannot cunently be remitted to a children’s hearing 
because, where the sentence for a crime is fixed by law, section 49 of 
the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 is expressly disapplied.*^  ^
The sentence for murder where the accused is aged under eighteen is 
detention without limit of time.^^ Without seeking to enter the debate 
on the mandatory sentence for murder generally^^ it is submitted that, 
given the importance placed on the individuality of every child- 
offender in this thesis, it would be more appropriate to repeal this 
rule so that, in an appropriate case, the option of referral to a 
children’s hearing remains. Certain aspects of sentencing practice 
then, would be ripe for change in response to the matters raised in 
this thesis
Once a refenal is made to a children’s hearing, the jurisdiction of the court 
ceases: CP(S)A 1995, s 49(4)
C(S)A 1995, s 16(3)
CP(S)A 1995, s 49(5)
CP(S)A 1995 s 208(2)
See, for example. Lord Windlesham “Life Sentences: The Paradox of
Indeterminacy” 1989 Crim LR 244
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Children’s Hearings Procedure
Finally, in this chapter, it is necessary to consider certain aspects of 
the role of children’s hearings in dealing with children who offend. 
Chapter 1 demonstrated that where a child commits a heinous crime, 
this often engenders a public demand for a punitive response .This  
thesis advocates a more cautious approach which bases the decision 
taken as to the state’s response to the crime on an appraisal of the 
child’s actual understanding of his/her action. The two positions are 
likely to be particularly conflicted where the child-accused fails to 
satisfy the preconditions, and therefore camrot be tried, but where 
there appears to be sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable 
doubt that s/he carried out the actus reus with the necessary mens rea 
on the very thin concept of mens rea adopted by chapter 2.^  ^ hi these 
circumstances, it is submitted that the appropriate course of action 
would be to refer the child to a children’s hearing, although this 
would necessitate two modifications to the hearings system which 
will be discussed below. The alternative, which would be simply to 
discharge the child from all further proceedings because of his/her
See Barry Vaughan “The Government of Youth: Disorder and Dependence 2000 
Social and Legal Studies 9(3), 347, at p 360
This issue is demonstiated in the response to the attempted assassination of 
President Ronald Reagan in the United States by John W Hinckley in 1981. 
Hinckley was acquitted on the ground of insanity. Despite his subsequent 
detention in a mental hospital, the acquittal caused outcry and led to the abolition 
of the insanity defence in many American states. See Michael L Perlin The 
Jurisprudence o f the Insanity Defense (Durham NC: Carolina Academic Press, 
1994), particularly chapter 2
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inability to participate actively in the trial, fails altogether to respond 
to the public interest injustice being seen to be done and the need to 
retain public confidence in the criminal justice system/^
The two proposed changes to the hearings system are required 
because the concept of the mental element, and the procedural 
mechanisms for ascertaining it in court, which have been proposed in 
this thesis, could apply to a child of any age/^ Accordingly, for the 
sake of completeness, it is desirable that even a child aged seven or 
imder should be able to be refeiTed to a children’s hearing in the 
circumstance just outlined. The two proposals are generally desirable 
anyway, and would enhance the service which the system currently 
provides to children referred on the offence gi’ound if they were 
adopted, even in isolation from the rest of the proposals made here. 
Following the case of Merrin v no child under the age of eight 
can be referred to a children’s hearing on the ground that s/he has 
committed an offence.^^ As was noted in chapter 3, the court held 
that the substantive rule of Scots law that children below the age of 
criminal responsibility were unable to formulate dole or mens rea
The importance of this point can be illustrated by a case which occurred in May 
1993, in Sydney, Australia. A four-week old baby was killed by a three-and-a-half 
year old boy by dropping the baby down a flight of stairs and then dropping him 
off a table. The coroner’s court recommended eighteen months’ counselling for the 
older child’s whole family, but this could not be enforced and the family left the 
area having attended two sessions. Some of the newspaper commentary is 
concerned with the inability to take any compulsory action both from tire child’s 
point of view and that of the baby’s family. See “When a Child Kills” Good 
Weekend: TJte Sydney Morning Herald Magazine 8 June 1996, p 31 
Though, in practice, the age of criminal responsibility would operate to prevent 
the prosecution of a very young child.
1987 SLT 193 
C(S)A 1995,s52(2)(i)
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was of blanket application both to the court system and to the 
hearings. There was no scope to interpret the word “offence” 
differently, simply because a different procedure applied to it.^ '^
Lord Dunpark, however, dissented, taking the view that to construe 
the tenn “offence” without reference to the purpose of the children’s 
hearings system was to deny children whose offending behaviour 
indicated that they were in need of care and protection the benefits 
which the system could provide. In his opinion it would be artificial 
to require the Reporter to find another ground for referral under 
which the child could be referred if the true reason was offending 
behaviour. Despite accepting that Lord Dunpark was wrong in law, 
his overall point concerning the purpose seiwed by the children’s 
hearings system, was endorsed by John Grant at the time^  ^ and is 
equally valid today.
Welfare theory suggests that the offence is simply the trigger to the 
children’s hearings system. As discussed in chapter 4, the hearing 
considers the circumstances surrounding the offence, and the 
accused’s responsibility, in rather more detail than the pure theory 
suggests, but the ethos of the system -  that the overarching puipose is 
to meet the child’s needs and to act in his/her best interests -  applies 
to referrals on the offence gi'ound as much as to each of the other 
eleven gi'ounds. On the care and protection side, children’s hearings
See Lord Justice Clerk Ross, supra,note 72 at p 196
Jolm P Grant “The Under Age Offender” 1987 SLT (News) 337
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can deal with newborn children. It is submitted that there is only one 
reason not to extend their remit in relation to children who offend. 
This relates to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 and, as will 
be argued next, ought, in any event to be amended.
The Court of Session held, in the case of S v Miller^^  that a child 
refeiTcd to a children’s hearing on the offence ground is not ‘charged 
with a criminal offence’ in tenns of Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. One effect of the decision is that the 
protections which Article 6 accords to those charged with a criminal 
offence (such as a right to legal representation) do not apply, in all 
circumstances,^^ to children appearing before a children’s hearing on 
the offence gi'ound.^  ^ Despite this, S v Miller also endorses the 
continued application of section 3 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders 
Act 1974 to such children.^^ That section recognises the acceptance 
or establishment of a ground for referral under section 52(2)(i) of the 
Children (Scotland) Act 1995 as a conviction, albeit for the purpose 
of allowing it to become spent after a maximum of one year. The 
justification for endorsing this provision, given by the court, was that 
it conferred a benefit on the child, allowing him/her not to disclose
2001 SLT 531
Because the proceedings deal with a child’s civil rights under Article 6, however, 
s/he is now entitled to legal representation where any question of committal to 
secure accommodation arises and where the issues involved are complex. For a list 
of the circumstances in which the court in S v Miller thought that legal 
representation might be required see Joe Thomson Family Law in Scotland 
(Fdinburgh: Butterworths, 2002). For the actual rules as they passed into 
legislation see Children’s Hearings (Legal Representation) (Scotland) Rules 2001 
(SSI 2001/478)
78 S v  Miller, supra, note 76, at pp. 536K -  540J, 552C - 557H, 565D -  576F 
7*SvM iller,supra, note 76, at 5381 -  539E, 553D, G-H, 5741 - L
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the matter after the conviction had become spent. In fact, however, it 
is submitted that the better course of action would be to legislate to 
disapply the 1974 Act to children’s hearings altogether. This would 
place children refened on the offence ground on exactly the same 
footing as those who are subject to supervision requirements after 
referral on any of the other eleven grounds. Allowing children’s 
hearings proceedings to lead to a “conviction”, in any sense, is unfair 
where the child has not had access to the ‘due process’ rights which 
proceedings in a criminal court automatically attract.
These innovations would also require a change in the wording of s 
52(2)(i) because, if the proceedings are to be entirely civil and not to 
lead to a “conviction,” it is no longer appropriate to state that “the 
child has committed an offence.” A possible alternative might be: 
“the child has committed an act which would have constituted a 
criminal offence but for the age of the child and/or the application to 
him of children’s hearings procedure” ®^. The “age” points covers the 
child aged under the age of criminal responsibility. For an older 
child, who could have been prosecuted, the fact that s/he has been 
referred to a children’s hearing removes him/her from the criminal 
sphere.
See Merrin v S supra, note 72„ per Lord Dunpark at p. 1981.
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Conclusion
All of the measures outlined in this chapter are required in order to 
secure the provision of fair, compassionate and equal treatment to all 
child-accused, whilst retaining the criminal justice system’s natural 
focus on the public interest and the retention of public confidence. 
Cases involving children who commit serious crimes are inlierently 
difficult and often distressing. The best approach is to respond to the 
child-accused as a whole person, taking account of his/her inlierent 
immaturity and the difficulties which this presents in tenns of 
understanding. It is, self-evidently, possible, if paradoxical, to be 
both a child and a criminal simultaneously. The legal system fails 
children if it caimot respond to the challenge thereby presented.
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